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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation explores the intersection of two major developments in global 
environmental governance: the vision for a Green Economy and the growing influence of 
non-state actors. The work draws on multi-sited thick description to analyze how 
relationships between the state, market, and civil society are being reoriented towards 
global problems. Its focus is a non-binding agreement between California and Chiapas to 
create a market in carbon offsets credits for Reducing Emissions for Deforestation and 
forest Degradation (REDD). The study draws on three bodies of scholarship. From the 
institutionalist study of global environmental politics, it uses the ideas of orchestration, 
civil regulation, and private entrepreneurial authority to identity emerging alignments of 
state and non-state actors, premised on an exchange of public authority and private 
expertise. From concepts borrowed from science and technology studies, it inquires into 
the production, certification, and contestation of knowledge. From a constitutionalist 
perspective, it analyzes how new forms of public law and private expertise are reshaping 
foundational categories such as territory, authority, and rights. The analysis begins with 
general research questions applied to California and Chiapas, and the international space 
where groups influential in these sites are also active: 1) Where are new political and 
legal institutions emerging, and how are they structured? 2) What role does scientific, 
legal, and administrative expertise play in shaping these institutions, and vice versa? And 
3) How are constitutional elements of the political order being reoriented towards these 
new spaces and away from the exclusive domain of the nation-state? The dissertation 
offers a number of propositions for combining institutionalist and constructivist 
approaches for the study of complex global governing arrangements. It argues that this 
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can help identify constitutional reconfigurations that are not readily apparent using either 
approach alone. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
I. Introduction 
Sporting a green tie and disarming charm, California’s Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger 
delivered a message of sub-national leadership to the 15th Conference of the Parties 
(COP) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in December 
2009.1 The Governor implored the delegates arrayed in Copenhagen to flip the climate 
problem on its head. If Kyoto “made us think differently about the world”, he said, then 
Copenhagen presented the “opportunity to think differently again.” Rather than look to 
the 115 heads of state gathered for the most anticipated climate summit in years, the 
solution, he quipped, lay in tales of transformation told by a statue sitting atop a rock in 
the city’s harbor: 
 
In the harbor there is the Little Mermaid, the statue based on the Hans Christian 
Andersen fairy tale. When I was a boy in Austria, the Andersen fairy tale that I 
always liked best was The Ugly Duckling. And looking back, I think the reason 
that I liked it was because it was a tale of transformation and that spoke to me 
inside. I have always believed in the tremendous power of personal 
transformation. 
 
The desire, the hope, the desperate need for planetary transformation is what 
brought us together here. And the question is: is this also a fairy tale? Is it a 
                                            
1 Transcript of Schwarzenegger’s speech at COP 15 December 2009, available at 
http://blogs.kqed.org/climatewatch/2009/12/15/schwarzeneggers-speech-in-copenhagen/ 
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dream? Is it a false hope? And if it is not, how do we make it real? Is that 
something that we ought to discuss?  
 
Much like how Schwarzenegger himself muscled his way from a small village in rural 
Austria to govern the most populous state of the most powerful country on Earth, states 
and provinces like California are asserting themselves to become unlikely leaders guiding 
the world forward to a sustainable future. Encapsulating the vision, Schwarzenegger 
assumed a near-prophetic tone, extolling the transformative force of technology and 
economics: 
 
I believe technological and economic forces will overtake the political and the 
regulatory efforts of national governments. We are beginning one of history’s 
great transitions – the transition to a new economic foundation for the 21st 
century and beyond. 
 
The transformative vision is not Schwarzenegger’s alone. His successor, Governor Jerry 
Brown, has eagerly taken the mantle, signing a raft of Memoranda of Understanding 
(MOUs) on environment and trade with national and sub-national partners at home and 
abroad. Among the most noteworthy is the Under 2 MOU, a non-binding agreement 
signed in Sacramento in May 2015 among 12 states and provinces in Brazil, Canada, 
Germany, Mexico, Spain, UK, and the US to work together to limit their greenhouse gas 
emissions in line with a 2 degree Celsius warming threshold.2 Together the members 
                                            
2 The founding signatories are: U.S. states of California, Oregon, Washington and 
3 
represent 100 million people and $4.5 trillion in GDP. Senior officials from the UN and 
World Bank lauded the agreement as a major milestone for the climate negotiations, and 
UNFCCC Executive Secretary Christiana Figueres assured the group an unprecedented 
spot on the main agenda at the Paris COP. 
 In this vision, technology and economics, not politics and regulation, betoken a new 
paradigm of global environmental governance that is to supersede the top-down model 
envisioned at the birth of the UNFCCC and other Rio Conventions in 1992. And it will 
do so by metamorphosing a motley assortment of sub-national players into global leaders 
worthy of Christensen’s beautiful swan. Yet, this vision to upturn a staid but stagnant 
international order is partial at best, for it assumes a stark divide between technology and 
economics on the one hand and politics and regulation on the other. 
 In The Politics of Green Transformation, Ian Scoones, Melissa Leach, and Peter 
Newell (2015) raise critical questions about the growing call to belatedly realize the 
changes hoped for at Rio over two decades ago. They caution that green can mean many 
things, leading down divergent paths with wildly different roles for markets, technology, 
knowledge, publics, and the state. Despite the allure of progress through the autonomous, 
globalizing force of technology and economics, resolving these differences is inherently 
political, prompting the authors to stress, “Understanding of politics is important in 
explaining which pathways get supported and legitimated.” California’s drive to govern 
from the bottom-up is emblematic of this larger and little understood transformation. 
                                                                                                                                  
Vermont; the Canadian provinces of British Columbia and Ontario; the Mexican states of 
Baja California and Jalisco; the Brazilian state of Acre; and in Europe, Baden-
Württemberg, Germany; Catalonia, Spain; and Wales, UK. Under2MOU website: 
http://under2mou.org/ 
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 The dissertation is a study of the politics of global green transformation along two 
key axes. The first is the idea of the ‘green economy’, which has come to dominate the 
discourse on sustainable development. More specifically, the dissertation focuses on 
carbon markets, which are a common theme in the green economy, in particular the 
proposal to keep tropical forests standing by conferring to their carbon financial value. 
That proposal, called Reducing Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+), is one 
major thread of this study. The second is the move towards a model of ‘transnational new 
governance’ where a top-down model based on treaties between nation-states is giving 
way to networked governance characterized by decentralized public and private actors 
and institutions, dispersed expertise, and voluntary commitments and other forms of soft 
law (Abbott and Snidal 2009). Here, I focus on efforts to bring REDD+ into California’s 
carbon market, through case studies on activities in and around a sub-national partnership 
spearheaded by California called the Governors’ Climate and Forests Task Force. 
 The next two sections provide more background on these two threads. The chapter 
then introduces sections on key research questions to the study of green transformation, 
theoretical orientation, and methodology. It closes with a summary of the study’s 
conclusions and a review of each of the following five chapters. 
 
II. Background 
II.1. REDD+ and the Green Economy 
In the few short years following the 2007-2008 financial crisis, the green economy rose 
from relative academic obscurity to become the dominant frame for sustainable 
development. In 2012, the UN Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) made 
5 
the green economy one of its two core themes and a central part of the Rio+20 outcome 
document, titled The Future We Want. Twenty years earlier the original Earth Summit in 
Rio, the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), helped 
mainstream the idea of sustainable development, famously defined in the 1986 
Brundtland Commission Report as “development that meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” 
 The resulting model for a green transformation—in the climate, biodiversity, and 
desertification conventions, Agenda 21, and global environmental governance more 
broadly—was largely a top-down managerial one, increasingly politicized over national 
and economic interests, and bogged down in growing bureaucracy (Scoones et al. 2015). 
Rio was supposed to transcend old tensions between the environment, development of the 
Global South, and continued growth of the Global North, but these tensions could not be 
stamped out and appeared with renewed vigor following the great financial crisis of 
2007-2008. 
 The win-win discourse of the green economy, however, promised not only a 
palliative but a transformational response to ecological and financial crises alike (Bina 
2013, Jessop 2012). The term dates back at least to the 1989 publication of Blueprint for 
a Green Economy by two environmental economists (Pierce & Barbier 1989). It is 
impossible to pin the term down to a single meaning, but, in general, it envisions ‘green 
growth’ through some mix of technological innovation, market mechanisms, and state-led 
support for green jobs, public-private partnerships, and fiscal stimulus (Scoones et al. 
2015). To take one prominent example, in 2009 the UN Environment Programme 
6 
(UNEP) put forward a Global Green New Deal as a Keynesian response to the twin crisis 
for the planet and the economy. 
 As part of its vision, UNEP also championed REDD+ as a pillar of the green 
economy, which included, among others, a ‘Global Symposium on REDD+ in a Green 
Economy’ and a report on Integrating REDD+ into a Green Economy Transition (2013). 
REDD+ was introduced into the international climate negotiations in 2005 under the 
original moniker reducing emissions from deforestation (RED). Forests have 
conventionally served sawmills and cooking stoves, but the proposal to value forests not 
for the products that come out of them but for the carbon that stays in quickly gained 
traction, making REDD+ one of the few items of broad agreement in the climate 
negotiations. 
 Yet, many were not so sure markets in forest carbon were possible, and many 
others downright opposed them. Skeptical economists balked at the complexity of putting 
such a scheme in place, while activists charged that REDD+ puts the rights of the market 
over the rights of people and nature. One organization framed REDD+ as a battle over the 
world’s biomass, grouping it with biofuels and biotechnology in a broader struggle over 
the “Bio-economy versus Biodiversity” (Global Forest Coalition 2012). Thus, REDD+ 
has become a debate over not only the pragmatics of forest management but also the 
structural, or ‘constitutional’ changes in markets, the state, citizens, and science in global 
society (Ackerman 1992, Jasanoff 2002). 
 This dissertation is partly a study of the open moral struggles for and against the 
green economy. But it also finds pressing moral tensions in the technical and economic 
details of the green economy itself. Policy-makers, practitioners, academics, and activists 
7 
too often overlook these details, which lead down very different pathways with 
constitutional implications involving globalization and the proper role of markets, 
technology, and the state. 
 REDD+ is a particularly good illustration of why it is important to attend to these 
details. Although almost all proposals for REDD+ seek to place a financial value on 
forest carbon, not all propose to do so through carbon markets. REDD+’s close 
association with markets, especially markets based on local forest conservation projects, 
is more an historical outcome than a feature inherent to REDD+ itself. Over the course of 
the debate, many countries, Brazil foremost among them, have favored a version of 
REDD+ based on an international fund of some sort, which would issue performance-
based payments to compensate countries for emission reductions. The dissertation 
elaborates on why the details of these various proposals matter greatly, especially in the 
ways they configure scale, risk, and finance for the green economy. California’s REDD+ 
efforts are especially important in this regard because they aim to make new channels for 
finance possible by rendering the sub-national scale into a legible space for global 
governance, a topic to which we turn in the next section (Scott 1998). 
 
II.2. Sub-national Leadership for Green Transformation 
In November of 2010, the sub-national vision for a green economy was on display for 
two days as 1500 thought leaders, administrators, practitioners, and business people from 
80 states and provinces around the world convened in Davis, California for the third 
Governor’s Global Climate Summit (GGCS3). Held in advance of COP16 the summit 
brought hopes of delivering sub-national leadership under the theme ‘Building the Green 
8 
Economy’ to high-level international climate negotiations deadlocked since the lackluster 
outcomes of the previous year in Copenhagen. 
 The Governors’ Global Climate Summit embodied this network and its role as a 
trading zone between enterprising sub-national states and provinces and influential 
transnational players. To situate these cross-scalar connections between sub-national 
governments and the global green economy, it is important to examine the growing 
network of diverse actors engaging global problems at the sub-national level. UNEP with 
its own program for a green economy was notably on the agenda, alongside other 
international organizations like the UN Development Programme (UNDP), World Bank, 
and Asian Development Bank. International science-policy luminaries like 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) head Rajendra Pachauri, were 
present and even, via satellite uplink, UK Prime Minister David Cameron. Financiers and 
businesses also had a big presence, including BMW and Chevron, Cisco Systems, Frito-
Lay, Veolia Transportation, and the International Chamber of Commerce. 
 The Summit’s thoroughly transnational roster underscores that sub-national 
leadership drew support from powerful transnational organizations, bypassing the 
sanction or request of national governments. While hosted by the governors of four states 
in the Western Climate Initiative—California, Michigan, Washington, and Oregon—
specialized UN agencies, international financial institutions, and private corporations 
added legitimacy and institutional support to the allies they saw in at the sub-national 
level. Organizations like UNDP, for instance, increasingly call for the rapid 
implementation of climate responses on the ground, with the agency estimating that 50-
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80 percent of climate mitigation and adaptation actions must be implemented at sub-
national or local levels of governance. 
 The most significant project launched at GGCS3 was the R20, or Regions of 
Climate Action—a partnership of sub-national governments, international organizations 
and financial institutions, NGOs, businesses, and academic institutions. The model for 
regional climate governance carried on this theme of devolving global governance 
downwards, which is perhaps most widely known through the C40 Cities Climate 
Leadership Group. Founded in 2005 by the former Mayor of London, Ken Livingstone. 
By 2015, the group counted over 75 cities as members, representing over 500 million 
people and one-quarter of the world economy.3 
 R20 was modeled in part on C40, with a focus on sharing expertise, information, 
and best practices for climate action outside and in advance of the international climate 
negotiations. Looking for alternatives to the deadlock in international climate policy, the 
R20 presented itself an “An innovative sub-national private-public alliance that will 
implement concrete actions to solve climate change and build the global green 
economy.”4 Speaking at the Summit, Governor Schwarzenegger described an imperative 
to link urgency and innovation: 
 
We can’t afford to wait for national and international movement….The role of 
sub-national governments is more important than ever, and California has shown 
that state and regional governments can institute policies that will grow the green 
economy, create jobs and clean our environment. With this unprecedented level of 
                                            
3 C40 website: http://www.c40.org/ 
4 R20 website:  http://regions20.org/about-r20 
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cooperation and collaboration, the Regions of Climate Action will continue this 
leadership around the world and will help influence national and international 
action. 
 
C40 mirrors these goals, and the role of cities in global environmental governance is a 
growing area of interest in scholarship on global environmental politics (Aust 2015, 
Betsill & Bulkeley 2006, Johnson 2015, Lee 2014). The literature tends to focus on sub-
national networks for sharing knowledge and practices for developing and implementing 
policies and projects. How knowledge and practices take shape, help shape, and travel 
through these global networks, however, has received less attention. Moreover, the 
scholarship has had less to say about the 3000 regional states and provinces in the world, 
which carry important differences for understanding networked environmental 
governance. In federal systems, for instance, states and provinces carry distinct 
constitutional and law-making authority, and often act as intermediaries between central 
and local governments. Moreover, states and provinces encompass not only cities but also 
the rural, agricultural, mining and wilderness areas implicated in a great many 
environmental issues.  
 The dissertation addresses these two themes—of the unique role of states and 
provinces, and the shaping of global knowledge and practice—with a focus on a related 
initiative spearheaded by California for REDD+. Of all REDD+ initiatives, the 
Governors’ Climate & Forests Task Force (GCF) is unique for being a partnership of sub-
national states and provinces. The governors of the nine states and provinces in the US, 
Indonesia, and Brazil that launched the partnership in early 2009 did so outside the 
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official recognition or support of the global climate negotiations, international 
organizations, or even their own central governments. Their mission was not to reach 
high-level political agreements but to create a platform and shared performance metric 
for measuring and circulating the financial value of carbon stored in tropical forests. To 
justify this endeavor, the GCF underscored the role states and provinces could play as 
places to test and refine REDD+ infrastructure and the authority sub-national 
governments often had over forest governance through the provision of rural services, 
law enforcement, land-use zoning, and the titling of land. 
 The GCF emerged from the first Governors’ Global Climate Summit in Los 
Angeles in November 2008. At the time, REDD+ was quickly rising to prominence in the 
international climate negotiations and passage of climate legislation in the US appeared 
increasingly likely, presenting an attractive opening for the governors attending the 
Summit to get ahead of the curve with programs of their own. Sub-national carbon 
markets being designed in California and proposed in Illinois and Wisconsin offered one 
way to do this, leading these states to sign MOUs with Aceh and Papua in Indonesia and 
Amapá, Amazonas, Mato Grosso, and Pará in Brazil to facilitate cooperation for 
financing, climate policy, research, and technology exchange, with an emphasis on 
reducing emissions from tropical deforestation. 
 At the 2010 Governors’ Global Climate Summit, the heads of three GCF 
members—California, Acre, Brazil, and Chiapas, Mexico—announced their commitment 
to work together towards the creation of a common carbon market for REDD+. 
California’s nascent carbon market provided the impetus for the agreement. California 
was the closest of any political jurisdiction in the world to bringing REDD+ into a 
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government-mandated carbon market. (A mandatory, also known as a compliance or 
regulated carbon market, caps emissions among regulated entities, as opposed to a 
voluntary market where companies, individuals, governments, or other buyers purchase 
credits for self-defined purposes.)  
 The California Air Resources Board (ARB) had expressed significant interest in 
incorporating REDD+ offsets into the cap-and-trade program it was designing in accord 
with the landmark Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (AB32), which would make 
California’s compliance market the world’s first to accept REDD+ credits. The act 
designates ARB as the regulatory authority for implementing measures to bring 
California’s greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by 2020. In December 2008, the 
agency released its initial Climate Change Scoping Plan, laying out an array of an 
measures to achieve these reductions, including fuel efficiency standards, renewable 
energy targets, and the world’s first economy-wide cap-and-trade program. The Scoping 
Plan points to the potential for state-provincial partnerships to advance the international 
policy debate by delivering early climate action in developing countries. These include 
shared performance standards and benchmarks, and sectoral agreements designed to 
promote low-carbon growth. The plan endorses working with REDD+ partners in Brazil, 
Indonesia, and beyond to establish “sustainable financing mechanisms to support eligible 
forest carbon activities in the developing world.”5 
 By 2015, GCF members were designing and implementing forest provisions in 26 
member states and provinces from the US, Spain, Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, and 
Peru, representing over 20% of tropical forests worldwide, and over 50% and 75% of 
                                            
5 ARB (2008). Climate Change Scoping Plan: A Framework for Change. 
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/document/adopted_scoping_plan.pdf. 
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tropical forests in Indonesia and Brazil respectively (Figure 1). While international 
initiatives and negotiations drew attention over REDD+ at the global level, and voluntary 
projects drew attention locally, the GCF expanded its technical and administrative work 
with little fanfare into the unoccupied sub-national space. The partnership garnered 
modest support from prominent donors interested in innovating REDD+ outside the 
obvious channels, such as the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation, David and Lucile 
Packard Foundation, Google Earth Outreach, and the Norwegian Agency for 
Development Cooperation (NORAD). 
 
 
Figure 1. States and Provinces of the GCF. 
 
 The GCF illustrates the complex social, political, and epistemic process of making 
the green economy, as well as emerging forms of sub-national governance and their ties 
to existing global governance regimes. Practitioners, as well as scholars, are beginning to 
realize the need to understand sub-national market making efforts on their own terms. 
When the preeminent Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) established its 
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REDD+ research program, for example, it initially focused on three areas: international 
negotiations, national strategies, and local livelihoods. Only later did it realize the need to 
include sub-national initiatives as the “missing part”, prompting the organization to 
describe the GCF as the “strongest example” of innovations to advance “subnational 
jurisdictional programs [that] can move forward with actions that leverage forests for 
climate change mitigation even as international negotiations continue at a slow pace”. 
 The thickening web of sub-national and supranational actors of the GCF, R20, and 
GGCS, reveals a green economy being built by a variety of policy entrepreneurs, expert 
communities, government decision-makers, and carbon market proponents as they traffic 
expertise, institutions, norms, ideas, and practices between sub-national and global 
spaces. Thus, emerging forms and processes of transnational new governance for the 
green economy at the sub-national level cannot be understood in isolation or opposition 
from existing regimes of global environmental governance. 
 The dissertation is therefore divided into two parts. The first part, following the 
introduction, recounts how REDD+ developed outside of the GCF at a global level in the 
international climate negotiations and voluntary carbon market promoted by conservation 
groups and carbon market entrepreneurs. The second half of the dissertation looks at how 
subsequent policy efforts unfolded sub-nationally, with a focus on California and 
Chiapas. 
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III. The Argument: The Challenge Green Transformation 
III.1. Purpose 
The purpose of the dissertation is to empower deliberate action by contributing to a 
vocabulary for talking about global environmental governance in a politically meaningful 
way, which inevitably means talking about economics and technology too. 
 The point is not simply that all things are political. To politicize one thing is to 
depoliticize another. Attention’s finitude—“the act or state of applying the mind to 
something”—is a fact of life. If we accept an expansive view of power as that which 
forces, prevents, or maintains order, the initial rush one might have in unmasking power 
everywhere, quickly gives way to confusion, banality, or, most ironically, the 
powerlessness of apathy—unless guided by principles of some sort for sifting away the 
chaff.  
 Considering the ubiquity of “green economy” and “political economy”, the phrase 
“green political economy” is in surprisingly short use. Activists and progressive-minded 
scholars usually present it as a model or an ideal—“a normatively compelling and policy-
relevant path to outlining a ‘green political economy’ to underpin sustainable 
development (Barry & Doran 2006). 
 I support this goal, but it is not mine here. I aim to sharpen the critical tools needed 
for goals like this to make sense of contemporary shifts in global environmental 
governance and, if possible, articulate their claims in a way that can be heard and acted 
upon. Thus, my motivation is to better ask and answer a general question: What kind of 
politics and knowledge for what kind of power? 
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 Other writing on “governing the green economy” or “green economy governance” 
likewise treat it as an aspirational program but one that is already well underway. 
Specialized UN agencies like UNEP and expressly international policy organizations like 
the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) describe “enabling 
conditions”6 and actionable steps, usually countries, can take through capacity building, 
policies, laws, finance, expertise, and stakeholder engagement to foster the good 
governance needed for a transition to the green economy. 
 Again, my purpose is different. The dissertation grapples with how the vision for a 
green economy is already ushering institutional and epistemic change, and even altering 
the very definition of “the state”, “the market”, and “civil society" (Swyngedouw 2005, 
Taylor 2003). This is not an abstract exercise because how those entities are defined—as 
the three basic spheres of society as we know it in the modern nation-state—touch on 
basic, constitutional questions, such as: Who has a right to property or civil protections? 
Who can speak as an authoritative expert in public decision-making? And what 
responsibilities does the state have to its citizens? 
 Much of this work is taking place outside of the national and international 
institutions of government that have been the hallmark of political theory and science and 
technology studies (STS). In the following sections I highlight the main theoretical 
findings of this study, which aim to add to a vocabulary for engaging global governance 
of the green economy in deliberate and meaningful ways. The subsequent sub-section 
outlines the narrative arc of the empirical material in the remaining chapters. 
 
                                            
6 Bass, S. (2013). Scoping a Green Economy. IIED, London. http://pubs.iied.org/16554IIED 
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III.2. Main Theoretical Findings 
 
At the intersection of the green economy and transnational new governance, the 
dissertation is a study in complexity. REDD+ is in many ways the poster child of this 
intersection and an ideal model of complex, network governance. REDD+ is 
characterized by: 
 
• Episodic interactions of different actors as they move between institutional roles 
and sites 
• Processes and problem frames across multiple scales 
• Institutions in flux 
• Contested scientific knowledge 
• Disputed values 
• Ill-defined political, legal, and scientific categories 
• Relationships that grow in geometric proportion to number and diversity of actors 
 
The case material demonstrates all of these qualities in spades. This poses a theoretical 
and methodological challenge to the analyst looking for solid ground. But it is also what 
makes case material like that examined here, so interesting and pressing. Therefore, in 
line with my stated purpose, I aim to contribute to a mode of theoretical and 
methodological inquire that sharpens our faculty to speak about the transformations of 
governance in politically meaningfully ways. To this end, I forward several propositions 
gleaned from the dissertation: 
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1) Focusing on ‘Hot and Cool Sites’ of Institutional and Epistemic Change: As the 
number, diversity, and connections of actors grows, deductive analyses of sites and 
structures grow increasingly strained. While state hierarchies might pose the analyst the 
challenge of unearthing state secrets and hidden interests, networked arrangements swing 
the pendulum in the opposite direction. It is a relative difference, of course, but the 
desired information on actors’ whereabouts and actions is, in networked arrangements, 
often available though difficult to track and interpret. I suggest turning these theoretical 
and methodological liabilities into a strength. This requires a shift in focus from 
explaining how institutions shape knowledge or how knowledge reconfigures institutions 
to inquire into institutional and epistemic change across multiple sites. The former 
questions remain important, although seen in relation to broader network dynamics, open 
possibilities for action and investigation, which I elaborate in the following propositions.  
 
Example: Strictly comparative methodologies are ill-suited to the current cases of 
Chiapas and California because the states are so politically and economically different, 
and their REDD+ policies so closely linked. Yet, to forge a stable relationship, the states 
must hold certain forms of political and expert authority constant, while reconfiguring 
others to harmonize policy and practice across borders.  
 
2) A Keener Sense of Institutional-Epistemic Change Across Sites is Itself a Capability: A 
central concept in the dissertation is that, in a very general sense, actors have capabilities 
that they can exercise in different sites, under specific circumstances, and in certain 
institutional roles. As a result, actors able to recognize where institutions and knowledge 
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are in stable configurations or in flux and who can act on that recognition tend to be more 
influential across the network. In this sense, an awareness of ‘hot and cold sites’ of 
change is a capability to cultivate other capabilities. Analysts or practitioners must 
therefore fit their terms tactically to the right register, even while thinking in terms of a 
wider stratagem. 
 
Example: Private standard-setters in the voluntary carbon market were able to reassert the 
status of local forest conservation projects in REDD+ after national governments 
excluded them over concerns about sovereignty and technical uncertainty when 
negotiating the rules for the Clean Development Mechanism. They did this through a 
combination of political work outside the negotiations and devising carbon accounting 
innovations that reconciled carbon accounting across scales. 
 
3) Reading Institutionalist and Constructivist Analyses Together Across Multiple Sites 
Can be an ‘Early Indicator’ of Constitutional Change: The first two propositions might 
be thought of as addressing ‘faster level’ institutional-epistemic change—the first in 
regard to the overall shape and dynamics of a network, and the second relative to the 
position and capabilities of particular actors in that network. The third proposition 
addresses those ‘constitutional’ aspects that tend to change more slowly. To this end, I 
attempt to use the case material to sketch the outlines of an explanatory framework that 
might be gainfully refined to chart emerging global governing arrangements where 
institutionalist and constructivist approaches run into difficulties because institutions and 
knowledge are in simultaneous flux. 
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The theoretical investigation of the material proceeds as follows: The first two chapters 
identify international environmental laws for REDD+ and private expertise in the carbon 
market as two areas of rapid institutional and epistemic change at the global scale. The 
subsequent three chapters trace the movement of global institutions, knowledge, and 
institutions examined in chapters two and three into the sub-national scale. (See Sections 
III.3. and VII. for details on individual chapters). Tracing the movement and 
configuration of actors, institutions, and knowledge across scales brings into relief subtle 
constitutional shifts that escape global-centric analyses. I argue that a multi-scale 
approach does so because of the dynamism that arises when global knowledge and policy 
frames are introduced and negotiated deep within the nation-state. (It is important to note 
that the decision to frame the analysis in this way was the outcome of an iterative multi-
sited approach, not a decision built into the research design.)     
 
Example: Concerns about local air pollution and the veracity of carbon offsets led the 
environmental justice community in California to issue a legal challenge to regulators in 
an effort to eliminate or severely curtail the use of carbon offsets in the state’s cap-and-
trade program. The groups charged that regulators exceeded their legislative mandate by 
issuing offset credits to projects that did not reduce carbon emissions. The Court decided 
in regulators’ favor, citing significant regulatory expert authority. A transnational 
perspective, however, tells a more complicated story given regulators’ dependence on the 
expertise of a much wider network of private actors hold and have embodied in the 
standards goals that may only partially align with those of public agencies. 
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4) Transposition Does Not Equal Transformation (or the More Things Change, the More 
They Stay the Same): Finally, the dissertation advances an approach for evaluating the 
politics of green transformation (Scoones et al. 2015). I do not further explore the idea 
here but propose that the dissertation’s multi-scale approach for analyzing institutional 
and epistemic change could be used to contrast transposition with genuine 
transformation. In mathematics, transposition is defined as a permutation that occurs 
through the exchange of two elements while others stay fixed. This is not what is meant 
by green transformation, which envisions more thoroughgoing structural change. In the 
metaphor I propose here, this would amount to the transposition (and thus extension 
rather than transformation) of existing hierarchies through horizontal means. This 
introduces novel democratic concerns because these emerging forms of global 
governance lack the accountability mechanisms that, in principle, constrain the arbitrary 
exercise of power in the liberal democratic nation-state (see Miller 2007, 2008; Chayes & 
Chayes 1998).  
 
III.3. Narrative Arc 
Two central threads run through the dissertation: the making of global laws and global 
knowledge to govern environmental problems through REDD+. The dissertation seeks to 
complicate the REDD+ narrative found in most policy discussions and scholarship, 
which typically targets specific items on the REDD+ policy agenda, such as safeguards, 
carbon accounting, or financial mechanisms. This narrative tends to separate scientific 
and policies issues from one another (when in reality they are hybridized) or isolates 
specific organizations, governments, or groups within the nation-state or international 
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sphere (see Miller 2001a). Alternatively, policy and scholarship focuses on REDD+ 
implementation at the local level (and, at times, the interactions between the local and 
national levels), for example, in much of the very insightful though locally- and 
nationally-bound studies of political ecology (see Osborne 2013). Instead, I forward an 
alternative narrative in order to make sense of REDD+ as an emerging form of global 
governance. (The text in this section highlights empirical material in the chapters; for 
their connection to theoretical issues, see Section VII. For a timeline see Table 1). 
 The empirical and theoretical material for the dissertation falls into two parts. Part I 
(Chapters 2 and 3) provides an account of the development of REDD+ rules in the 
UNFCCC and technical accounting proposals in the voluntary carbon market. Part II 
(Chapters 4-6) explores how the actors and ideas that initially emerged in the 
international deliberations were subsequently reconfigured at the sub-national level in 
California and Chiapas. 
 It is important to stress that these cases should be thought of as transects or probes 
across a complex, dynamic, and ill-defined network. The intent is not to map the full suite 
of relationships among actors or follow any single issue or site. Rather, I aim to identify 
key moments where configurations of knowledge, law, territory, authority, and rights are 
made and unmade around the running theme of market-making in California and 
Chiapas. 
 Chapter 2 gives an historical account of the development of REDD+ rules and 
knowledge in the UNFCCC. The first part of the chapter presents an overview of the 
international deliberations leading to a set of methodologies and guidelines for 
implementing REDD+ known as the REDD+ Rulebook. The chapter describes how the 
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Parties and international organizations ostensibly responsible for implementing REDD+ 
relied on private sector expertise. Specifically, the chapter ties global law-making in the 
UNFCCC to three technical carbon accounting proposals that private actors devised 
between the late-1990s and 2007. The chapter highlights how these technical proposals 
sought to calculate carbon emissions at different scales, which carried significant but 
underappreciated implications for the interpretation and implementation of global 
environmental law.  
 Chapter 3 moves to the voluntary carbon market, in which private actors around the 
world advanced the proposals for local forest offset projects outlined in Chapter 2. 
Conservationists, project developers, and fellow market proponents invested significant 
technical, institutional, and financial resources in building a voluntary market in hopes of 
persuading governments to legislate a much larger compliance market. The chapter 
recounts how these efforts consolidated expertise in transnational private networks, most 
notably the Verified Carbon Standard (VCS). Through a series of detailed cases, the 
chapter argues that the consolidation of private expertise required standards that met the 
demands of private-sector investors and project developers—demands that made the 
content of those standards different from the content required by governments alone.   
 Chapter 4 introduces the first of three chapters on market-making for REDD+ in 
California and Chiapas, exploring key meetings and advisory processes where 
jurisdictional and nested proposals for REDD+ were discussed by government and 
private actors. The chapter also provides an overview of California’s cap-and-trade 
regulations, and their connection to proposed REDD+ offsets. 
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 Chapter 5 recounts the cancelation of Governor Sabines’ signature REDD+ project. 
It then examines key sites in both California and Chiapas where private authority was 
established and tested in public institutions. These are: mapping efforts in the Lacandon 
rainforest; tensions between Chiapas and the central government of Mexico over 
REDD+; the representation of carbon market expertise in California; and a judicial 
challenge to California regulators’ authority to issue carbon offsets. 
 Chapter 6, like Chapter 5, traces key sites where market-making established new 
forms of rights while curtailing others. These include: procedural grievance mechanisms, 
the formulation of forest communities as stakeholders, environmental justice legislation 
designed to restrict offsets to California, and the social dimensions of carbon mapping in 
the Lacandon. 
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Table 1. Timeline of Major Events (Relevant chapter in roman numerals) 
 
DATE EVENT 
 
1997 Scolel'Te project launches carbon payments to farmers in Chiapas (II)  
 
Dec-1997 Kyoto Protocol adopted, paves way for project offsets in Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) (II)  
 
2001 Legislature establishes California Climate Action Registry, precursor to 
Climate Action Reserve (CAR) (IV) 
 
Apr-2001 Marrakech Accords Reach CDM Rules, Exclude Avoided Deforestation (II)  
 
Nov-2001   Avoided deforestation projects excluded from CDM in Marrakesh Accords (II)  
 
2003  California, Oregon, Washington start West Global Warming Initiative (I)  
 
2005 CDM issues first credits 
  
2005          C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group launched (I) 
  
2005 Voluntary Carbon Standard (VCS) founded by NGOs and private   sector (III)  
 
Aug-2005 Santilli proposes national compensated reductions (CR) for avoided 
deforestation in journal Climatic Change (II)  
 
Nov-2005 Coalition for Rainforest Nations adapts CR as RED in submission to    
UNFCCC (II)  
 
2006         California Passes Global Warming Solutions Act (AB32) (IV)  
 
2007 Pedroni proposes 'nested' REDD, Conservation NGOs endorse (II)  
 
2007 Western Climate Initiative (WCI) founded (I)  
 
Apr-2007 Bali Action Plan puts REDD on UNFCCC agenda (II) 
 
Sep-2008 Lehman Brothers files for bankruptcy  
 
Oct-2008 Chiapas passes Law for Sustainable Forestry Development  
 
Nov-2008  GCF MOU signed at first Governors' Climate Change Summit in LA (I)  
 
Dec-2008 California Air Resources Board (ARB) endorses REDD in AB32 Climate 
Change Scoping Plan (IV)  
 
2009 Governors’ Climate & Forests Task Force (GCF) Launches (I)  
 
Jan-2009 Programa de Accion ante el Cambio Climatico del Estado de Chiapas 
(PACCCH) launches (V) 
  
Jun-2009 US House passes climate legislation (I)  
 
Dec-2009 Copenhagen disappoints expectations for binding global agreement COP 15 
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Table 1. (continued) 
 
DATE EVENT 
 
Sep-2010 BNP Parabis lends $50 million to Wildlife Works' Kasigu Corridor REDD 
project in Kenya (III) 
 
Nov-2010 Governors of California, Chiapas, Acre sign MOU  
 
Nov-2010 California hosts third Governor’s Global Climate Summit on 'Building the 
Green Economy' (I)  
 
Dec-2010 Cancun Agreement recognizes REDD+ Safeguards (VI) COP 16 
 
Dec-2010 Chiapas passes Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation Law (V)  
 
Dec-2010 Governor Sabines Announces Pact for the Respect of Mother Earth: 
Lacandon Jungle (V)  
 
Dec-2010 REDD+ replaces REDD in Cancun Agreement (II) 
 
2011 Terra Global starts first private equity fund for REDD+ projects, secures $40 
million from the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) (III) 
 
Feb-2011 ROW Established (IV)  
 
Feb-2011 VCS issues first REDD credits to Wildlife Works’ Kasigu Corridor project in 
Kenya (III)  
 
Apr-2011 Chiapas campesino and indigenous groups oppose REDD+ in Declaration of 
Patihuitz (VI)  
 
Aug-2011 Chiapas becomes first state in Mexico to start a REDD+ Technical Advisory 
Committee (CTC) (V)  
 
Nov-2011 Chiapas establishes Intersecratarial Commission for Climate Change 
(CCICCCH) (V)  
 
2012 Acre becomes first jurisdiction to receive performance-based REDD+ 
payments (VII) via Germany’s REDD+ Early Movers Programme 
 
Jun-2012 Green Economy one of two themes at Rio+20 (I)  
 
Jun-2012 Mexico passers General Law on Climate Change  
 
Sep-2012 GCF Annual Meeting held in Chiapas (VI)  
 
Oct-2012 VCS releases Jurisdictional and Nested REDD+ (JNR) (IV) 
  
Jan-2013 Superior Court throws out offset case (V)  
 
Feb-2013 ROW public comment period starts (VI)  
 
Feb-2013 ROW Workshop 1: MRV (IV) 
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Table 1. (continued) 
 
Mar-2013 ROW Workshop 2: Safeguards (IV)  
 
Apr-2013 ROW Workshop 3: Legal and Institutional Issues (IV) 
 
May-13  SB 605 passes California Senate, aims to restrict offsets to state (VI)  
 
Jun-2013 UNEP publishes 'Integrating REDD+ into a Green Economy Transition' (I)  
 
Jul-2013 Governor Velasco cancels PACT in Chiapas (V)  
 
Nov-2013 California, Quebec link carbon markets (I)  
 
Nov-2013 Parties adopt REDD+ Rulebook in Warsaw (I) COP 19 
 
2014 338 REDD+ projects cover over 4 million hectares in 52 countries (II)  
 
Jan-2014 Terra Global publishes alternative nesting proposal, Aims to clarify public, 
private responsibilities (III)  
 
Jan-2014 Terra Global receives first political risk insurance for a carbon offset project,  
OPIC issues $900,000 insurance contract for Oddar Meanchey REDD+ 
project in Cambodia (III) 
 
May-2014 ARB retains REDD+ option in First Update to the Climate Change Scoping 
Plan (V)  
 
Feb-2015 California Court of Appeal denies offset challenge in Citizens Climate Lobby  
 and Our Children’s Earth Foundation vs. California ARB (V) 
 
May-2015 California leads Under 2 MOU (I) 
 
Jun-2015 REDD+ rules provisionally settled at Bonn Climate Change Conference 
 
 
IV. Three Research Questions 
Sub-national leadership through technology, markets, and cooperative arrangements for a 
green economy does not make politics moot. The ideals and anxieties every society asks 
itself are as alive as ever. Who has the authority to govern? To what ends? How is justice 
to be served? Differences resolved? Roles and responsibilities given and assumed? The 
ways such questions are asked and answered, however, is transforming, perhaps radically 
so. The scholar’s task then is to revisit these perennial questions so that they may be 
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asked anew and made intelligible in an age when many of the avenues we thought we 
could use to order society in a just and responsive way are being sidelined, unsettled, 
bypassed, reinvented, and obstructed. With a keener sense of how green transformations 
are being envisioned and advanced, there is the possibility of better orchestrating their 
activities and engaging their politics. 
 The challenge is that the new forms of governance are partial, novel, incomplete, 
and, therefore, often illegible. They are, moreover, not wholly replacing but emerging 
alongside and in relationship with older modes. An inquiry of this kind thus needs a 
compass and signposts to guide its way into the labyrinth and to chart a path, however 
tentatively, to the always present stakes of governance that are elided and obscured by 
claims of a post-political era. To that end, the dissertation is oriented to three core 
research questions and three corresponding bodies of theory, which direct the selection, 
analysis, and interpretation of the case material in each chapter. The three research 
questions are: 
 
1) Where are new political and legal institutions emerging, and how are they 
structured? 
 
2) What role does scientific, legal, and administrative expertise play in shaping 
these institutions, and vice versa? 
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3) How are constitutional elements of the political order (territory, authority, and 
rights) being reoriented towards these new spaces and away from the exclusive 
domain of the nation-state? 
 
The first of these questions is structural. It aims for a more accurate map of the ‘global 
project’ where the de facto sites of governance are located, the relationship of those sites 
to each other, and the identity of the actors that make and inhabit them.  
 The second introduces an epistemic dimension. It is concerned with how 
knowledge, especially about natural and economic systems at the global scale, shapes and 
stabilizes the global project, and how such knowledge is shaped and stabilized in turn. 
This includes the framing of environmental problems and solutions; shaping institutions, 
policies, and practices; and the role of science in building the credibility, legitimacy, and 
authority to govern. 
 The third asks how these emerging structures and processes are reshaping basic 
social, legal, and political categories, namely territory, authority, and rights. It considers 
the degree to which the cases reflect more fundamental changes to the social and natural 
order, and the ways emerging forms of environmental governance speak to globalization 
more broadly. 
 By asking these questions about structure, process, knowledge, and meaning, the 
dissertation aims to sharpen our theoretical understanding of what is at stake in the sub-
national agendas for a green economy and suggest opportunities for crafting it more 
deliberately and productively. 
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V. Methods 
V.1. Historical Multi-sited, Interpretive Analysis  
Understanding global projects as emerging governing regimes for the green economy 
calls for detailed interpretations of how these processes unfold in particular sites. Only 
then can those sites be strung back together to account for how global projects come 
together or fall apart. 
 Methodologically, this requires a multi-sited, interpretive approach. Sassen (2006) 
puts it thus, “Foundational change in complex systems is a complicated matter. Such 
change is only partly legible and hence interpretation becomes critical in the account of 
that change.” 
 To capture the dynamics and constitutional dimensions of green transformation, the 
study adopts an interpretive strategy in this study is based on grounded theory (Charmaz 
2006) to develop concepts for describing otherwise illegible patterns discerned from the 
description of “thick environments, multisited localized domains, and small worlds in 
global systems” (Sassen 2006). Thus, the study also adopts a multi-sited design in 
recognition that knowledge generation, maintenance and sharing occurs in networks 
involving a mixture of actors whose identities and relationships cannot be fully known in 
advance of analysis (Marcus 1995). 
 To get a handle on this complex process, I began data collection and analysis by 
identifying key sites where the discourse, policy, and practice in the relevant case 
material were being either opened up (e.g. legal contests, expert controversies, protest) or 
closed down (e.g. regulations, meeting agendas, expert findings). Special attention was 
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paid to elements (e.g. ideas, technical proposals, policy frameworks) appearing across 
multiple sites. 
 
V.2. Site Selection and Data Collection 
Data collection proceeded iteratively with site selection and data analysis. I conducted an 
initial qualitative review of the historical and contemporary scientific and political 
debates surrounding forest degradation in REDD+ using a combination of a) textual and 
visual documents found in the form of meeting minutes, policy statements, scientific 
papers, advocacy positions, newspaper headlines, and maps; b) ethnographic observations 
at key meetings, workshops, and organizational work spaces; and c) semi-structured 
interviews with country negotiators, secretariat staff, biodiversity scientists, agency staff, 
NGOs, and other representatives of scientific, political and activist institutions. 
 
a) Documents: Transparency requirements make extensive documentation of the key 
meetings and governing documents readily available online. NGO position papers, 
technical reports, media stories, and training materials are also readily accessible. An 
historical review of these texts offers an important window into the changing discourse 
and institutionalization of forest degradation in REDD+ policy negotiations and scientific 
community. Texts include the state regulations, court decisions, state climate agendas and 
advisory reports, state-provincial MOUs, GCF Joint Action Plan, REDD+ project 
planning documents, NGO policy briefs, media articles, and country SBSTA position 
papers. 
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b) Observations: Ethnographic observations of international negotiations, technical 
workshops, scientific conferences, and daily work routines complement the institutional 
and discursive signature found in written documents with information on practice and 
materiality. Observations of social practice are particularly valuable when practice differs 
from discourse. Although many activities take place out of public sight, ethnographic 
observations offer an alternative window through numerous, and often episodic, sites that 
bring together diverse actors, institutions and discourses. 
 
I conducted observations at the following events: 
 
• Thirty-sixth Meeting of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice 
(SBSTA), UNFCCC, 14-25 May 2012, Bonn, Germany 
 
• UN Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20), 13-22 June 2012, Rio de 
Janeiro, Brazil 
 
• Annual Meeting of the Governors' Climate and Forests Task Force, 25-27 September, 
2012, San Cristobal, Chiapas, Mexico 
 
• REDD+ Offsets Working Group Workshop on Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification, 
5 February 2013, Stanford University, Stanford, California, USA 
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• REDD+ Offsets Working Group Workshop on Safeguards, 25 March 2013, University 
of California - Davis, Davis, California, USA 
  
• REDD+ Offsets Working Group Workshop on Linkages, 5 April 2013, University of 
California - Los Angeles, Los Angeles, California, USA 
  
• Navigating the North American Carbon World Conference (NACW), 16-18 April 2013, 
San Francisco, California, USA 
 
• Various webinars, seminars, workshops, conferences, and other events archived and 
broadcast online. 
 
c) Interviews: Semi-structured interviews are a third, complementary data source in 
addition to documents and observations, and offer independent and interpretations and 
insights from individuals independent from this study. I identified interviewees through 
the observations and documents described, and by using a snowball approach with 
interviews and other third-party contacts. Three dozen interviews were conducted in 
person or over the phone or Skype. I also solicited counter-perspectives from 
marginalized groups who hold views on forest monitoring that are not expressed in 
mainstream forums. Interview questions were designed to provide information and 
interpretations unavailable through observations and documents. 
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VI. Theorizing Global Projects 
International environmental law scholar and Senior Adviser to the GCF, William Boyd 
(2010), argues that the 2009 climate negotiations in Copenhagen marked a turning point 
in global environmental governance, where the ambition for countries to submit to a 
supra-national system to govern global problems succumbed to near-paralysis at the 
international level and downright domestic hostility in many countries, the United States 
not least amongst them. Continued foot-dragging in the UNFCCC casts further doubt that 
supra-national regimes guided by a global managerial logic are adequate to the 
increasingly “plural, fragmented nature of the international legal and political order (pp. 
458)”. 
 To make sense of emerging governing arrangements like the REDD+, Boyd offers 
the concept of the global project. I adopt the concept of the global project to frame the 
GCF within the broader REDD+ enterprise. The current study uses the concept because 
it: 1) complements institutionalist and comparative political thought on global 
environmental governance, which is useful for understanding the structural heterogeneity 
of the GCF, 2) calls for constructivist approaches for understanding the co-productive 
relationship between governing institutions and expertise, and 3) invites further 
investigation on how global projects are driving globalization and constitutional change 
by creating new spaces to know and govern global environmental problems outside of the 
nation-state. I describe the each of these three theoretical perspectives below. 
*Note: Core theoretical concepts appear in italics when first introduced, in this and 
subsequent chapters. 
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VI.1. Structure, Institutions, and Comparative Politics 
VI.1.1. Institutionalism 
Observers of environmental regimes, particularly post-Rio, began to argue that existing 
theories could account for neither the influence of non-state actors nor the emerging suite 
of international organizations and institutions characteristic of environmental politics. 
International relations had until then favored realist and neorealist explanations for the 
interactions between nation-states, largely seen as atomistic, self-interested actors who 
calculated behavior in terms of the perceived economic and military might of themselves 
and their opponents. Such a paradigm may have approximated matters of war, but saw no 
possibility for global environmental governance, save perhaps through the projection of 
state power through puppet institutions. Regime theorists in international relations went 
beyond neorealism by extending state-centric theories to problems of collective action 
but saw institutions as neutral accountants—reducing transaction costs, facilitating 
negotiations, and communicating information, but otherwise exerting little independent 
force in their own right. 
 Institutionalists, unsurprisingly, took institutions seriously.7 They argued that 
institutions—defined as sets of collectively understood norms, rules, rights, and 
responsibilities—could better explain the complex and rapidly evolving domain of global 
environmental governance than the clean, mathematized, state-centric abstractions that 
dominated thinking in international relations. The resulting body of work has generated 
substantial insights into the ways transnational networks of businesses, scientific groups, 
and non-governmental organizations actively partake in the creation and operation of 
                                            
7 Institutionalist sub-fields that have written on global environmental governance include 
new institutionalism, neoliberal institutionalism, and weak constructivism. 
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international regimes by shaping the norms and knowledge through which nations 
interpret and pursue their national interests (Lipschutz 1996, Wapner 1996, Risse et al. 
1999, Newell 2000, Betsill & Bulkeley 2004). This includes: epistemic communities of 
experts who share and press for common scientific and political sensibilities (Haas 1990); 
transnational advocacy networks (TAN) of state and non-state actors allied around a 
common issue, discourse, and values across international and domestic settings (Keck 
and Sikkink 1998); international institutions that shape scientific knowledge and reduce 
uncertainties around it (Walsh 2004); and the interplay of institutions across multiple 
scales (Young 2003, Cash et al. 2006). 
 Institutionalists have also addressed matters of democracy and accountability. 
Robert Keohane, for example, conceives of international institutions as not merely 
avenues for collective action but also means to secure accountability to citizens otherwise 
far removed from the elite circle of global affairs. Against the backdrop of globalization's 
“shrinkage of distance on a world scale through the emergence and thickening of 
networks and connections” (2002), he sees institutions caught between the horns of a 
twin dilemma: institutions are needed to provide security against the dangers of an 
interdependent world without being captured by elites and tyrants (also see Chayes & 
Chayes 1998; Miller 2007). To guard against the latter, Keohane advocates institutions 
designed to defend against the arbitrary exercise of power that is limited in liberal 
democracies by elections and other mechanisms that cannot exist absent a world 
government. To that end, he sees legitimacy, that is, “institutionalized procedures for 
open communication and collective reflection”, as possible in global affairs through 
accountability (e.g. chains of delegation and the transparent evaluation of government 
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performance), participation (e.g. new modes of communication and the autonomy and 
authority of publics in new geographies), and persuasion (e.g. rational discussion and 
legalization of decision-making). As we will see, each of the epistemic, normative, and 
political aspects of institutions are relevant to theorizing the structure of global projects. 
 
VI.1.2. Institutional Structure: Heterogeneity - Groups - Collectives 
Global project is a term that encapsulates the fact that initiatives like the GCF are at once 
decentralized and collective, composed of project developers, conservation groups, 
private investors, sub-national governments and other unconventional global actors who 
come together to address a global environmental problem, often with little or no oversight 
from higher national or international authority. The heterogeneity is captured in Governor 
Schwarzenegger’s soaring appeal to any and all who might forge new sub-national 
“laboratories of innovation”: 
 
I also believe in the power of the iconoclast and the entrepreneur and the 
individualist. I believe in the power of the scientists, the capitalists and the 
activists. I believe in the power of the cities and the states and the provinces to be 
laboratories for new ideas, which the national governments then can go and study 
and adopt. 
 
The vision implies a collective endeavor but without the binding values or identity of a 
community or group. A global project is therefore closer to a collective lacking hard and 
fast borders, made up of overlapping communities or groups. Collectives, in 
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institutionalist thought, refer to the global system of states made of social groups related 
to each other through mutually understood sets of formal and informal institutions. The 
collective is generated through the interaction of these groups and institutions. Whereas 
members of a groups recognize a central authority to act on their behalf—a sovereign in 
the case of states—no such figure exists overseeing the collective as a whole, and the 
sense in a common “we-ness” is weak or absent altogether (Walsh 2004). 
 None of these concepts, however, are quite suited to understanding global projects. 
Unlike collectives, global projects connote intent. Projects can succeed or fail, implying 
the collective aspiration and anxiety heard in the performative refrain, “We are the GCF,” 
often voiced by GCF governors to invoke a common mission and identity. In some ways 
then, a global project resembles a social movement or discourse coalition, with room for 
divergent interests and beliefs coalesced around common issue. But if a social movement 
or discourse coalition, then one with an explicit global orientation where governments, 
albeit sub-national ones, remain key and where technical, administrative, and legal 
practice are more important than high-level policy goals. 
 Finally, while global projects downplay the importance of high-level policy, they 
are, as projects, still goal oriented. Projects are assembled bit by bit, by working with, 
through, and around a plural and fragmented epistemic and legal order. Best practices, 
standard setting, capacity building, norm-making and the like are central to see global 
projects as a directional-process attempting to move from a less to a more coordinated 
state of affairs, where the relations among actors are typically voluntary, loose, and 
opportunistic. 
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 Theorizing the structure of global projects helps to clarify the decentralized 
institutional arrangements that determine the roles, identity, and relationship of the great 
many agents involved, with important implications for understanding how such projects 
form, operate, and change. This is particularly important because we are interested in 
understanding how the global project is successfully orchestrated (or not), which requires 
specificity about the lines of delegation and responsibility around knowledge and 
decision-making. The following sections clarify what this means for the GCF with a 
discussion of the empirical findings of comparative political studies of sub-national 
climate policy, in both their vertical and horizontal dimensions. 
 
VI.1.3. Vertical Interactions Single States - Federalism - Laboratories of Innovation 
The GCF states and provinces continue a tradition of “policy experimentation” and 
“laboratories of innovation” in federalist systems that predate global environmental 
concerns in other areas, such as health care and education (Rabe 2007, Hoffmann 2011, 
Bulkeley et al. 2014). More recently, states like California and New York have begun to 
assert a role in climate policy, as have counterparts in other federal systems, such as 
Australia, Canada, and the European Union. Comparative political studies reveal several 
reasons for this bottom-up push, including economic self-interest through energy 
efficiency and clean energy development; concerns over vulnerability to climate impacts; 
‘first mover’ status ahead of national action; concentration of expertise and policy 
networks in state capitals; alternative approaches to federal policy formation such as 
litigation and direct democracy; and the possibility to more readily respond to local and 
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often less contentious shifts in public opinion (Aulisi et al. 2007; Rabe 2008, Urpelainen 
2009; Klinsky 2013). 
 Federalism is also a key enabling factor for the GCF. Most GCF members already 
function with considerable independence from the central governments, with 14 of the 26 
states and provinces belonging to federal systems (Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria, and the 
United States). Of the remaining 12, 7 belong to devolved national-states (Indonesia and 
Spain), which confer significant law-making powers to the state level. Of the remaining 
GCF countries, Peru has enacted policies to decentralize forest management to the state-
level in recent years, and Indonesia is considered to be a critical REDD+ country, with 
the third largest area in tropical forests after Brazil and the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo. 
 State and provincial climate policies are highly dependent on internal and national 
political priorities and economies. The most notable of these are renewable portfolio 
standards, carbon taxes, cap-and-trade systems, which have been implemented and 
maintained with variable levels of success. Most often sub-national governments have an 
eye on how these policies will advance not only their internal priorities but facilitate 
policy diffusion to other states or provinces, or shape future federal legislation from 
below. Again, the results of sub-national action are mixed, in regard to both climate and 
other policy domains (Rabe 2008). Being in the vanguard presents the potential risk of 
higher-levels of government pre-empting or invalidating state action. Alternatively, it can 
lead towards collaborative federalism, for instance, in a multi-level governance 
arrangement where sub-national and central governments set and coordinate separate 
targets. To date, however, there has been little to suggest that climate policy in the US is 
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taking this path. Instead, it resembles a third possibility, where states continue to devise 
bottom-up policy amid federal inaction. Over time, this abets the extension and 
coordination horizontally between states, even with those in other countries, which 
carries further implications for how global projects unfold, outside the ‘experimentation’ 
and ‘laboratories of innovation’ within individual sub-national jurisdictions. 
 In an institutionalist light, these three pathways for state-federal policy 
interactions—pre-emption, collaboration, independence—correspond to alternative 
configurations of authority, albeit in narrowly defined sphere like cap-and-trade. In the 
first, state authority is subsumed by national authority (autonomous national group); in 
the second, mutually understood institutions permit autonomy and interaction between 
state and national government (groups in a collective); and in the third, state authority is 
left to its own devices with few restrictions from diminished or absent federal governance 
(autonomous state group). The advantage of spelling out these political comparisons in 
institutional terms is that it helps us specify the lines of authority that may be drawn or 
re-drawn in the making of a global project, including lines between states and provinces, 
as well as the kinds of authority, which include not only overt decisions but also 
knowledge and moral vision, as we will discuss in later sections. 
 
VI.1.4. Horizontal Interactions: Sub-national Partnerships - Transnationalism 
The GCF is not the only example of sub-national state-to-state climate cooperation. 
Others have preceded it but not all remain active, and each has contended with challenges 
that are instructive to understanding how global projects come together or fall apart. In 
the US and Canada these include the Western Climate Initiative (WCI), Regional 
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Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), Pacific Coast Collaborative (PCC), Transportation 
and Climate Initiative (TCI), and, until recently, Midwest Greenhouse Gas Reduction 
Accord (MGGRA), and North America 2050 (NA2050). Of these, the WCI and RGGI 
are specifically focused on building a carbon market. 
 The WCI is particularly relevant for the current case, for, like the GCF, California 
is at the core of its transnational partnership. And, like the GCF aims to set an example 
for REDD+ writ large, the WCI was designed as “a powerful framework for developing a 
national cap and trade program” (Gregoire et al. 2007). Though launched in 2007, the 
origins of the WCI go back to the early 2000’s to initiatives devised to circumvent federal 
inaction on climate change, notably the 2003 California-Oregon-Washington West 
Global Warming Initiative (Klinsky 2013, Locke 2003). At its height, the WCI counted 
seven US states and four Canadian provinces as members. In January 2014, California 
and fellow WCI-member Quebec linked their cap-and-trade systems to permit the sale of 
allowances and offsets between the jurisdictions, with Ontario soon to follow. 
 The WCI emerged in a period of high hopes, when US federal climate policy 
seemed within grasp. In 2009, a federal cap-and-trade program moved one step closer 
when Congressmen Henry Waxman and Edward Markey’s American Clean Energy and 
Security Act (ACES) passed the U.S. House. The shared sense of momentum helped to 
pull even some conservatives states into the WCI and a provision in the Waxman-Markey 
bill for 6 billion tons of supplemental reductions from REDD+ through 2025 likely had a 
spillover effect on the GCF itself. Many members of both the WCI and GCF also had 
enabling climate legislation, which facilitated the partnerships, though few had actual 
regulations in place. Both were spearheaded by governors and, typical for such 
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agreements, loosely structured through non-binding MOUs, reflecting authority 
distributed widely rather than concentrated in a single political sovereign. Economic 
incentives were also important to making the case “a broad geographic scope [would] 
reduce overall compliance costs and help mitigate leakage risks” (WCI, 2010a, Klinsky 
2013). Finally, policy entrepreneurs and experts played a role in both initiatives, exerting 
influence in key technical and policy-making sites and multiple levels of governance.  
 The WCI experienced an “intense coalescence” between 2003 and 2008, but 
partially disintegrated by 2010 following stalled federal legislation in the US and Canada 
and an unreached global agreement in Copenhagen (Klinsky 2013). The re-framing of 
economics from a net benefit to net cost, political polarization, shifting governors and 
legislatures, and growing public doubts about climate science took some wind out of the 
WCI. These challenges, however, are only partly applicable to understanding the GCF. 
 The GCF shares certain similarities with the WCI but differs in very significant 
ways having to do with the identity and relations of market players. First, the GCF 
membership is thoroughly transnational, with both states and provinces from seven 
developing and developed countries. Second, these members represented both potential 
buyers in jurisdictions with their own compliance cap-and-trade programs and sellers in 
jurisdictions that did not have their own compliance markets but would supply carbon 
offsets to those that did, with developing country suppliers far outnumbering developed 
country buyers. And, third, while all carbon markets require substantial investments in 
the regulatory, administrative, and technical infrastructure needed for those markets to 
function, these investments are particularly demanding in GCF members from developing 
countries. Few such jurisdictions have even a basic capacity to monitor emissions from 
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deforestation and forest degradation and, in many cases, lack clear land tenure, property 
rights, and other institutions taken for granted in the developed world. 
 While the WCI shrunk after 2008, the GCF nearly tripled its membership. In part, 
this has to do with continued progress on REDD+ in the UNFCCC relative to the 
negotiations on a Post-Kyoto agreement. But REDD+ was stymied by this impasse too 
and local and national REDD+ efforts proved much more taxing than originally 
imagined. Nevertheless, the GCF has weathered the uncertainty, in part, I argue, by 
reinventing itself to build institutions for knowledge-sharing and agenda setting. These 
epistemic and moral dimensions are also major features of (in a negative sense) the 
orchestration challenge in the case studies of California and Chiapas. To inquire more 
deeply into the divergent paths, purpose, and character of the GCF and WCI , I take a 
constructivist lens to those cases, as explained in the next section. 
 
VI.2. Constructivism - Knowing and Governing 
VI.2.1. Constructivism 
The preceding section discussed the institutional structure of global projects. To this, a 
constructivist perspective demands an account of the norms, discourses, knowledge, legal 
and technical practices, and other basic categories often taken for granted in international 
environmental politics and law. Both institutionalism and constructivism counter top-
down, nation-centric models of international power and politics. Both approaches also 
deny the common view that globalization results from autonomous technological and 
economic forces. In contrast to institutionalism, however, constructivism emphasizes the 
subtle and intimate ties between knowledge, power, and discourse. These ties are 
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significant for two reasons. First, constructivist studies are attuned to the content of 
particular knowledge claims and the multiple forms of knowledge that, in principle, 
might be applied to any particular policy problem. This makes it possible to ask questions 
about values and interests embodied in knowledge claims, and why certain knowledge 
claims come to be seen as credible or relevant and others not. Second, knowledge matters 
not only for the material outcomes it generates but also for how it stabilizes or 
undermines political and social order. Constructivism is therefore concerned not only 
with the use of knowledge in problem-solving but also the legitimation of authority, 
coordination of action, and formation of social identities and political communities. 
 This perspective confers the advantage of making it possible to ask questions that 
escape accounts of institutions, actors, and interests alone. What it loses in terms of 
institutionalism’s generalizability, constructivism gains in the subtlety needed to grasp 
new beliefs, subjectivities, categories, and the like as they come into being, shaping and 
being shaped by the institutions, actors, and interests around them. It is critical to train the 
analytic microscope at this level of detail if we are to expand questions about governance, 
politics, power, and justice to both knowledge-making and decision-making. This calls 
for detailed interpretations of “empirically, grounded study of thick policy contexts” 
(Boyd 2010), eschewing parsimonious explanations about an emergent and complex 
governing arrangement when the character of that arrangement is the very thing that 
needs explaining.  
Governing techniques are far from isolated tools to understand the world; they 
knit themselves to the quotidian routines of governance. These routines are encapsulated 
by regimes of practice—or the complex ensembles of knowledge and scientific and 
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technical practice (episteme), institutions and techniques of administration (techne), and 
identities (ethos) that are oriented towards a given end (telos) (Dean 2003). These 
regimes comprise an: 
 
ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the 
calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex 
form of power, which has as its target, population, as its principle form of 
knowledge, political economy, and as its essential technical means, apparatuses of 
security. (Foucault 1991: 102). 
 
Most every liberal democracy has, for instance, regimes of practice for reforming 
criminals, curing the mentally ill, identifying at-risk youth, and demarcating safe levels of 
contaminants in food. They embed particular ways of producing power, truth, and 
identity that, in turn, are embedded within an overarching governmentality, like that of 
the health care or criminal justice system. Here, government is the conduct of conduct, 
carried out through circumscribed routines for thinking and intervening towards certain 
ends. Following Durkheim and other early sociologists, as well as the historians of the 
Annales school, the approach views thought as a collective activity (Rose 2006). These 
are ways of thinking that privilege rational thought as a necessary means of government 
and refer to “any way of reasoning, or way of thinking about, calculating and responding 
to a problem, which is more or less systematic, and which might draw upon formal 
bodies of knowledge or expertise” (Dean 2003). The mentality of government and 
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accompanying rationalities, techniques, and subjectivities can be oriented towards the one 
who governs others, one is governed by others, or one who governs oneself. 
 
VI.2.2. Constructing Governing Regimes - Techniques of Globalization 
A constructivist reading of global projects like the GCF reveals that the building blocks 
of environmental governance—policy, science, law—are not diffused evenly throughout 
the planet and its peoples like some rarefied globalizing ether but rather fragmented 
across sub-national pockets of political and epistemic order. To get a handle on how these 
threads are strung together, the analyst must investigate how regimes of practice are 
constituted through “instruments, ideologies, calculative rationalities, expert systems, 
networks, legalisms” and other techniques of globalization. Since we are interested in 
how these techniques pull the global project into being, we must examine how they work 
themselves into “national and sub-national institutions and what this entails for efforts to 
coordinate efforts across various jurisdictions” (Boyd 2010).  
 Indeed, one of the chief tasks the GCF sets for itself is to build the technical and 
administrative capacity of its members to monitor forest carbon, translate that carbon into 
a new kind of financial asset, and circulate that asset in a common carbon market. Thus, 
GCF’s 2009-2010 Joint Action Plan, the core guiding document formalizing the 
initiative, recommends the: 
 
development of the substantive frameworks, protocols, principles, and criteria 
necessary to link the future generation of compliance-grade forest carbon assets in 
Brazil and Indonesia with emerging compliance regimes in the United States and 
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elsewhere, with particular attention to forest carbon accounting, crediting, and 
monitoring issues.8  
 
To do this, the GCF emphasizes shared scientific, technical, and legal expertise for 
promoting technical cooperation, building capacity and developing policy 
recommendations. These activities are organized across three working group to provide: 
project-level standards and criteria for REDD activities; forest carbon accounting 
frameworks and integration and coordination mechanisms, and technical, legal, 
institutional, and financial needs assessment for moving toward compliance-grade REDD 
activities. The initiative has also hosted capacity building programs with in Brazil, 
Indonesia, Peru, Mexico, and Nigeria under its regional GCF Training Program, on 
technical and legal topics such as the cross-scale integration of monitoring, reporting, and 
verification of forest carbon; strategies to change national law and policy; cross-sectoral 
policy alignment; field visits; and an e-learning course on integrated forest management.  
 The green economy is being built out of these modest and incremental activities. 
Their aim is to standardize the measurement and valuation of carbon so that it can travel 
in global circuits of capital. Standards are needed to establish an equivalence between 
ecology and economics (MacKenzie 2009). They are what Larry Busch (2013) calls 
‘recipes for reality’, in this case the imagined reality of planetary transformation. 
 Regimes of practice, standards, protocols, best practices, and so forth represent a 
particular episteme (and hence pathway and design logic) for constructing the green 
economy. Success is not guaranteed. Any of these links that pull together the regime—
                                            
8 GCF Joint Action Plan (2009-2010). August 2009. available at: 
http://www.gcftaskforce.org/documents/GCTF-1000-2009-031.pdf 
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episteme, telos, techne, ethos—could fail, making the venture far from the all-
encompassing disciplinary power sometimes attributed to governmentality. Boyd 
cautions that REDD+ is fragile and uncertain. 
 First, epistemic and ontological uncertainties threaten to undermine the equivalence 
between carbon as a material entity and carbon as a financial asset. Resolving technical 
and financial uncertainties within a unified episteme calls for the creation and negotiation 
of social and technical practices within and between finance and economics, and climate 
science and ecology. For the former pair this means, in part, reducing capital risk through 
credible carbon measurement and monitoring, while for the latter it calls for adapting 
scientific methods, standards of evidence, and acceptable levels of uncertainty to produce 
carbon units appropriate to the strictures set down by finance and policy. 
 Second, stabilizing a new regime means infusing measurement and monitoring into 
administrative routines of reporting and verification. (The abbreviation MMRV for 
Measurement, Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification, often just MRV, itself indicates 
this integration of episteme and techne.) In addition to implying what credible knowledge 
looks like and how it is obtained, standards always also imply the identity and behavior 
of the standard-setter (Busch 2013). Thus, the GCF training workshops and working 
groups emphasize sharing best practices and building the administrative capacity to turn 
units of carbon into units of carbon credits. Bureaucratic inertia, inter-agency competition 
for resources, divergent mandates, and differing cultural expectations conspire against the 
easy integration of knowledge into practice, hence a proliferation of inter-agency 
commissions among GCF members, often centralized under the office of the governor. 
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 Third, capacity building is not only about knowledge and practice but also 
inculcating a shared ethos. Standard-setting a process of building a sense of community 
and trust. It involves developing a shared mutual understanding of the roles, rights, and 
responsibilities—the institutions—needed to facilitate any social interaction. These may 
be formal but often aspire to be internalized into the subjectivity of the governing and the 
governed, who may be one and the same. This can have profound implications in social 
identity and responsibility, as when the decentralization of forest management 
transformed villagers in the Kumaon region of Northern India from seeing themselves as 
victims of centralized forest policy to self-identified forest stewards. 
 Fourth, and perhaps most significantly, the regime requires a common telos, which 
may be undermined in at least two ways. One is policy uncertainty. The GCF was 
established under the belief that a carbon market for REDD+ would soon be at hand. 
However, California regulators are yet to accept REDD+ credits and hopes for a global 
post-2012 market have receded. The ends of the GCF were called into question, causing 
the initiative to reinvent its purpose away from a narrow focus on carbon markets to a 
more general one on low-emission rural development. The other teleological uncertainty 
is over the ends to which politics and power are exercised. The GCF has provoked vocal 
resistance over groups that saw the green economy as cover for green-grabbing aimed to 
deliver forests into the hands of corporations and the state and away from local 
communities. At times, teleological disputes rise to the level of ontological politics, for 
instance, when indigenous groups argue that carbon markets overlook and sever intimate 
ties between forest people and forest communities. 
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 This fragility itself is an important topic of investigation speaking to the multi-
faceted problem of harmonizing standards horizontally across the different, often vastly 
different, political cultures of the GCF, and vertically with local, national, and 
supranational levels.9 We are interested in the transformation of a centuries old political 
and economic order of global scale. Given the magnitude of the change in question, even 
halting efforts to build REDD+ from the bottom-up offer noteworthy insights into an 
emerging regime. The dissertation explores these questions by zeroing in on key 
struggles over REDD+ in Chiapas and California, with an eye towards the political, 
institutional, cultural, and epistemic mechanisms by which such struggles are opened up 
or closed down. Answers to these questions offer a window to potentially momentous but 
less easily discerned constitutional questions around the relation between knowledge, 
governance, and global change. To this we turn in the next section. 
 
VI.3. Globalization and Constitutional Change 
VI.3.1. Re-thinking Globalization 
In this section I return to the issues surrounding the politics of transformation that 
motivates this study. The preceding sections on institutionalism and constructivism 
discussed theoretical tools to zoom in on particular configurations of knowledge and 
institutions in environmental governance. Here, I step back to situate the dissertation 
within the broader frame of globalization and constitutional change. The ambition of 
states and provinces to lead a planetary transformation is hardly a modest one, heralding 
                                            
9 In general, I follow the distinction between scales and levels, with the former referring 
to spatial and temporal dimension and the latter hierarchical tiers of political and social 
organization (see, for example, Cash et al. 2006). 
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change at the broadest and of deepest levels. Explaining institutional change, however, 
much less global and constitutional change, has proved to be a great challenge for the 
social sciences (Young 2008). Part of the problem is the tendency to treat the local, 
national, and global formations and comparing them in toto against one another (Sassen 
2006). This only serves to perpetuate popular notions that local communities are helpless 
victims to globalization’s juggernaut or paranoia over a cabal of “geoplutocratic ‘elite’ 
bent on global domination”.10 
 We therefore need to go beyond thinking of globalization simply as the trait of an 
increasingly complex and interdependent economy or a layering of supranational 
government over the international community of states whose members willingly cede 
authority to secure collective action for the greater good (Miller 2001a, 2001b, 2004a, 
2004b, 2007, 2015). According to Boyd (2010): 
 
The point, though, is not to debate the analytical merits of globalization (a 
polysemic term to be sure), but rather to avoid ascribing causal logic to a single, 
totalizing process. By focusing instead on the relationships, linkages, and 
mechanisms that constitute globalizing processes, we can understand and explain 
how particular actors, institutions, practices, and places cohere in specific global 
assemblages. 
 
The dissertation builds on Miller and Boyd to understand globalization as the 
reorientation of long-standing forms of political order within the nation-state itself 
                                            
10 Boylan, Dylan. The Cabal. 
http://www.bibliotecapleyades.net/sociopolitica/sociopol_cabalelite.htm 
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towards global problems. My objective is not to explain this process in a causal sense but 
to draw on detail-oriented institutionalist and constructivist thinking to describe and 
interpret specific cases where novel alignments of global knowledge and governance to 
offer insights into how the globalizing process is proceeding through sub-national 
partnerships. By conceiving of the GCF as a global project, the dissertation positions the 
local, national, and global in relation to each other, helping us to understand how these 
complex formations mutually condition and legitimate one another under a globalist 
rubric (Jasanoff and Long-Martello 2004).  
 
VI.3.2. Globalism - Science and Administration in the Global Environmental Imagination 
What makes these projects global is not their independence from the governing 
institutions of the nation-state but the ways they re-articulate existing regimes of 
knowledge and practice towards global ends. That is, global projects are an expression of 
globalism—“the explicit framing of policy issues as being capable of identification, 
analysis, and management on scales no smaller than the planet as a whole” (Miller 2007). 
Globalism justifies these projects, and they, in turn, abet the movement away from 
government centered on the nation-state towards multi-valanced governance fragmented 
across a mesh of actors, sites, and scales. In doing so, they draw on unifying global 
norms, discourses, and practices, while also diversifying them back into the new legal, 
technical, political, and institutional spaces that such maneuvers open up. 
 While a global imaginary of some sort or another has existed for centuries, none 
has taken the global environment as an entire system unto itself until the latter part of the 
twentieth century (Jasanoff and Long-Martello 2004, Miller 2007, Miller & Edwards 
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2001). In the decades following World War II, globalism emerged from an ontological 
shift from the belief that worldwide ills like war and disease were ultimately problems 
that originated inside, and could be managed by, nation-states to the view that they were 
the emergent risks of an interconnected global system. The international architecture set 
up in the wake of World War II and the decades previous were of an older order, built by 
and for the world community of states. When founded in 1944 and 1945, the Bretton 
Woods institutions and United Nations were not different in kind from the League of 
Nations established in the fallout of the First World War. Their common purpose was to 
fashion ‘One World’, where nations would peaceably settle disputes and promote 
economic prosperity on behalf of their citizenry (Miller 2001b, 2015). 
 Globalism, by contrast, built upon the power of a vast, post-War socio-technical 
monitoring and modeling infrastructure (Edwards 2010) to reveal systemic global risks 
far beyond the control of any individual nation-state. Within a few short decades, climate 
came to be seen not simply as long-term average weather in a particular place but the 
patterned dynamics of the complex biogeochemical system of the Earth as a whole. The 
planetary scope rendered new domains of governance thinkable, ushering in a new breed 
of global institutions and specialized agencies like the International Monetary Fund and 
World Health Organization for understanding and managing systemic insecurities like 
epidemics and financial risk that individual countries were powerless to prevent (Miller 
2007). As a result, globalism has reshaped international institutions into global ones, 
restructured centers of power and authority, and greatly expanded the scope of 
environmental governance, and the administrative and accounting practices that go with 
it. 
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 Yet, global knowledge does not determine these governance arrangements in a 
linear or straightforward way, for reasons of both contingency and complexity (Allenby 
and Sarewitz 2011). As previously discussed, the elements of governing regimes—
episteme, techne, ethos, and telos—must come into alignment for the regime to stabilize. 
This is a political, social, and epistemic process, which draws from a pool of resources 
that cannot be definitively identified a priori and the outcome of which cannot be fully 
known in advance. The complexity of global problems and the open-ended nature of the 
publics they are said to afflict greatly amplify the number and variety of possible 
governing arrangements. The failure to anticipate and adapt to these dynamics can 
undermine the stability and effectiveness of the regime in question. Indeed, the UNFCCC 
seems to have followed such a path. Premised on the idea that climate change was 
essentially a problem of atmospheric CO2 concentrations, rather than, say, consumption 
or energy production, the regime pursued a global managerial approach of top-down 
emission controls, which has failed to enact the depth and extent of governance 
transformations intended. 
 Contingency and complexity, however, can open as many doors as they close. As 
engines of globalization, global projects like the GCF work to re-imagine and re-
articulate how global problems are known and governed at sub-national scales and levels 
of political administration. Thus, they seek to render new spaces legible and 
governable—spaces distinct from either the nation-state or supranational world politics 
that have been the focus of environmental politics to date. This makes it all the more 
critical to attend to the underlying political and constitutional changes at stake, and the 
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modes of public accountability needed to guide them forward—changes that, at their 
deepest level, are constitutional. 
 
VI.3.3. Constitutional Change 
The transformation from a national to global order portends a shift as potentially 
disruptive as the move from the monarchical state to the modern nation-state and liberal 
democracies that followed. That shift issued from the 18th century arrival of the idea of 
the economy and the population as entities that existed outside of and independent from 
the state (Dean 2003). Much like the earth system sciences hatched the notion that global 
systems do what they will do independent from the sovereign will of nations, human 
populations and the economy came to be seen as self-regulating things. The resulting 
ontological perplexity posed a dilemma: Should a sovereign power intervene to manage 
these entities or leave them to their own devices? If so, when, how, and to what ends? 
Over centuries, sovereign and disciplinary power grappled with these questions, 
morphing and merging to eventually yield the governing regimes we know in modern 
liberal democracies today. Centered on problems of security, population, and 
administration, these regimes constituted a new, subtle form of power—
governmentality—reappearing in contemporary debates over the proper division between 
the government, free market, and popular will (Taylor 2003). 
 These amount to constitutional questions about “a form of rule which both 
empowers a government to carry out the range of functions associated with the modern 
interventionist state and excludes arbitrary and despotic forms of rule” (Walker 1996). 
Here I follow Sheila Jasanoff, who takes “the heart of constitutionalism” to entail the 
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“preservation of balance: between enabling and constraining power, and between 
individual and societal demands.” This expansive definition finds constitutions not only 
in written texts, legislative decrees, or constitutional jurisprudence codifying common 
norms (Tribe 1978) but also basic ontological commitments, such as the nature of the 
state and the identity of the beings to be granted rights to protect them against state 
action. 
 In globalization, Jasanoff (2003) finds a “constitutional moment”, where science 
and technology play an under-theorized role in reworking the basic organizing principles 
of society. The idea extends Bruce Ackerman’s (1991, 1993, 1998) proposal that such 
moments as the Founding, Reconstruction, and New Deal are responsible for ‘America’s 
living democracy’. At times like these, politicians transform existing institutions and 
practices towards new ideals. Globalization presents just such a constitutional moment, 
Jasanoff argues, that top-down explanations of constitutional change as issuing from the 
national (Ackerman 1991), regional (Grimm 1995, Walker 1996), or global level (Hardt 
and Negri 2000) cannot address. Instead globalization triggers fundamental changes from 
the bottom-up through, among others, new definitions of self, identity and community; 
the empowerment of consumers as right-bearing agents; and, most relevant for our 
purposes, the meteoritic rise of the ‘global sciences’ in environmental governance 
(Jasanoff 2003). 
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VI.3.4. A Framework for Analyzing Globalization and Constitutional Change - 
Territory/Authority/Rights - Capabilities/Organizing Logics/Tipping Points 
The idea that globalization presents a constitutional moment strikes a chord with 
sociologist Saskia Sassen’s thinking on foundational global change. Sassen (2013) 
likewise sees the global at work in the transformation of national institutions and 
practices towards global ends: 
 
…the history of the modern state can be read as the work of rendering national 
just about all crucial features of society: authority, identity, territory, security, 
law, and economic accumulation….[Today] Global firms, global market, global 
subjectivities, human rights, and other kindred figurations entail the 
denationalizing at least some of the components of the national. Thus even 
entities structured inside thick or highly formalized settings can undergo 
foundational transformations. [Italics added] 
 
Foundational and constitutional change are close cousins, with the former foregrounding 
structural aspects and the latter normative and interpretive ones. I treat them 
interchangeably here. Both entail the reconfiguration of transhistorical elements that are 
common across societies, like those identified in the quote above: authority, identity, 
territory, security, law, economy. 
 Global projects like the GCF figure a transformation of this very kind. In the 
dissertation, I explore the relationship between constitutional/foundational change and 
globalism/global knowledge by framing sub-national transformations for the green 
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economy as a global project, and taking that frame to launch a detailed, empirical 
investigation of the co-production of global knowledge and new forms of territory, 
authority, and rights. I have outlined the institutionalist and constructivist perspectives on 
global environmental governance above. I combine these with Sassen’s framework to 
make sense of those detail-oriented approaches within a broader theorization of 
globalization. By doing so, I hope to sharpen the insights from this work and extend its 
relevance to the broader scholarship on global environmental governance and change. 
 Forms of global order are fragile, specialized, and shifting, which means they are 
only partially legible, calling for theoretical and methodological innovations in the social 
sciences. Sassen (2006) offers a conceptual framework for understanding emergent forms 
of order in a sweeping account of the reconfiguration of territory, authority, and rights in 
two grand historical transformations, from the feudal era to the nation-state, and the 
nation-state to the global. It is a provocative thesis, aiming to shake the mistaken 
conviction that one will spy the globe by looking up. Up is the world system where the 
nation resides, a secular godhead and Olympus above. The globe is where it has always 
been: underfoot.  
 The framework is made of three core concepts (Sassen 2006), which help situate 
the GCF within broader globalizing trends: organizing logics, tipping points, and 
capabilities. First, the configuration of foundational elements reflects an organizing logic, 
which refers to “the centrifugal/centripetal dynamic and the relational system that 
constitutes order, in our case a social and geopolitical order.” In modern times, the 
centripetal dynamic centralizes exclusive, political authority in the nation-state—a 
dynamic that also characterizes the logic of global managerialism, whereby upward 
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modes of accountability hierarchically concentrate geopolitical power in supranational 
institutions to which nation-states have ceded sovereignty to facilitate collective action in 
the face of common global threats. A centrifugal dynamic, by contrast, was the kind of 
order found in feudal Europe, where crisscrossing lines of decentralized authority and 
rights were not collapsed in a unified geographic territory like in the later nation-state. 
Today, globalization presents an analogous centrifugal dynamic, where unconventional 
global actors like sub-national governments, transnational expert networks, social 
movements, and venture capital organize into specialized arrangements to address 
particular problems. The resonance with the GCF’s sub-national agenda to create carbon 
markets from the bottom-up is clear. 
 Second, tipping points signal the movement from one organizing logic to another, 
manifest in current times from the national to the global. As remarked earlier, however, it 
is a mistake to assume that the national and the global are discrete or opposed. Global 
logics are not total—they do not replace the nation-state—but they do denationalize 
foundational/constitutional elements of political order, often articulating themselves with 
supranational orders like the UNFCCC that nation-states themselves produced. Thus, the 
centripetal logic of global managerialism envisioned in the early decades of treaty-based 
environmental governance is not antithetical to the centrifugal logic expressed in 
initiatives like the GCF. Rather, supranational governing structures help constitute a 
tipping point from one organizing logic to the next, by fostering globalism and global 
institutions, which are then refracted back into plural, fragmented social and epistemic 
orders—state and regional carbon markets like California’s being a prime example. 
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 Third, specific capabilities tip orders from one organizing logic to the next, 
meaning globalization cannot be chalked up to the autonomous push of faster 
communication technologies or denser economic ties. Capability is a general term that 
refers to the power to configure foundational/constitutional elements in particular ways. 
In regard to the GCF, capabilities can be seen as the institutions or regimes of practice for 
making forest carbon legible and governable. By thinking of capabilities (i.e. regimes of 
practice) in this way, it becomes possible to see how existing capabilities are both 
contingent achievements and resources that can be re-deployed for purposes they were 
not intended. Sassen, for instance, documents how globalization proceeds to 
denationalize existing national institutions not by over-riding them with greater authority 
but re-orienting the institutional and legal machinery of the nation-state to global ends. 
Two capabilities, in particular, facilitate globalization in such a manner, and both are 
central to the GCF. One is that, as an initiative of governors, the GCF represents the 
extension, or attempted extension, of executive power. The other occurs as the states and 
provinces of the GCF work to advance their goals through extension of private authority 
and leveraging of private financial, symbolic, social, and epistemic resources. 
 
VII. Summary of Chapters 2-6 
Part I. Policy History of REDD+ in the UNFCCC and Voluntary Market 
Chapter 2 - Calculation, Law, and Scale: Local, National, and Nested Proposals for 
REDD+ 
The chapter theorizes global environmental law-making as a capability of states in the 
international community designed around certain conceptions of global collective action. 
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It argues, however, that the problem of enforcing collective global action as not been 
resolved by means of political power or institutions alone. Rather, it builds on the 
institutionalist and constructivist literature to make the case that this global political 
power of states is increasingly buttressed by private expertise. The chapter focuses on 
how each of three carbon accounting proposals for avoided deforestation—project, 
national, and nested—bear a distinct organizing logic, reflective of the particular problem 
framings of the actors who framed them. In particular, it highlights how these framings 
led to different answers to the question, “What is the right scale for RED?”—framings 
that carry important constitutional implications, for example, in regard to basic notions of 
causality, agency, responsibility, participation, and the public. By doing so, this chapter 
serves as groundwork for the following four chapters, which trace the movement and 
negotiation of these three proposals from the international space into sub-national 
projects and programs. 
 
Chapter 3 - Standards of Trust in the Voluntary Carbon Market: Financing Local-Scale 
Projects and De-Risking the State 
This chapter continues with ideas and actors introduced in Chapter 4, as they moved from 
the international space to the voluntary carbon market. It uses the case material to show 
that the development of private expertise for REDD+ standards was most immediately a 
response to demand from other private actors. As an intermediate step between paper 
proposals and  the adoption of private standards by governments, this complicates the 
understanding of private carbon market standards as a response to anticipated public 
demand. 
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The first part of the chapter recounts how conservationists and developers 
overcame barriers to investment by consolidating a hodgepodge of carbon accounting 
standards into a small number verification and validation standards under centralized 
third-party certifiers. The chapter describes this process of consolidating third-party 
certification as the development of the capability of the network of project developers in 
the voluntary market to generate a new form of economic value based on the calculation 
of avoided carbon emissions in a delineated project area. In very general terms, capability 
can be understood as the potential for a network of actors to configure foundational, or 
constitutional, interdependent-elements of natural and political order, such as territory, 
authority, and rights. 
The most notable of the standard-setting organizations was the Verified Carbon 
Standard, which, as both an organization and set of verification and validation practices, 
incorporated carbon accounting and financial expertise to gain the trust and credibility 
needed to secure high-risk investment capital for REDD+ projects. Yet, while the VCS 
and other standard-setters succeeded in attracting private capital, they often employed 
rhetoric and practice that ignored or even undercut the authority of the governments 
whose help the ultimately needed to legislate the compliance market that the voluntary 
market was to be a precedent for. 
The second part of the chapter reviews two mechanisms—political risk insurance 
and a variation on ’nesting’ projects—that private sector developers devised to mitigate 
‘government risk’ that posed an additional barrier to attracting capital investment. These 
cases show that the standards of trust devised between the project developers and 
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financiers through the VCS and related efforts stand in stark relief to the distrust the 
private sector displayed towards host governments. 
 
Part II. Making Sub-national Carbon Markets in California and Chiapas 
Chapter 4 – Carbon Territory: Risk, Scale, and Finance in Jurisdictional vs. Project-
based REDD+ 
This chapter contrasts the private sector led initiatives discussed in Chapter 3 with an 
initiative launched by California and sub-national government partners in Brazil and 
Indonesia called the Governors’ Climate & Forests Task Force (GCF). Like project 
developers had in the VCS, the governments in the GCF sought to create a platform to 
develop techniques, frameworks and other technical and administrative measures to build 
a carbon market for REDD+. The GCF, however, did this in very different ways that had 
to do with the fact that it was not building a voluntary market, like the VCS, but a 
compliance market for California’s new cap-and-trade program. One of the key 
differences is that the VCS was organized around local scale projects (102-105 ha), 
which were the kind of initiatives that the private sector could develop and finance. The 
GCF, by contrast, aimed to create carbon accounting mechanisms at the much larger 
scale of sub-national political jurisdictions (104-107 ha). 
In order to understand why the GCF opted for the larger scale, and the 
constitutional implications of that choice, the chapter presents the concept of the global 
project, as developed by international environmental law scholar and senior GCF adviser, 
William Boyd. According to Boyd, the concept offers an alternative lens view global 
environmental governance that calls attention to the way global problems and proposals 
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like REDD+ are reworked in national and sub-national settings that scholarship on 
international environmental governance has typically overlooked in favor of a narrow 
focus on the nation-state as a singular, unitary actor. Global projects center around 
particular, specialized, and limited activities and thereby become a mechanism by which 
the global organizing logics—such as the three RED proposals presented in Chapter 2—
escape conventional spaces of supranational governance, like the UNFCCC. The chapter 
presents the GCF as an example of a project that orients sub-national knowledge and 
institutions towards the problems of global forest loss and climate change. In particular, it 
discusses the technical and administrative practices, or techniques of globalization, that 
confer the GCF with the capability to create and order sub-national political and 
epistemic spaces conventionally thought to be the exclusive remit of the nation-state. 
The chapter explores territory as one key dimension of the capability produced 
through the GCF. The GCF prioritized jurisdiction-wide carbon accounting, rather than 
the project-level accounting developed in the voluntary market, because regulations for 
California’s cap-and-trade program require that any forest offsets originating outside the 
U.S. be issued at the jurisdictional scale. Several cases illustrate the political and legal 
obstacles project-scale offsets presented California regulators, flipping the ‘government 
risk’ facing the private sector into a kind of ‘private risk’ facing regulators in California. 
California regulators’ framing of the problem reflects their objective to not only produce 
new forms of economic value, as in the voluntary market, but also in ideas and concerns 
over political territory. 
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A main central idea in this chapter is the notion of ‘carbon territory’ as a political 
technology where new scales of knowledge and governance are being made. The next 
two chapters tie this idea to two related notions: ‘carbon authority’ and ‘carbon rights’. 
 
Chapter 5 - Carbon Authority: The Authorization of Private Transnational Expertise 
This chapter is a study of the new, crisscrossing lines of authority needed to hold together 
market infrastructure. It proposes carbon authority as a complex category to account for 
transnational lines of private authority that go unrecognized in state-centric understanding 
of global governance. In particular, it focuses on the authorization of expertise from 
private standard-setting organizations and affiliated conservation groups covered in 
Chapter 3. The chapter contrasts California Air Resources Board (ARB) success in 
securing authority for its carbon market, with the difficulties the Governor of Chiapas 
faced in securing authority to sell credits in that market. The chapter argues that the 
failure to anticipate these challenges is partly a result of a state-centric view of global 
governance, underscoring the need to recognize the tacit authority and, by extension, 
responsibility of private actors to orchestrate public policy. 
This chapter examines ‘carbon authority’ as a second form of order being 
produced alongside ‘carbon territory’ through the work of the GCF and its member states. 
It argues that the forms of political and economic territory being devised to bring carbon 
markets in line with California’s regulatory requirements also open new forms of 
sovereignty over those spaces. The chapter uses case material from California and the 
GCF-partner state of Chiapas in Mexico to investigate how the production of sub-national 
territories and the economic value they contain lead to the extension and creation of 
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political institutions needed for their design, calculation, and administration. These 
institutions can be said to embody new authoritative spaces because in no direct way do 
they answer to a higher national authority and often exist without any national 
counterparts at all. The chapter focuses on how this process is unfolding in two respects: 
1) by redistributing decision-making and agenda-setting power towards the executive, 
and 2) allocating epistemic authority towards private and non-governmental actors. 
The first part of the chapter begins with a discussion about why governors (as 
opposed to another division of government) spearheaded the GCF. It then elaborates on 
these reasons, and the resulting regulatory, programmatic, and institutional endeavors, as 
played out in Chiapas, which, along with Acre, Brazil, signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding with California in 2010 to work together towards the issuance of 
compliance-grade REDD+ offsets for the California market. In particular, it probes the 
ways that the new political and economic territory opened in Chiapas by the production 
of those credits in line with California regulatory requirements echoed ongoing efforts by 
the governor’s office to make legible and incorporate indigenous communities into the 
state polity and economy—communities with long-standing disputes over land tenure 
amongst themselves and the government, most emblematically in the Zapatista rebellion 
in 1994. 
The second part of the chapter recounts how the epistemic authority to determine 
and carry out carbon accounting was, in large part, allocated to quasi-governmental, non-
governmental, and private sector organizations. In-house regulatory expertise in 
California, much less Chiapas, proved insufficient to devise de novo the rules, protocols, 
standards, methodologies and other techniques to validate and verify the jurisdictional-
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level offsets mandated for California market. To redress this gap, both states engaged 
outside experts to recommend and conduct such calculations, including through a two-
year advisory process funded by the Moore Foundation, the creation of expert networks 
in the GCF, and a mapping and feasibility study conducted by Conservation International 
on behalf of Chiapas. Most importantly, the project developers in the VCS assumed a 
central role in this process, which offered a powerful position to reassert the role of 
projects that would otherwise be left out of a jurisdictional framework. 
The chapter closes by suggesting that the extension of executive and epistemic 
authority is not accidental to the heterogeneous and specialized character of global 
projects, proposing that the flexibility and specialized expertise needed to extend 
ambitious global initiatives like the GCF afford authority to actors otherwise locked out 
of stable, unconventional systems of government.  
 
Chapter 6 -  Carbon Rights: Remaking Property and Community 
This chapter looks at how configurations of territory and authority emerging in California 
and Chiapas relate to the production of rights (and responsibilities) for citizens and 
private entities operating in these states. ‘Carbon rights’ determine such things as the 
standing of citizens to design REDD+ projects and programs, entitlement to the 
distribution of benefits from the sale of carbon offsets, and the definition and contractual 
exchange of property rights to those offsets.  
The chapter explores the origin and character of such rights and their ties to novel 
configurations of territory and authority discussed in the previous chapters. The first part 
of the chapter inquires into a political challenge by citizen groups and Democratic 
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legislators in California who sought to overturn a provision in the state’s cap-and-trade 
regulations for the potential sale of carbon offsets originating in jurisdictions outside the 
U.S. By working through existing legislative channels and air quality laws, these groups 
to aimed to improve air quality in California by attaching additional meanings to “the 
carbon offset.” Though ultimately unsuccessful, concerned citizens and their 
representatives hoped to harness a new regulatory entity into a vehicle for local 
environmental justice, in addition to the global concerns for which the market was 
originally intended. 
The second part of the chapter turns to rights-making in Chiapas. In contrast to 
California, where concerned citizens used existing laws and law-making capacities to 
reframe a novel entity, in Chiapas, local communities and indigenous groups encountered 
“the carbon offset” as an already stabilized entity even as they themselves were poorly 
defined as citizens. As discussed in the previous chapter, Chiapas’ long history of conflict 
leaves sizable areas outside of state control. REDD+ territories therefore offer state 
authorities a way to extend their presence into unruly areas and transform the people 
living in those areas into legible subjects. This process extends beyond mapping and 
administering carbon governance to include forest people themselves in the envisioning 
and design of REDD+ initiatives. To illustrate how this process creates new REDD+-
related roles, responsibilities, and identities for marginalized communities, the chapter 
dissects deliberative institutions created for the explicit purpose, including a discussion of 
the ‘ideal’ stakeholder as formatted inside these institutions. The chapter then contrasts 
this form of inside engagement with protests and other forms of outside resistance, which 
see the distribution of costs and benefits of REDD+ as unjust, and more fundamentally, 
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incompatible with their own conceptions of legitimate authority and territorial claims. 
The chapter closes with a reflection on the significance of these two poles for exclusion 
and inclusion in emerging spaces for knowing and governing the globe at the sub-
national scale. 
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CHAPTER 2 
CALCULATION, LAW, AND SCALE: LOCAL, NATIONAL,  
AND NESTED PROPOSALS FOR REDD+ 
I. Introduction 
This chapter complicates the usually straightforward narrative around REDD+, where 
policy and technique travel on separate paths until their fates converge in a global 
agreement on how to manage and measure forest carbon. The narrative presented here 
instead recounts the entwined histories of global law-making and scientific and technical 
progress on avoided deforestation from the mid-1990s to 2014. 
 I present and analyze this narrative as an empirical and theoretical backdrop for the 
rest of the dissertation. Section II recounts three key theoretical concepts for 
understanding foundational changes in the social order, which were first introduced in 
Chapter 1: capabilities, organizing logics, and tipping points. It elaborates several related 
ideas, such as scales and techniques of globalization, and their methodological 
implications, that are particularly salient to the climate governance. 
 Section III provides examples of how the concepts relate in practice and their 
applicability to governance write large. It also refines the generic notion of capabilities to 
emphasize the interaction of: 1) extant and emerging capabilities, and 2) distinct 
capabilities for making public laws and private calculations expertise (civil regulations) 
as these are running themes of the dissertation. The case material in Section III serves 
two purposes. First, it ties the theoretical notions above to REDD+. Second, explores the 
interplay between extant global law-making capabilities for REDD+ and emerging 
technical capabilities for measuring, monitoring, reporting, and verifying forest carbon. 
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These calculative technique three proposals for carbon accounting at different scales: the 
project, national, and nested approaches. 
 Section IV argues that behind a general economic logic, these three scales entail 
very different constitutional assumptions that go to the heart of the division of public and 
private domains, such as the identity of economic actors, drivers of deforestation, and 
legitimate forms of political participation. The discussion and conclusion argue that these 
underlying assumptions go to the substance of calculation itself, which carry major but 
under-explored implications for global law-making. 
 
II. Theorizing Capabilities, Organizing Logics, and Tipping Points 
The climate policy debate is full of talk about dangerous tipping points. IPCC AR5 warns 
that climate change may trigger tipping points, or “thresholds for abrupt and irreversible 
change”. At times it is said that climate policy itself is at a tipping point, requiring a 
“radical rethink” to avert the crisis of Kyoto’s failure to deliver significant emission 
reductions (Prins 2008). Often the fear is that climate policy must tip soon for the better 
lest action comes too late. Rarely do debates countenance that the legal and technical 
systems underlying climate policy may be subject to abrupt or irreversible change. 
 I argue that thinking about legal and technical capabilities in terms of linked socio-
technical systems is useful for understanding tipping points in climate policy because it 
calls attention to the connection between capabilities and constitutional or foundational 
changes in social organization (Sassen 2006; I recount the concepts here because they are 
central to the dissertation; for a more detailed discussion see Chapter 1, Section V.3.4.).  
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 Organizing logics are the configuration of foundational/constitutional elements. 
This includes the definition of political territory, authority, and rights, and their 
relationship to each other. At the most general level, organizing logics can take a 
centripetal form that concentrate these elements (e.g. the sovereign nation-state) or a 
centrifugal form where they are overlapping and dispersed (e.g. feudal Europe). 
 Tipping points mark the movement from one organizing logic to another. At the 
largest scale, tipping points mark momentous shifts, namely the transition from the feudal 
order to the nation-state or, potentially, the fracturing of nation-states through 
globalization today. At this scale, sweeping worldwide changes unfold across decades 
and centuries. Organizing logics and tipping points, however, are scale-dependent.11 They 
may trigger shifts across scales or systems. Tipping points do not simply happen—they 
are enacted through capabilities. 
 Capability is a general term that refers to the power to configure 
foundational/constitutional elements in particular ways. Examples of capabilities in 
carbon markets are various ‘techniques of globalization’: the technologies, standards, 
practices, and expertise for quantifying forest carbon; the laws and regulations for 
holding firms accountable for their emissions; and the international treaty-based system 
to set binding national emission targets. 
 Methodologically, this does two things. It means that organizing logics, 
capabilities, and tipping points may be found at different scales. It also suggests that 
                                            
11 Here, scale refers to the spatial and temporal extent and variability of the system in 
question. The difference or similarity between forms of organization (e.g. systems, 
assembles, networks, etc.) is beyond the current discussion may be relevant to theorizing 
capabilities, organizing logics, and tipping points. I treat them synonymously hear, with 
the understanding that some level of coherence and coordination apply across the entity 
in question. Also see discussion of global projects in Chapter 1. 
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smaller scale changes, in legal or technical capabilities for carbon markets, for example, 
may foreshadow or yield larger transformations in global governance. 
 
III. Extant and Emerging Global Capabilities 
I distinguish between ‘extant’ and ‘emergent’ capabilities. I use these adjectives (rather 
than, say, ‘old’ and ‘new’) because they indicate history and continuity—emergent 
capabilities can build on extant ones. It also implies that conflicting capabilities can co-
exist. The purpose of this is to: 1) connect to ideas for thinking about how capabilities are 
built, like practice, network, bricolage, and assemblage, and 2) avoid the common 
methodological trap of setting up a false dichotomy between the global and the local or 
national (Sassen 2006, Jasanoff & Long-Martello 2004). 
 I offer four ideal examples of the relationship between capabilities 
(extant/emerging), organizing logics (centripetal/centrifugal), and tipping points (yes/no): 
 
1) emergent/centrifugal/tipping point: The emergent capability of derivative swaps and 
other forms of financial innovation facilitated the global flow of capital outside of the 
competence of national regulators. 
 
2) emergent/centripetal/no tipping point: Conversely, emergent capabilities can defend 
an already-dominant organizing logic against change. Most military innovations would 
fall into this category. 
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3) extant/centripetal/no tipping point: Alternatively, extant capabilities in national or 
international law can maintain an organizing logic—the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization’s (NATO) perpetuation of an East-West balance of power between nation-
states, for example. 
 
4) extant/centrifugal/tipping point: Finally, extant capabilities can ‘jump-tracks’ to be 
used for purposes for which they were not intended. This is the case with the proposed 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which aims to work through national legislation to 
weaken national jurisdiction over global capital, and increase the efficiency and stability 
of the global trade. 
 
 The following two sections examine two global capabilities (i.e. for knowing and 
governing global problems) that are critical to REDD+: 1) the extant public capabilities 
of governments to make global law in the UNFCCC and 2) the private emergent 
capabilities of conservation groups and carbon market pioneers to calculate carbon 
savings from reducing deforestation. 
 
III.1. Extant Capabilities for Global Law-making: The UNFCCC and REDD+ 
III.1.1. A Problem of Missing Global Teeth 
The rediscovery of Roman law in 11th-Century-Italy set the groundwork for civil law and 
secular authority across Europe. According to the geographer and political theorist Stuart 
Elden (2013), Roman law “produced a fundamental shift in the way the relation between 
power, people, and place was understood.” While common law accumulates from the 
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bottom-up through tradition and experience, Roman law works its way from the top-
down without regard for culture or context. In Europe, Roman Law “was oriented to 
overriding localized interests without necessarily promoting universal claims” (Sassen 
2006). 
 Similarly, international law aims to fashion a common set of rules for all nations, 
irrespective of their history, present condition, or future prospects. This is, of course, an 
ideal, compromised in the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibility’, which 
was established to facilitate Parties’ agreement to the UNFCCC and other environmental 
conventions. Such qualifications belie the limits of international consensus and therefore 
the reach and effectiveness of international law. 
 Much like nations today legitimize their actions by invoking invoke international 
law, medieval monarchs used Roman law to authorize their actions outside the Church 
and above feudal lords. There is, however, a crucial difference. While monarchs secured 
secular authority by joining Roman law to royal justice (Sassen 2006), the global era 
lacks an equivalent power of justice to enforce and authorize international law over non-
compliance nations. 
 This is the classic problem of global governance: it lacks teeth. Contra realist 
scholars, the weak enforcement of global governance does not mean it is irrelevant. As 
institutionalist scholars have argued (e.g. Chayes and Chayes 1998), the institutions of 
global governance have other capabilities, namely the creation and application of soft 
power in the form of norms and rules (Nye 2005). 
 Given that no world government exists that might apply coercive force over 
nations, as nations do over their citizens, I argue that these consensus-based guidelines 
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must rely on means other than hard judicial enforcement to gain authority. This is not an 
original insight. Rather than suggest, however, that compliance with international 
regulatory agreements services from a ‘New Sovereignty’ based on the interests nations 
have in gaining good standing in world affairs (Chayes and Chayes 1998), I argue that 
soft authority comes from the articulation of extant global law-making capabilities of 
governments (i.e. REDD+ rulemaking) with emerging expert and technical capabilities 
(i.e. REDD+ standards). 
 The perspectives are not incompatible. Both Chayes and Chayes’ ‘managerial’ 
view, and the legal and technical capabilities presented here, diverge from the 
‘enforcement’ model. Focusing on legal and technical capabilities, however, confers 
several advantages: 
 First, it builds on institutionalist scholarship on orchestration, civil regulation, and 
private entrepreneurial authority to understand the relationship between international law 
and expertise. Civil regulation refers to self-regulation of private enterprise through 
consumer politics and standard-setting by NGOs to green corporate practice (Bendell 
2000, Vogel 2008). Jessica Green (2014) proposes the related concept of delegated 
authority to explain how private actors become de facto rule makers in global governance 
by having private standards and other forms of expertise adopted by public policymakers. 
This also relates to Abbott et al.’s (2015) idea of orchestration, where international 
organizations lacking the mandate or resources to manage other actors directly 
‘orchestrate’ their targets’ behavior through an intermediary with overlapping interests 
that does have the mandate or resources. (Chapters 3 and 5 elaborate on civil regulation, 
and orchestration/private entrepreneurial authority, respectively.) 
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 Second, it has the advantage of defining the analysis through capabilities and their 
logical organization rather than actors. This helps circumvent the problem of 
“methodological nationalism” (Beck 2010), which results from a nation-centric view that 
renders many of the most interesting and important dynamics of globalization invisible. 
As the dissertation will show, it is necessary to investigate the actions and relationship of 
state and non-state actors at national levels to understand how the venerable forms of 
territory, authority, and rights are being reworked in the name of global problems. 
 
III.1.2. The REDD+ Rulebook 
In 2014 at COP 19 in Warsaw, Parties to the UNFCCC agreed to the ‘REDD+ 
Rulebook’. The seven decisions of the Rulebook, also known as ‘Warsaw Framework for 
REDD+’, represent the full suite of rules guiding how carbon reductions will be 
measured and results-based payments will be delivered. Five of the decisions are the 
outcome of nearly a decade of work on methodological guidance in the Convention’s 
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA), which the COP 
tasked with devising technical procedures for counting carbon in tropical forests. These 
procedures are a prerequisite for any results-based payments to developing countries, and 
cover technical matters such as the identification of drivers of deforestation and forest 
degradation and activities to address them, as well the creation of national forest 
monitoring systems based on remote-sensing and ground-based carbon inventories. 
 The agreement, inter alia, requires countries to have national forest monitoring 
systems in place before receiving results-based payments for curbing deforestation. For 
the sake of flexibility, it carves out an exception for “subnational monitoring and 
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reporting as an interim measure” to help countries get those national systems up and 
running. The main purpose of this methodological guidance is to create accounting 
systems to certify that REDD+ activities have achieved “real, measurable, and verifiable” 
emission reductions. This involves, among other things, estimating the deforestation and 
emissions from deforestation expected in a country absent intervention. These ‘reference 
levels’ and ‘reference emission levels’ are then measured against the actual emissions 
from deforestation. The difference between the two determines results-based payments to 
be rewarded. There are many potential ways this measurement and reporting could be 
done. 
 REDD+ has been praised as a rare point of agreement in the international climate 
negotiations, but Parties remain divided on how to design financial incentives to reduce 
deforestation. In a market, REDD+ credits could be traded as a fungible commodity 
alongside credits generated from the farms, energy projects, and other emission-reduction 
efforts measured by emissions auditors, whereas a fund would deliver direct results-based 
payments, outside of a market proper. 
 In principle, the rules are in place to deliver results-based payments for forest 
conservation. While these rules do not yet tie those payments to a market, negotiations 
for a market-mechanism are moving forward. In the meantime, the UNFCCC has 
encouraged developing country Parties to develop the forest monitoring systems needed 
to certify that payments reward real results, whether they come from a fully-fledged 
market or fund. In order to accommodate diverse national circumstances, Parties have 
agreed to pursue a ‘flexible’ approach when developing their forest monitoring systems. 
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 Countries are often given significant latitude to interpret international 
environmental law “as appropriate to national circumstances”—certainly much greater 
discretion than regulated entities typically have when complying with national 
environmental law. This is a feature of the global law-making capability that nations have 
built over the latter decades of the 20th Century. The SBSTA, for example, is ostensibly 
the chief scientific advisory organ to the COP. This has encouraged the expectation that 
SBSTA can (and should) mediate between outside scientific institutions and the political 
institution of the COP in the same way that the National Academy of Sciences acts as a 
go-between for science and Congress in the U.S. (e.g. see Guston 2001 on boundary 
organizations; and Miller 2001b on SBSTA). The climate regime, however, is far more 
dynamic than national scientific and political institutions in the U.S., which have come 
into a stable alignment over more than a century. 
 As a result, many call for SBSTA to become “more scientific” and “less political”. 
The REDD+ rules are an example. The rules, first negotiated in SBSTA, and then 
approved by COP, are more lax than many would like. Some worry that the rules are so 
open that countries will perversely be able to define the plantations that cause 
deforestation ‘natural forests’, and get money for it. Others are concerned that the 
language of the rules means that social and environmental safeguards amount to a rubber 
stamp, and afford no meaningful protections to biodiversity or local communities. 
 These are legitimate concerns, but they do not mean that making SBSTA more 
scientific will make it more effective or that reforms of this kind are even possible within 
the international system. This is because in a highly divisive and dynamic regime, 
SBSTA performs ‘hybrid management’ (Miller 2001a). Where most every issue is hotly 
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contested, there must be some means to decide which issues are amenable scientific 
closure and which require political negotiation, if collective decisions are to be reached. 
In the UNFCCC, SBSTA is it. 
 Therefore, the model we use to make sense of capabilities for making laws and 
making calculations in the climate regime cannot be the same model we use to 
understand science and decision-making in national settings. This is due to the extreme 
fracturing of values, interests, identities, beliefs, and so forth that characterizes global 
environmental politics. This does not mean that it is deficient or disordered, exactly, so 
much as global governance is able to do certain things, and not others, that we take for 
granted in the modern nation-state. 
 Most importantly, the borders between what gets treated as science and what 
politics are very porous in bodies like SBSTA. To get find purchase on how global 
calculative capabilities relate to global law-making capabilities, I ask two sets of 
questions. 
 The first investigates the rudimentary accounting frameworks or proto-capabilities, 
private actors proposed for private and public rulemaking. Here I focus on frameworks 
and proposals for forest carbon accounting. These proto-capabilities are ‘proto’ because 
they are only partially worked out. They may elaborate a logic with rigor but have not 
been adopted into practice. Proto-capabilities are the first stage of emergence, are often 
the product of individuals working in well-networked organizations, and exist somewhere 
between what Jasanoff (2015) describes as the origin and embedding of a socio-technical 
imaginary. 
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 Of proto-capabilities, the remainder of this chapter asks: Where does the 
environmental knowledge that motivates or justifies global laws come from? How does it 
become authoritative in the negotiations? In particular, what kind of knowledge do non-
state actors outside the formal climate regime produce to influence law-making inside the 
regime? What values, interests, and objectives does this knowledge embody? More 
deeply, what constitution/organizing logic for what kind of global governance?” I pick up 
these questions in the next section. 
 Chapter 3 takes up second, related set of questions of capabilities that have been 
embedded in regulations, practices, or institutions, be they private or public. Chapter 3 
asks, “Where does the knowledge to refine and implement global laws inside the nation-
state come from? How does it become authoritative outside of the negotiations? Are the 
non-state actors providing this knowledge the same as the ones who provide knowledge 
to motivate or justify global environmental laws? What are their values, interests, 
objectives, and organizing logic/constitutional implications?” 
 
III.2. Emergent Technical Capabilities: Three Ways to Calculate a Carbon Credit 
The following cases trace the history of three proposals for measuring and reporting 
avoided deforestation from its initial appearance in the Kyoto negotiations in the mid-
1990s to the post-Kyoto negotiations today. Each of these proposals—project, national, 
and nested—represents an emerging calculative capability of non-state actors, devised to 
steer global rulemaking for REDD+. Each proposal played a prominent role in the 
international climate negotiations, appearing in submissions to the UNFCCC from either 
Parties or observers to the Convention.  
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III.2.1. The Rise and Fall of Deforestation in the Clean Development Mechanism: The 
Local Project Scale 
Emissions assessors visit many kinds of carbon offset projects for the Kyoto Protocol’s 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), ranging from hydroelectric power plants to 
waste incineration plants to facilities that flare ozone-destroying gases, yet very rarely do 
they visit forest projects. Of the 7535 projects registered with the CDM in mid-2014, only 
55 dealt with forests (Figure 2).12 None addressed deforestation, which Parties made 
ineligible for carbon credits under the Marrakesh Accord of 2001. 
 
Figure 2. Carbon Offset Investment Cycle. 
 
 During the negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol in the mid-1990s, however, 
deforestation was widely seen as an important emissions source that should be covered 
by carbon trading. At that time, forest loss was already recognized as a major contributor 
                                            
12 CDM Project Search, http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/projsearch.html, accessed 7/15/14) 
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to global warming, accounting for 15-17% of all anthropogenic carbon emissions—or an 
amount equal to the entire transportation sector.13 
 One of the reasons why there are so few such projects in the CDM is the 
methodological difficulties for measuring, reporting, and verifying forest carbon credits 
(Marechal & Hecq 2006). These methodologies are more complicated and require more 
expertise to administer than those for other kinds of projects because of technical 
uncertainties unique to forestry. Unlike the carbon prevented from entering the 
atmosphere by building a wind power plant instead of a coal plant, carbon stored in trees 
could be suddenly reversed at the whim of loggers or forest fire. Therefore uncertainties 
exist over the permanence of forest carbon credits. Further uncertainties also exist about 
additionality and displacement. Additionality is the counter-factual requirement that the 
project brings benefits that would not occur under businesses as usual. Displacement, also 
called leakage, refers to the possibility that even if a project were to provide additional 
benefits by alleviating deforestation in one site, total emissions might remain unchanged 
because deforestation would simply shift elsewhere to meet the demand for subsistence 
agriculture or commodities like timber, cattle, or soy. 
 Taking measures to avoid deforestation fit well within the ‘comprehensive 
approach’ introduced by the United States into the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) in the late 1980s, which called for accounting guidelines for the sources 
and sinks of all anthropogenic greenhouse gases relevant global climate system, equated 
through the standardized metric of ‘global warming potential’. The idea for 
                                            
13 The Fifth Assessment Report of the IPCC (2014) had revised the estimate for carbon 
emissisions from forest loss to 12 percent of of global emissions, largely because of 
growing emissions from fossil fuels (http://www.ipcc.ch/). 
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comprehensive emissions accounting was at first controversial because it, in principle, 
called for all greenhouse gas emissions to be covered under a single global policy. 
Nevertheless, the notion soon became an unquestioned part of the dominant global 
environmental imaginary with the 1992 signing of the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) (Bodansky 1995, Stewart & Wiener 1992). 
 Once enshrined in UNFCCC, the practicalities of managing all emissions sources 
under a single treaty proved challenging. While the Kyoto Protocol aspired to include all 
forest carbon sources and sinks, the actual wording of the agreement remained vague, 
leading to a dispute in the Marrakesh negotiations over what parts of the carbon cycle 
should be included, and how. The debate largely centered on the interpretation of the 
scientific uncertainty and political implications of a Special Report by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) on Land Use, Land Use Change, and 
Forestry (LULUCF) commissioned by the SBSTA to inform rule-making for the CDM 
(Fogel 2005). 
 The United States, Canada and Europe continued to back the comprehensive 
inclusion of all forest sources and sinks, on the basis of cost-savings, environmental 
effectiveness, and sustainable development in the Global South. An informal coalition of 
Latin American countries concurred. On the other side, Brazil and Peru, along with most 
of the G77 and China, argued against the idea for a host of reasons. Some saw the 
measure as a way for industrialized countries to dodge their responsibility to reduce fossil 
fuel emissions at home. Others feared so-called ‘Kyoto lands’ infringing on national 
sovereignty, and dislocating communities with commercial plantations (Boyd et al. 
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2004). Often these arguments joined concerns about technical and scientific uncertainty 
related to permanence, additionality, and displacement of emissions from forest projects. 
 In the end, Parties settled their differences in setting the rules for Kyoto’s first 
commitment period from 2008-2012 by allowing limited credits from carbon stored in 
newly planted forests under the categories afforestation14 and reforestation.15 But Parties 
removed avoided deforestation altogether, at just the time when forest loss surged in 
Brazil, Indonesia, and other rainforest countries. The expulsion of avoided deforestation 
projects from the CDM was a disappointment to many who had heralded a global carbon 
market as an unprecedented opportunity to fund local conservation projects. The mid-
1990s had seen the spread of a new breed of market-based approaches to conservation, 
where large conservation organizations, reversing their traditionally anti-business stance, 
entered partnerships with businesses and governments in anticipation that carbon markets 
would become a new and massive pool of finance to flow from the Global North to 
protect forests, forest communities, biodiversity and the global climate all in one go. 
These partnerships, already well underway when countries made deforestation projects 
ineligible under the CDM, sought new ways of linking finance to conservation, and doing 
so over much larger areas, more cost-effectively, than the smaller-scale tree planting 
initiatives that were permitted. 
                                            
14 “Afforestation is the direct human-induced conversion of land that has not been 
forested for a period of at least 50 years to forested land through planting, seeding and/or 
the human-induced promotion of natural seed sources” (16/CMP.1, Annex, paragraph 
1(b)). 
15 “Reforestation is the direct human-induced conversion of non-forested land to forested 
land through planting, seeding and/or the human-induced promotion of natural seed 
sources, on land that was forested but that has been converted to non-forested land. For 
the first commitment period, reforestation activities will be limited to reforestation 
occurring on those lands that did not contain forest on 31 December 1989 (16/CMP.1, 
Annex, paragraph 1(c)).  
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 One of the first large-scale avoided deforestation projects began in 1996, when The 
Nature Conservancy spearheaded an avoided deforestation project in the area around 
Bolivia’s Noel Kempff Mercado National Park. The conservation group joined with the 
Bolivian Fundación Amigos de la Naturaleza (FAN) to create the Noel Kempff Mercado 
Climate Action Project (NKCAP) to protect 0.6 million hectares (ha) of tropical forests. 
With support from the Bolivian government and the sale of carbon credits to three energy 
companies— American Electric Power, BP America and PacifiCorp—the US$11 million 
project terminated logging rights in an effort to keep 55 million metric tons of carbon 
dioxide out of the atmosphere over a 30 years period.16 A second exemplar of avoided 
deforestation projects, Scolel Té, emerged around in the same time in the Mexican state 
of Chiapas. In 1997, the project, led by the Mexican conservation group Ambio, started 
selling carbon credits to the voluntary (non-compliance) market from agroforestry 
activities undertaken by some 2000 campesinos, at a price of US$4-8 per ton of carbon, 
or about US$140 dollars per hectare per year (Corbera 2009, Osborne 2011, 2013). 
 Noel Kempff and Scolel Té have since been joined by hundreds of other avoided 
deforestation projects around the world. When a global compliance market for carbon 
credits from avoided deforestation did not materialize under the CDM or EU-ETS, these 
projects were forced to find buyers in the much smaller voluntary carbon market made of 
                                            
16 The initial estimate for savings of 55 million metric tons of carbon dioxide from the 
Noel Kempff project were later revised downwards by nearly 90% to 5.8 million metric 
tons and become the subject of major controversy over the environmental integrity of 
forest carbon offsets (see Greenpeace report, http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/en/news-
and-blogs/news/carbon-scam/). In addition to carbon storage, TNC claims the project 
provides benefits by protecting biodiversity, preventing soil erosion and agricultural 
runoff, providing training and employment, and securing legal status of communities as 
indigenous people and legal tenure to their traditional lands 
(http://www.nature.org/ourinitiatives/urgentissues/global-warming-climate-
change/places-we-protect/noel-kempff-mercado-national-park.xml). 
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the relatively few number of businesses, international organizations, and, to a lesser 
extent, individual consumers electing to purchase offsets on their own accord. 
 With no compliance market in place, project developers were free to develop their 
own monitoring, reporting, and verification guidelines, which tended to be less strenuous 
than those required for similar projects under the CDM. One review of the land use and 
livelihood impacts of Noel Kempff, Scolel Té, and eighteen other ‘pre-REDD+’ projects 
launched between 1996 and 2008 found that the verification for these projects’ emission 
reductions and other social and environmental impacts often “appeared to be 
afterthoughts” that “lacked rigor” (Caplow et al. 2011).17 In part, these loose accounting 
practices were due a lack of quality standards and dearth of reporting requirements like 
those mandated for other kinds of projects to qualify for credits under the CDM. 
 Although private certification systems like the Verified Carbon Standard (VCS)18 
and Climate, Community, and Biodiversity Alliance Standards (CCBA) would later 
devise more exacting requirements for the voluntary carbon market, early avoided 
deforestation projects liked Noel Kempff and Scolel Té lacked a clear or consistent set of 
practices.19 
                                            
17 Capow et al. (2011) identified these twenty ‘pre-REDD+’ projects, which “include 
projects on avoided deforestation, avoided degradation and sustainable forest 
management, but not those delivering carbon credits solely through 
afforestation/reforestation”, according to four criteria: “(a) was launched after UNFCCC 
COP-1 but before COP-13; (b) is located in a developing (non-Annex I) country; (c) aims 
primarily to reduce deforestation and forest degradation; (d) has estimated its net impact 
on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.” 
18 The standard-setting body was named the Voluntary Carbon Standard when it was 
created in 2005 but changed its name to the Verified Carbon Standard in 2011, 
http://www.v-c-s.org/who-we-are, accessed 7 August 2014. 
19 Scolel Té adopted an early standard for certifying carbon credits called Plan Vivo, 
although the project implementation of this standard (e.g. Capow et al. 2011) as well as 
its requirements are considered to be insufficiently rigorous for certifying carbon credits 
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 Despite the setback posed by the dashed hopes for a global carbon market, 
conservationists and their partners in businesses and government have sought to re-
introduce avoided deforestation into a post-2012 Kyoto agreement. In pressing their case 
for market environmentalism in the UNFCCC, these groups have put forward 
increasingly sophisticated scientific, technical, and political programs for how forests and 
climate should be known and governed, and, in the process, articulated new rationalities 
for global governance. 
 
III.2.2. Avoiding Deforestation with Compensated Reduction: The Jurisdictional Scale 
A groundbreaking moment for global climate and forest policy came in 2005 when a 
small group of American and Brazilian scientists published an alternative scheme to 
address the uncertainties reputed to have kept avoided deforestation out of the CDM. The 
paper, published in the journal Climatic Change under the title “Tropical deforestation 
and the Kyoto Protocol”, proposed to account for deforestation at the national-level 
instead of the project-level as in the CDM.  
 Heading the team was Márcio Santilli, a researcher at the Amazon Institute for 
Environmental Research (IPAM), indigenous-rights activist, and the second youngest 
Congressmen ever elected in Brazil. To these laurels Santilli would add Time Magazine’s 
2009 Hero of the Environment for his novel proposal to reward tropical countries for 
forest protection. During the early 2000’s Brazil’s deforestation rate plummeted after the 
country passed new land-use legislation, strengthened enforcement of existing legislation, 
                                                                                                                                  
(personal communication from a representative of a carbon market consultancy, 
Governors’ Climate and Forest Task Force (GCF) Annual Meeting in Chiapas, Mexico, 
September, 2012. 
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and recognized indigenous rights to large expanses of the Amazon rainforest. 
Complementing Brazil’s unexpected policy success, advancements in satellite remote-
sensing technology promised to make it easier for scientists to monitor vast areas of 
forest more cheaply, accurately, and quickly than ever before. 
 Santilli figured that, with adequate international funding and robust forest 
monitoring, these results could be maintained in Brazil and replicated in other developing 
countries. International donors were skeptical of the viability of national-level reforms, 
citing a litany of past failures amid corruption, poor planning, bureaucratic inefficiencies 
and general challenges confronting high-level development assistance everywhere. 
Santilli’s proposal nevertheless found favor in Brazil’s sympathetic environment 
minister—a rarity in a country long intent on developing its forested interior—and with 
the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD). The two countries 
agreed to establish the Norwegian Rainforest Fund to pilot results-based payments for 
bringing down the deforestation rate in Brazil.  
 At this point, the proposal had not entered the climate negotiations. Santilli’s team, 
though, refined the idea into the 2005 paper in Climatic Change. The nation, not the 
project, they argued, was the right scale to address the global problems of deforestation 
and climate change. Under this scheme, national-level deforestation measured across a 
large spatial area would resolve the scientific and technical uncertainties of the 
permanence, additionality and, especially, displacement that kept site-specific projects 
out of the CDM (Table 2). The calculation of the carbon saved by reducing deforestation 
and the subsequent payments based on those calculations would likewise be determined 
across a country’s forests as a whole. In principle, these payments could be come from a 
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carbon market or dedicated fund. To set apart this national-level idea from the earlier 
avoided deforestation projects like Noel Kempff and Scolel Té, the authors devised the 
term “‘compensated reduction’, as a means of both mitigating climate change and 
facilitating significant developing country participation in the Kyoto Protocol 
framework.” 
 
 
Table 2. Comparison of National Sub-national REDD Approaches (Corbera et al. 2010)  
 
 This shift in the scale from local projects to the nation provided a political solution 
for developing countries worried that an influx of forest projects would erode their 
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sovereignty by locking away large stretches of their territories in ‘Kyoto lands’.20 The 
shift from the local to the national scale alleviated these worries by, in effect, drawing a 
line of accountability above which, in the supranational space, developed and developing 
countries could re-engage in stalled negotiations over deforestation by discussing 
national-level compensations. This appealed both to developed countries concerned over 
the environmental integrity of local emission reductions by accounting for net 
deforestation over the entirety of a national jurisdiction, and to developing countries that 
saw compensation for non-binding emissions reductions as a means to engage in climate 
change mitigation while preserving their sovereignty. 
 In the sub-national space below that line, the concept also appealed to developing 
countries because it left interventions for achieving cuts entirely in their discretion. The 
original proposal in Climatic Change scarcely mentions sub-national projects that were 
so divisive in the CDM. The paper instead argues that large-scale reductions in 
deforestation will come from the sweeping reforms that only governments can enact, with 
projects playing a bit part amid a broader array of mechanisms: 
 
Tropical country governments can reduce deforestation through adequate funding 
of programs designed to enforce environmental legislation, support for economic 
alternatives to extensive forest clearing (including carbon crediting), and building 
institutional capacity in remote forest regions (Santilli et al. 2005). 
 
                                            
20 Local projects are not to be confused with the idea of global projects presented in 
Chapter 1. Although I do not pursue it, it may be fruitful to explicitly theorize the two 
together. 
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National-level reforms, combined with adequate finance, promised a fresh approach to 
piecemeal conservation. This level of action, it was thought, was needed to grapple with 
the ultimate drivers of deforestation at-scale. The majority of country submissions to the 
UNFCCC reflected strong support for a national focus, not simply to preserve their 
sovereignty, but also because it ostensibly struck the drivers of deforestation at their root 
(Angelsen et al. 2012). Small-scale projects inevitably focused on proximate causes of 
forest loss attributed to local landholders or swidden farmers. But only countries, it was 
argued, could deliver truly transformative changes by addressing the ultimate drivers of 
deforestation both within and beyond the forest sector proper. If national forestry reform 
in the 1980s and 1990s had fallen short of this goal in the past, it was only because it was 
ill-planned and poorly funded.21 
 A new model of national compensation, however, would instigate durable, 
structural changes to reduce deforestation through various Polices and Measures (PAMs), 
like revising economic and regulatory frameworks, removing perverse agricultural 
subsidies, and re-zoning timber concessions and other forms of land use (Angelsen & 
McNeill 2012, Corbera 2009, Agrawal et al. 2011). 
 
We propose the novel concept of “compensated reduction”, whereby countries 
that elect to reduce national level deforestation to below a previously determined 
historical level would receive post facto compensation, and commit to stabilize or 
further reduce deforestation in the future (Santilli et al. 2005). 
                                            
21 UN proposals for Tropical Forest Action Plan of the 1980s, for example, had come to 
be seen as a failure to steer national forest policy towards conservation (e.g. Angelsen 
and McNeill 2012, Goldman 2005) 
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Shortly after the publication of Santilli’s paper in Climatic Change, the Coalition of 
Rainforest Nations (CfRN), led by Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica, picked up the idea 
in a submission to COP11 in Montreal on ‘reducing emissions from deforestation in 
developing countries’ (RED). The idea quickly gained traction and restored the attention 
to deforestation that had been lost in the CDM. RED took another major step forward in 
2007 when COP15 adopted the Bali Action Plan (Decision 1/CP.13), launching the post-
2012 long-term agenda for cooperative action for climate change mitigation. At the 
behest of developing countries whose low deforestation rates would have precluded their 
involvement, the long-term agenda recognized not only deforestation but also forest 
degradation and “conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of 
carbon stocks”, leading to the acronym REDD+ (Figure 3). 
 
 
Figure 3. Types of REDD+ Emissions Reductions and Carbon Enhancement (EPRI 2012) 
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 Around the same time, a spate of highly-influential studies calculated opportunity 
costs to argue for the cost-effectiveness for reducing emissions from deforestation. Lord 
Nicholas Stern, author of the UK-commissioned Stern Report on The Economics of 
Climate Change (2006), promoted the idea that “Curbing deforestation is a highly cost-
effective way of reducing greenhouse gas emissions and has the potential to offer 
significant reductions fairly quickly.” Similar studies touting the cost-effectiveness of 
REDD+ added credibility to the proposal (see for example, Busch et al. 2009; Eliasch 
2008; European Commission 2008; Gullison et al. 2007; Kindermann et al. 2006, 2008; 
Meridian Institute 2009). 
 A few years after the small group of researchers in Brazil and the US aired their 
idea for national-level compensated reductions for avoided deforestation in Climatic 
Change, the proposal had transformed the negotiations. By introducing a clear, plausible 
governing rationality their notion of ‘compensated reduction’ set REDD+ in motion, 
stimulating global discussions on how results-based payments for carbon could be made 
and certified at the national-level. The proposals, however, left much unsaid and allowed 
alternative programs centered not on countries but on projects to take the stage once 
again. 
 
III.2.3. The Return of Forest Projects: Nesting Projects in the Jurisdictional Scale 
In 2005, COP15 invited Parties and accredited observers to submit their views on RED.22 
In most of the twelve observer submissions that followed, large conservation 
organizations like the Environmental Defense Fund, Conservation International, and The 
                                            
22 For the mandate see FCCC/CP/2005/5, paragraph 81 
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Nature Conservancy, and their collaborators in universities and the private sector, praised 
the proposal as a second and perhaps last chance to save dwindling rainforests through a 
global carbon market. IPAM's Márcio Santilli and Paulo Moutinho reiterated their 
recently published case in Climatic Change, writing that national-level compensations for 
reducing deforestation “would not be a mechanism, like the CDM, linked to the 
execution of specific projects, but rather a commitment between countries.”23 Several 
groups, including the leading carbon market champion, the Environmental Defense Fund, 
endorsed their idea as at long last a credible way for countries to trade offsets from 
avoided deforestation in the global carbon market.24 Reflecting on the fervor for the idea 
at the time, a policy expert from Environmental Defense later remarked that: 
 
The publication of ‘Tropical deforestation and the Kyoto Protocol’ was a very 
important development because it created a scientific space—and a policy 
space—where you could actually talk about reducing emissions from 
deforestation and put the leakage [displacement] question to one side. It didn't 
completely resolve the leakage question but it greatly tempered it.25  
 
Other groups supported the general idea, while using the discussion to highlight the 
avoided deforestation projects that had begun a decade earlier in anticipation of a carbon 
                                            
23 2006 IPAM submission to SBSTA, see 
http://unfccc.int/parties_observers/ngo/submissions/items/3689.php, accessed 7/16/14. 
24 SMSN/NGO/2006/009 
25 ‘Are we on the brink of saving rainforests?’, Mongabay, accessed 8/1/14: 
http://news.mongabay.com/2009/0722-redd.html 
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market under the CDM. In separate submissions both The Nature Conservancy26 and 
Fundación Amigos de la Naturaleza (FAN)27 said the “Noel Kempff Climate Action 
Project (NKCAP) in Bolivia demonstrates that activities to reduce deforestation can 
provide real, verifiable emissions reductions,” adding that “the monitoring methods used 
by the NKCAP could also be applied to measure emissions reductions from sector-wide 
approaches to reduce national deforestation rates.” Conservation International went a step 
further in its submission, highlighting the Mantadia-Zahamena Corridor Restoration and 
Protection Project in Madagascar as an example of the kind of local projects that should 
be re-introduced into the CDM, whether or not Parties also went forward with a national-
level approach.28 
 A number of governments too voiced support for the general idea but doubted their 
prospects for benefiting from national-level RED, in large part because they lacked the 
sophisticated expertise and infrastructure of countries like Brazil to monitor and manage 
their forests (Global Canopy Foundation 2008). UNFCCC submissions from Central 
African Forest Commission (COMIFAC), as well as Chile, Malaysia, and Colombia, 
recalled the CDM-style projects as an alternative to top-down, national strategies. Yet, 
despite renewed attention from both conservationists and countries, CDM-style forest 
projects languished for two years in the negotiations because there was no clear way to 
count small-scale emission reductions in a national framework. 
 An accounting innovation first spelled out by a forest engineer in Costa Rica would 
change that. Lucio Pedroni, of the Tropical Agricultural Research and Higher Education 
                                            
26 SMSN/NGO/2006/007 
27 SMSN/NGO/2006/008 
28 SMSN/NGO/2006/012 
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Center (CATIE), developed a means to reconcile national and sub-national accounting. 
The idea was to calculate avoided deforestation and award credits to both levels 
simultaneously. This would resolve the leakage problem by requiring that the sum total of 
all compensation be based on net emissions saved across an entire country, but then 
allowing that sum to be distributed to individual projects in line with their local 
contributions. CATIE and the German Emissions Trading Association (BVEK) formally 
submitted the proposal to the UNFCCC in early 2007.29 
 Later that year, Pedroni elaborated the proposal in a paper titled ‘Mobilizing Public 
and Private Resources for the Protection of Tropical Rainforests’ with Charlotte Streck, a 
former Senior Counsel to the World Bank who founded the carbon market consultancy 
Climate Focus in the Netherlands in 2005 after helping to establish the World Bank’s 
BioCarbon Fund. Housed under the Bank’s Carbon Finance Unit, the Fund was created 
as a public-private partnership in 2004 to mobilize investments for CDM-style projects 
that sequester carbon in forests and agro-ecosystems. 
 In a 2006 article in International Affairs, Streck (2006) had already reacted against 
Santilli’s idea for national-level compensated reductions “as a pure government-to-
government mechanism. While the submission of Environmental Defense appears to 
contemplate private sector participation, IPAM’s submission considers private 
participation as a risk rather than an opportunity”, instead encouraging Parties to 
authorize private entities to participate in the market. Within months their alternative to 
national-level REDD+ entered the negotiations when Paraguay submitted it almost 
verbatim in a submission to the Bali COP, on behalf of Honduras, Mexico, Panama and 
                                            
29 SMSN/NGO/2007/002, responding to FCCC/SBSTA/2006/L.25. 
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Peru, with support from Ecuador and Chile.30 The proposal gives leeway to countries to 
adopt a national approach if they so choose but offers an alternative: 
 
“nested approach”, whereby project activities can start independently and 
immediately while national level emission reduction programs are progressively 
implemented by a larger number of countries. Developing countries would be able 
to decide on their initial level of participation in this mechanism.  
 
A national-only approach, they argued, was deeply problematic. In a section on the 
‘Problems of Relying on National Baselines Only’, they explained that: 
 
Many UNFCCC negotiators appear to favor a REDD mechanism exclusively built 
on the adoption of national baselines…[However] Such a system would only be 
successful in those countries that are able to successfully implement effective 
policy, legal and institutional reforms nation wide, including appropriate social 
and economic safeguards. 
 
These countries, they suggested, were few and the time, political cost, and risk of failure 
required for the necessary legal, political, and institutional reforms far exceeded any 
reasonable expectation. Under such constraints, the feasibility for REDD+ looked bleak: 
 
                                            
30 FCCC/SBSTA/2007/MISC.14 
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A consequence of such a mechanism is that countries with little capacity to 
implement forest protection measures, and thus most in need for international 
support, would not be able to participate in a system which rewards the nation 
wide lowering of deforestation rates only. 
 
Their solution was a ‘nested approach’ to carbon accounting and finance, based on a 
double baseline-and-credit system (Figure 4). Under this system, the central government 
would see to the international arrangements and reporting requirements needed to trade 
credits in avoided deforestation, but would also have the option to “allocate these credits 
to private entities and authorize them to trade the issued credits.” Below the national 
level, the central government would be entrusted with the “authorization of private or 
public entities to implement REDD activities at the project level, regardless if the host 
country has a negotiated a national emission reference level” and, more importantly, 
“Credits for these project activities would be issued directly to the project entities 
(emphasis added) through an international and independent mechanism.”31 
                                            
31 The full proposal (Pedroni & Streck 2007) calls for: 
“A country-wide scheme based on the following principles: 
 i. Internationally negotiated and agreed reference level of deforestation, 
which rewards the lowering of national levels of deforestation.  
 ii. The creation of fungible carbon credits which can be used to comply with 
GHG targets.  
 iii. Countries may allocate these credits to private entities and authorize them 
to trade the issued credits.  
 iv. A mechanism ensuring permanence of the achieved emission reduction.  
A project based mechanism for REDD based on the following principles: 
 i. The authorization of private or public entities to implement REDD 
activities at the project level, regardless if the host country has a negotiated a national 
emission reference level.  
 ii. Credits for these project activities would be issued directly to the project 
entities through an international and independent mechanism, regardless of national 
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Figure 4. Options for Capturing and Distributing International REDD+  
(Top: National and Subnational Crediting; Bottom: Only National Crediting) 
 
                                                                                                                                  
emissions from deforestation (CDM type of mechanism).  
 iii. Mechanisms addressing leakage and ensuring permanence of the achieved 
emission reduction.  
 iv. The creation of fungible carbon credits which can be used to comply with 
GHG targets.” 
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 In effect, the nested approach reinterpreted the national-level approach along what 
Pedroni described as the ‘natural dichotomy’ between the government and the private 
sector. In the supranational space, countries were to bestow the political legitimacy and 
bureaucratic underpinnings of a global market, while at home creating the monitoring 
systems and legal and technical framework to let the private sector do what it does best, 
namely securing the finance and expertise needed to reduce deforestation on the ground. 
 The Nature Conservancy, Environmental Defense Fund, and Conservation 
International, joined by a growing number of foundations and private sector partners, and 
interested governments, soon began advocating for the nested approach as the route to a 
global market and the scaled-up finance it could provide.32 The growing network was 
highly productive, penning `dozens of jointly-authored papers, holding regular seminars 
and technical trainings, and stepping into advisory roles on REDD+ inside and outside of 
the UNFCCC. For his part in the fervent, Pedroni, dubbed by his associates as the 
“godfather of nesting”, became the co-founder and CEO of Carbon Decisions 
International in 2009, a Costa Rica-based consultancy working with Peru’s Environment 
Ministry. 
 Pedroni and Streck, who herself had co-founded the D.C.-based think tank Avoided 
Deforestation Partners in 2007, went on to serve on the Verified Carbon Standard’s 
(VCS) REDD Expert Group. The standard-setting body—whose founders and board 
include representatives from the International Emissions Trading Association (IETA), 
                                            
32 Groups promoting the nested approach include international development agencies like 
USAID, Winrock International, Netherlands Development Organization; consultancies 
and ngos like Climate Focus, The Center for People and Forests, Carbon Decisions 
Internatinoal; law firms like Baker & McKenzie; trade organizations and industry-ngo 
consortia like International Emissions Trading Association (IETA) and Forest Trends; 
and many others. 
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World Business Council for Sustainable Development, and Environmental Defense 
Fund—employs such “expert committees to ensure existing and new requirements reflect 
state-of-the art knowledge and global best practice”, conferring it with an “unmatched 
ability to innovate and expand the international carbon market.”33  
 The possibility to nest projects and directly accrue compliance payments to private 
entities helped spur the nascent voluntary market in forest carbon. While advocating for 
nested REDD+ in and outside of the negotiations, The Nature Conservancy’s Noel 
Kempff project in Bolivia and Ambio’s Scolel Té in Mexico became exemplars of 
avoided deforestation efforts and examples of how the conservation groups, in 
partnership the governments and the private sector, could deliver real and measurable 
emission reductions, certified through rigorous standards for monitoring, reporting, and 
verification. Rigor, though, was just what these early voluntary standards were missing. 
Some NGOs suggested avoided deforestation projects could adapt the CDM’s forestry 
standards, but these were seen as too cumbersome and onerous, and ill-suited for 
integration with national-level accounting systems. Into this REDD+ standards gap 
stepped the VCS. 
 In 2013, VCS went on to develop and pilot a new standard for Jurisdictional and 
Nested REDD+ with funding from Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation 
(NORAD), in Chile, Vietnam, Costa Rica, Chile, and a number of other countries.34 By 
then, the group had already been actively working to expand the market for REDD+ for 
several years, issuing its first Voluntary Carbon Units (VCUs) for avoided deforestation 
                                            
33 Verified Carbon Standard website, http://www.v-c-s.org/who-we-are, accessed 7 
August 2014. 
34 See http://www.v-c-s.org/jnr-pilot-programs, accessed 7 August 2014. 
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to the Kasigau Corridor REDD Project in eastern Kenya in 201135. The Kasigau 
initiative, led by the project development and management company Wildlife Works’, 
has a 30-year plan to prevent the release the equivalent of 1 million tons of carbon 
emissions annually across 200,000 ha of dryland forest in a wildlife migration corridor 
between Tsavo East and Tsavo West National Parks by creating jobs among the 100,000 
people who live there as “a viable alternative for people that have previously had to 
destroy their environment just to survive.”36 A number of other initiatives drew 
complicated schemes to finance alternatives to deforestation, for example, by creating 
alternatives to state-planned palm oil plantations, like InfiniteEARTH’s 91,215 ha Rimba 
Riya Biodiversity Reserve37 in Indonesia, or compensating local communities to pursue 
substitutes for cropland conversion and settlement, like Terra Global Capital’s 63,841 ha 
Oddar Meanchey38 project in Cambodia (areas roughly half that of a large metropolitan 
area like London, Los Angeles, or Phoenix). Many more projects were soon generating 
                                            
35 VCS database, 
https://vcsprojectdatabase2.apx.com/myModule/Interactive.asp?Tab=Projects&a=2&i=56
2&lat=-3%2E5915&lon=38%2E79761&bp=1 and 
https://vcsprojectdatabase2.apx.com/myModule/Interactive.asp?Tab=Projects&a=2&i=61
2&lat=-3%2E944264&lon=38%2E773234&bp=1, accessed 7 August 2014. 
36 Wildlife Works’ website, http://www.wildlifeworks.com/company/aboutus.php, 
accessed 7 August 2014. 
37 Forest Carbon Portal, http://www.forestcarbonportal.com/project/rimba-raya-infinite-
forest-reserve, accessed 7 August 2014. Also see Code REDD file://localhost/, 
http/::www.coderedd.org:redd-project:infiniteearth-rimba-raya-indonesia: - .U-
Pm24BdWiQ, accessed 7 August 2014. And VCS database, 
https://vcsprojectdatabase2.apx.com/myModule/Interactive.asp?Tab=Projects&a=2&i=67
4&lat=-2.78051067417254&lon=112.170133504944&bp=1, accessed 7 August 2014. 
38 Forest Carbon Portal file://localhost/, 
http/::www.forestcarbonportal.com:project:oddar-meanchey-forest-carbon-project, 
accessed 7 August 2014. Also see Code REDD, 
http://www.coderedd.org/news/cambodia-verifies-the-worlds-first-vcs-triple-gold-ccb-
avoided-deforestation-project/,accessed 7 August 2014. Also see VCS database, 
https://vcsprojectdatabase2.apx.com/myModule/Interactive.asp?Tab=Projects&a=2&i=90
4&lat=14.2461233241779&lon=103.724792743118&bp=1, accessed 7 August 2014. 
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additional REDD VCU’s for the voluntary market, often in cooperation (but little direct 
funding) with new national REDD+ institutions and the several billions of dollars of 
bilateral and multilateral ‘fast start finance’ dedicated get countries ‘REDD+ Ready’, 
most notably the World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, UN-REDD 
Programme, Congo Basin Forest Fund, and Norwegian International Climate and Forest 
Initiative. 
 Altogether, by 2014, 338 REDD+ projects covering over 4 million hectares 
(covering an average of 11,000 of forested ha each, a fraction of mega-projects like the 
Kasigau Corridor REDD Project) were being implemented in 52 countries, many with the 
support of private investors hoping to sell credits in the voluntary market or future 
compliance market under the certification of VCS and other standard-setting 
organizations.39 The surge in projects marked a shift in the vision for REDD+ away from 
a national focus. As these projects proliferated in anticipation of a REDD+ agreement, 
their case was bolstered by the possibility for an agreement in the UNFCCC that would 
recognize nesting and open the possibility of direct carbon payments independent of 
government mediation, and justified by worries over a looming ‘finance gap’ that 
governments would not fill.40 
 The voluntary market, however, remained short of the tens of billions of dollars a 
post-Kyoto compliance market might deliver, having transacted just $70 million in 8.6 
                                            
39 CIFOR Global Database of REDD+ and Other Forest Carbon Projects: 
http://www.forestclimatechange.org/redd-map/, accessed 8/21/14. Also see State of the 
Forest Carbon Market 2013 Report (Forest Trends 2014). 
40 For instance, the US$100 billion per year by 2020 called for in the 2009 Copenhagen 
Accord “to address the needs of developing countries” was assumed to “come from a 
wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including 
alternative sources of finance” (Decision 2/CP.15). 
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million tons of REDD+ offsets from 45 projects in 2012 to a handful of government 
buyers and companies like Microsoft and Disney. Conservationists, financiers, project 
developers and no small number of development practitioners lamented that the 
negotiations and emerging national REDD+ strategies retained too heavy a focus on the 
national level (TNC and Baker & McKenzie 2010, Thompson et al. 2011). The 
assumptions behind those high-level discussions, however, and swell of activity outside 
of government, had changed dramatically (Angelsen & McNeill 2012). The top-down 
measures foregrounded in Santilli’s 2005 proposal for nationally compensated reductions 
had, in a couple of years after the Bali Action Plan, been rivaled, if not overshadowed, by 
bottom-up initiatives driven by the private sector.  
 
IV. Calculation, Law, and Organizing Logic 
Underlying each of the three versions of REDD+ presented in the preceding section is the 
idea that the environment can be indirectly managed through the economy. As opposed to 
the direct, coercive measures of command-and-control regulation, performance-based 
mechanisms are based on the logic that financial incentives can induce humans to behave 
in a more environmentally-friendly manner. In order to achieve this goal, each proposes a 
distinct logic to link policy and finance. Together innovations in governance and finance 
are to drive the green economy. 
 Behind a shared economic logic, the three versions propose organizing carbon 
markets at different scales, drawing on deep and often unexamined assumptions about the 
identity of buyers and sellers, sources of finance, nature of commodities, and legal and 
technical infrastructure needed to allow the market to function. Thus each proposal 
107 
presents a logic for how the green economy should work, as well as a logic for defining 
and organizing the people and things that compose the market. To unpack how these 
proposals relate to questions about governance and finance in different ways, it is critical 
to attend to their epistemic dimensions and the particular globalisms that lay behind them, 
which seek to build new carbon market capabilities and to articulate those to the extant 
capabilities of international law, albeit in quite different ways. 
 Critics and supporters of REDD+ typically agree on one thing: it is a mechanism to 
save nature by giving it financial value through performance-based payments for forest 
protection. Even keen observers describe it as the biggest Payments for Environmental 
Services (PES) scheme the world has ever seen (Corbera 2009). This is true only on a 
superficial level. While monetary payments are involved in almost all versions of 
REDD+, these payments might be calculated and delivered on nearly any scale (local to 
national), to any actors (communities, private organizations, or individuals, or 
subnational or national governments), for a great many interventions (alternative local 
livelihoods, community-based conservation, national land reform, or sustainable forest 
management). Political tensions run across all of these dimensions of REDD+ 
rulemaking, yet by boiling the REDD+ discourse down to PES, that debate tends to frame 
the REDD+ rules in drastically oversimplified terms: “What policy choices are able to 
deliver the most finance for the greatest reductions in the least time?” 
As a result, the standard narrative recasts earlier antagonism between national 
versus project-based approaches in friendly terms. The narrative goes something like this: 
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Carbon offset projects to prevent deforestation in the 1990s ran up against 
technical and political difficulties that thwarted an otherwise sound, and in fact 
essential, effort to harness markets for the global protection of forests and climate. 
An enterprising group of researchers responded by alerting the world that rapid 
advancements in remote sensing and global ecosystem science could sweep away 
the local projects’ problems with a new paradigm of national carbon accounting. 
Technical, institutional, and financial barriers though proved too great to 
guarantee quick results on par with the urgency of the crisis, ushering a 
reconciliation of the first two proposals. This third, nested approach, combined 
the best features of the project and national approaches. Nesting therefore enables 
the flexible strategy required to deliver both incentives for short-term results and 
financial and expert infrastructure for long-term action. 
 
The paragraph is mine, but policy-makers, practitioners, and researchers often talk this 
way, as if carbon accounting were in the first instance a technical question. By recasting 
the history of these technical proposals as a thesis-antithesis-synthesis, the narrative 
erases the interests and objectives of the individual proposals. This facilitates consensus-
based law-making because it defuses opposition by giving a palatable option to all. This 
is typical of the win-win strategies of the green economy, and is seen in other aspects of 
REDD+, such as the increasingly inclusive move from RED to REDD+ or the adoption 
of social and environmental safeguards. The historical erasure, however, carries deeper 
structural implications for the relationship between global law-making and calculative 
capabilities that are rarely recognized. In the following section, I discuss how the 
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decision to calculate deforestation at a certain scale reflects underlying assumptions about 
causation and agency, and political participation. In the section after that, I argue that 
design choices about scale entail overlooked implications for the path dependency of 
market infrastructures. 
 
IV.1. Constitution of Scale 
‘What is the right scale for REDD?’ is the title of a 2008 brief written by Streck and 
colleagues at the Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR). It poses the issue 
clearly: 
 
A key question in the debate concerns the level (scale) at which accounting 
should be done and incentives offered for REDD activities. Should international 
accounting be limited to subnational (or project) activities, or to reductions at the 
national level, or should they occur at both levels (nested approach)? 
 
The brief neatly frames the three approaches in terms of effectiveness, efficiency, and 
equity (Table 3). 
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Table 3. Pros and Cons of Accounting for REDD+ at Subnational, National, and Nested 
Scales (CIFOR 2008). 
 
 Instead of coming down decisively in favor of one approach or the other, the brief 
echoes many other groups calling for—a flexible both/and strategy, suited to national 
circumstances. The case is compelling and tends to favor nesting because it “could allow 
a country to engage in REDD with a project or national approach, ensuring broader 
international participation and thereby larger overall emission reductions in the shorter 
term.”  
 Notwithstanding the slim prospects that Parties would ever revert to the project-
only REDD+ they expunged from Kyoto, the conclusion is hard to contest. Countries do 
have unique needs and capacities. Many express concern that results-based payments 
accrue equitably across amongst them, not only to a few well-positioned to attract the 
greatest investment, as when a flood of CDM projects bypassed the smallest and poorest 
countries for China and India. A flexible, nested approach is proposed as a way to 
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dispense payments for ‘early action’ to countries, such as the COMIFAC members 
Africa’s Congo Basin, as they build the robust national monitoring systems that a handful 
of others like Brazil already possess. By giving Parties the flexibility to choose the scale 
at which they will deliver results-based payments, the nesting approach also promises to 
defuse tensions over sovereignty—one of the most contentious issues in the REDD+ 
negotiations (TNC and Baker & McKenzie 2011). 
 Very few activists, scholars, or practitioners on either side of the debate, however, 
have asked how the choice of scale in REDD+ is also a choice between starkly 
contrasting visions of good government. Perhaps Greenpeace, a group that blasted the 
Noel Kempff project in Bolivia as a “carbon scam”,41 comes closest when charging that 
the flexibility nesting proponents tout is really a “constructive ambiguity” designed to 
sneak CDM-style projects back into the negotiation (Greenpeace 2011). But even 
Greenpeace, like the groups it opposes, presents project-, nesting-, and national-level 
REDD+ as if they were discrete options for delivering more or less efficient, equitable, 
and effective outcomes. In the following section, I probe more deeply to show why the 
options are neither as independent nor outcome-oriented as they presume. 
 I begin that exploration by analyzing Márcio Santilli’s original 2005 proposal to 
compensate developing countries to reduce deforestation at the level of the national 
jurisdiction. The remaining chapters further explore these questions in regard to 
jurisdictional, project-based, and nested REDD+. In the following sections, I focus on 
jurisdictional REDD+ to highlight why a comparative account of the organizing logics, 
                                            
41 Greenpeace (2009), ‘CARBON SCAM: Noel Kempff Climate Action Project and the 
Push for Sub-National Forest Offsets’, accessed 9 August 2014. For a response from 
TNC, see http://blog.nature.org/2009/10/noel-kempff-climate-forest-greenpeace-nature-
conservancy/, accessed 9 August 2014. 
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capabilities, and constitutional elements of those proposals is useful for understanding 
why design choices matter with regard to the relationship between environmental 
knowledge-making and global law-making. 
 
IV.1.1. Causation and Agency 
The Environmental Defense Fund lauded Santilli’s proposal for national compensated 
reductions as “very important development because it created a scientific space—and a 
policy space—where you could actually talk about reducing emissions from 
deforestation."42 The proposal is striking because it addressed the scientific and policy 
discourses simultaneously. It did so by reconfiguring climate science, ecology, and 
economics to re-scale, and hence re-focus, the science and policy discourse on the drivers 
of deforestation, the agency of nations in addressing those drivers, and the legitimate 
political participation for collective global action. 
 Early discussions on RED mentioned avoided deforestation projects like Noel 
Kempff and Scolel Té only as afterthoughts. Local projects were, after all, the problem 
national-level compensations were to remedy. Where local projects do appear in early 
proposals to compensate countries for avoided deforestation, they are significant not 
because they are thought necessary for curbing large-scale forest loss but because they 
are conceptualized as having the same kind of agency as national governments (and, for 
that matter, forest communities)—entities capable of responding to market signals for 
forest conservation: 
 
                                            
42 ‘Are we on the brink of saving rainforests?’, Mongabay, accessed 8/1/14: 
http://news.mongabay.com/2009/0722-redd.html 
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Compensated reductions differs from previous forest protection programs and 
agreements in that it promises to give governments, forest communities, and 
private owners access to a market for forest ecosystem services, creating the 
economic value for standing forest long understood as essential for large scale 
forest conservation (Santilli et al. 2005). 
 
That is to say, when it comes to agents and the actions they might take to reduce 
deforestation, governments have ontological status no different than private project 
developers or forest communities under the CDM: their capacity to act may differ but 
both are at root economic agents. The economic basis underlying the concept of national-
level ‘compensated reduction’ is clear in the citation of a study published in Science 
provided in the above quote. In their 2000 study on “Economic incentives for rain forest 
conservation across scales,” Kremen et al. argue that “incentives at national and global 
scales are also essential to the success of conservation efforts, because national 
governments often make large-scale natural resource decisions affecting conservation”. 
Here, incentives are understood in monetary terms. Governments can be financially 
incentivized to reduce deforestation when such incentives compensate their opportunity 
costs, defined as “the land use that produces the highest alternative return”.  
 Lest it be seen as a rhetorical flourish for old, tried, and tired forest policies, this 
way of thinking of countries as rational economic agents has worked its way deep into 
the policy discourse. In a panel discussion with the heads of the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) on ‘The Economic Case for Climate Action’, the 
World Bank’s Vice President for Sustainable Development, Rachel Kyte, explained that a 
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price on carbon should be factored in as one input among many in optimizing rational 
national-level decisions when countries make choices… 
 
…for how their economies are going to grow and compete and reduce the amount 
of emissions in the economy and improve the robustness of the economy. So 
every country has a sweet spot. There are difficult trade-offs. There are, upfront 
capital costs as well associated with some choices, but I think what we want to do 
this week with the ministers of finance and then beyond is to talk to every country 
about where we think those sweet spots are.43 
 
Although she was talking about climate policy writ large, Kyte employed the same logic 
that had also come to characterize forest policy when she invoked the notion of emissions 
“sweet spot” and implored “ministers of finance to advise their heads of state about what 
their ambition levels should be over the next few years”. Being more than a metaphor, 
this line of thought of country-as-economic-agent carriers important policy implications.  
 The view shared the Stern Report, World Bank, and the REDD+ discourse more 
generally, of nation-as-economic-agent makes two presuppositions (Karsenty & Ongolo 
2012). The first takes a country as a cohesive entity that can make a decision to pursue 
one development pathway over another based on a cost-benefit analysis inclusive of 
anticipated financial incentives. The ability to make such a decision implies that countries 
are also “calculative agencies formatted and equipped to act on the basis of a logic of 
                                            
43 The Economic Case for Climate Action - Webcast & Live blog: 
http://live.worldbank.org/economic-case-climate-action-webcast-live-blog 
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accumulation and maximization”.44 In regard to deforestation, this calculation requires 
reliable information about the carbon currently stored in its forests, the carbon that will 
be stored in those forests if it takes no action to stem forest loss, and the carbon that will 
be saved if it does. National-level accounting and advancements in satellite remote 
sensing and other monitoring technologies are the technical innovations promised to 
make these calculations credible by reducing the uncertainty of, among other things, 
permanence, additionality, and displacement. 
 The second assumes that countries will actually be able to deliver the future they 
choose. When it comes to reducing emissions from deforestation, this means that 
countries are seen as able to successfully design, implement, and enforce the policies and 
other measures needed to reduce deforestation. It is irrelevant whether or not countries 
actually can exercise such control, for the governing mentality is a utopian one: If they do 
not they could and, moreover, should by building the technical and institutional capacity 
to do so. Doing so would bring the efficiency of the market into the governance of the 
earth system by enticing entire countries to rationally manage their forested lands in 
accord with a global price for carbon. The plausibility of a governance regime based on 
compensated reduction offered a justification for the investments in the monitoring, 
reporting, verification systems (MRV), carbon accounting systems, demonstration efforts, 
workshops and training sessions, and other dimensions REDD-Readiness pursued by the 
UN-REDD Programme, World Bank Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, national 
REDD+ strategies, and various other international, bilateral, and domestic initiatives. 
                                            
44 an interview with Michel Callon. Barry, A., & Slater, D. (2002). Technology, politics 
and the market: an interview with Michel Callon. Economy and Society, 31(2), 285–306. 
doi:10.1080/03085140220123171 
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IV.1.2. Participation 
In addition to re-imagining drivers and agency, the proposal for national-level 
compensation legitimated a particular model of political participation for collective 
action. Here, the normative basis for collective action as a political endeavor vouchsafed 
through national pledges to reduce emissions is replaced with an economic norm, where 
self-interested countries acting through the invisible hand of the market are to 
simultaneously mitigate climate change for the good of the global public. 
 As quoted in the paper above, the proposal for compensated reduction was an effort 
to encourage “significant developing country participation in the Kyoto Protocol 
framework”. The role of developing countries in climate change mitigation had long been 
a sticking point in the negotiations, as had become apparent in competing interpretations 
the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ endorsed in the Convention’s 
inception. With emissions rising rapidly in China and elsewhere in the developing world, 
developed countries had grown increasingly weary of interpreting the principle in a way 
that would continue to absolve the Global South from the responsibility for making 
emission reductions of its own. As early as 1997, the United States declared that it would 
not submit the Kyoto Protocol for ratification without the “meaningful participation of 
developing countries”, which it never clearly defined (Sari 2005). At the same time, 
developing countries, with historical and per capita emissions lagging far behind the 
developed world, were in no rush to voluntarily assume the reductions implied in the 
United States’ demands. They argued such cuts would jeopardize either their sovereignty 
or future development. Moreover, they criticized those demands as deeply unfair. 
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 The proposal for compensated reduction was a deliberate effort to break the logjam 
in the climate negotiations by building on the norm that, whatever else it entailed, 
“meaningful participation”, meant that countries could participate in collective mitigation 
efforts by pledging to reduce emissions from within their own borders. The proposal re-
interpreted this political norm through economics, and thereby opened the possibility of 
creating “incentives for developing countries to meaningfully participate in emissions 
reductions, while respecting the UNFCCC’s guiding principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities.” Without these economic incentives, it was argued, 
developing countries would have no political reason to participate in emission cuts. But 
re-imagined as rational economic actors, these same countries could claim responsibility 
for mitigation efforts in their own borders, even if developed countries footed the bill. At 
the same time, and consistent with the international offset trade in the CDM, developed 
countries could also count the carbon offsets they purchased from mitigation activities 
towards their own commitments. This signaled a subtle, and perhaps unnoticed, shift in 
meaning of “meaningful participation” from a political commitment pledged within a 
community of nations to an economic option facilitated through financial incentives and, 
potentially, a global market. 
 
IV.2. Path Dependence 
Legal, technical, and other forms of expertise (episteme) are built into durable 
infrastructures (techne). Any infrastructure sophisticated enough to measure, report, and 
verify the 3 billion tons of carbon dioxide released from nearly 10 million hectares 
118 
tropical deforestation each year (Baccini et al. 2012, Harris et al. 2012),45 will amount to 
what Paul Edwards (2010) calls ‘The Vast Machine’—a massive assemblage of satellites, 
local weather stations, national weather agencies, global circulation models, reporting 
protocols, and thousands of other heterogeneous elements into a “system of systems”. 
Such calculative infrastructures are path dependent like many large socio-technical 
systems (Hughes 1983), such as transport, communication, and power. 46 
Therefore, once built, legal and technical infrastructures may be difficult to 
reverse. If so, early decisions about market design may mark a tipping point, with lasting 
consequences for public and private rights to natural resources, governing authority, and 
other constitutional matters. 
 The path dependency of large technical systems makes the choice between national 
or nested REDD+ hardly as independent as the typical palette presentation of REDD+ 
options would suggest (recalling that a strict project-based is not an option under the 
Warsaw Framework). The order a country pursues in developing its REDD+ accounting 
systems is likely to matter greatly in the kind of system it finally gets. 
 Flexibility turns on the assumption that these contingencies are irrelevant. While 
some observers note that a conflict of interest may arise between governments and 
project developers as REDD+ programs scale-up (Agrawal et al. 2011), they do not 
consider how conflicts may be preempted or predetermined in the early design of 
                                            
45 The figure of 3.0 Gt CO2 yr-1 from 2000-2005 is a consensus estimate between 
Winrock International and the Woods Hole Research Center (WHRC). Confusion erupted 
when WHRC released a much higher figure of 8.1 3.0 Gt CO2 yr-1, due to the inclusion 
of additional sources, including forest degradation and soils, over a longer time period 
from 2000-2010. See CIFOR blog post, Scientists ‘reach consensus’ on global 
deforestation emissions’, http://blog.cifor.org/13144/scientists-reach-consensus-on-
global-deforestation-emissions#.U-fySYBdXgM, accessed 10 August 2014. 
46 also see: http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/69255/1/735611971.pdf 
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REDD+ infrastructures. Already, VCS is developing and piloting its subnational 
Jurisdictional and Nested REDD+ standard in half a dozen countries across the world. 
Designed well, these efforts have the potential to adapt themselves to changing public 
priorities; designed poorly they threaten to lock-in a narrow set of interests and divert 
resources from national reforms. 
 It is likely that a country that adopts a nested approach to build a national system 
from piecemeal projects will end up with a different kind of system than had it pursued a 
national-level approach from the outset. This carries legal and political implications that 
go beyond technical calculation. One of the most important is the definition and 
allocation of carbon rights—a legal novelty about the rights to own and trade carbon 
credits. 
 Under a nested approach, carbon payments will first be directed to the owners of 
projects for local forest protection, as opposed to central governments for broad reforms. 
Conversely, a central government that initiates a strong national approach to deforestation 
may later prove reluctant to relinquish ownership of carbon credits to private or sub-
national entities. To the extent that a national system distributes benefits to sub-national 
governments and private investors, it is possible that they will take non-monetary forms 
rather than financial rewards.  
 With nesting, it is not apparent that a national-level approach need ever move 
forward. The UNFCCC’s ‘REDD+ Rulebook’ opens a space for results-based payments 
to projects as an “interim” basis. The text does not define what interim means, but project 
proponents do. Paraguay’s original submission, drawn from Pedroni and Streck’s white 
paper on nesting, proposes that: 
120 
in case of implementation of activities at the sub-national level, once the total area 
of a participating country reaches XX% of its forest territory or, alternatively, 
more than YY years have elapsed since the start of the first sub- national activity, 
such country would have to adopt a national emission reduction goal.47 
 
Under one scenario, a country could direct payments to sub-national initiatives 
indefinitely, never graduating from a sub-national interim stage into a full-blown national 
one. Such a de facto project-based REDD+ could play out if projects never tripped the 
“XX%” forest area threshold, which the country itself is likely to define. In principle, 
projects could claim significant revenue while covering only a small fraction of a 
country’s forests because deforestation occurs in circumscribed hotspots, not everywhere 
all at once. There is no indication that this scenario is unfolding, but its possibility is what 
leads Greenpeace to note with a hint of dry sarcasm that the group “does not believe that 
the aggregation of projects that have failed individually to deliver real climate benefits 
makes for sound public policy.” 
 
V. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have sought to bring together the major theoretical and empirical strands 
of the dissertation, which will play out across the remaining text. Of all chapters, this is 
the one most focused on the international policy space where nations have, through the 
global law-making powers of the UNFCCC, sent ripples through climate and forest 
                                            
47 Later versions of this idea update “national emissions reduction goal” with the national 
forest monitoring systems, for which sub-national monitoring is permitted as an interim 
measure in the REDD+ Rulebook. 
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governance the world over by delivering the REDD+ Rulebook. The express purpose of 
placing the international policy space first, however, is not to imply that nations have 
reached firm agreement on how tropical forests should be protected to fight climate 
change. 
 To call the REDD+ Rulebook an “agreement” is accurate in a literal or legal sense 
but impedes our understanding of global authority. The rulebook has reverberated widely 
to be sure, but in a way more like chaotic interference patterns than a clean and pure 
signal from a global center. More interesting signals, I argue, are detectable in the noise. 
 The following chapters identify those signals as moments of global 
constitutionalism, where rules and knowledge for environmental governance are coming 
into being together. Of particular interest is relationship between extant and emerging 
capabilities of public law-making and private expertise. The configuration of the two 
marks constitutional considerations, such how accountable those responsible for 
environmental decline, or define the identity and agency of political and economic actors. 
Since emerging technical capabilities for REDD+ and the green economy offer very 
different answers to these questions, the choice between technical proposals for REDD+ 
is also a constitutional choice. Moreover, it is a choice not easily undone because carbon 
markets are path dependent socio-technical infrastructures. To the extent that 
constitutions are in play in the design of market infrastructures, decisions made early in 
their history have the potential to be tipping points, where the harnessing of existing 
global capabilities of law-making in the UNFCCC are extended and appropriated in new 
technical capabilities for carbon accounting. 
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CHAPTER 3 
STANDARDS OF TRUST IN THE VOLUNTARY CARBON MARKET:  
FINANCING LOCAL-SCALE PROJECTS AND DE-RISKING THE STATE 
I. Introduction   
As of 2015, no regulated market in the world trades REDD+ credits. Millions of tons of 
REDD+ credits surged into the voluntary market years earlier, though, after the 
UNFCCC endorsed REDD+ in the Bali Action Plan in 2007. Project developers and 
conservation groups led the campaign, intent on creating a thriving market in voluntary 
carbon credits and using that market as a platform to launch a full-scale global regulated 
market with the backing of the world’s governments. These groups had embarked on a 
rocky course, which challenged them to rethink what REDD+ could and should become 
after finding that their vision differed sharply with the vision of many of the countries 
whose support they solicited. 
 This chapter charts the consolidation of private REDD+ standards and an influential 
transnational network of private REDD+ experts. Over the course of a decade, private 
standard-setting organizations, conservation groups, project developers, and large 
financial investors came together outside of the international negotiations to assemble the 
voluntary market for REDD+. Their goal was to prompt governments to establish a 
global compliance market by building early action projects, monitoring and verification 
standards, and related forms of knowledge and practice, which were to demonstrate the 
feasibility of project-based REDD+. 
 Expertise figured centrally in their strategy. This chapter recounts how functional 
calculative capabilities emerged out of the proto-capabilities (i.e. rudimentary 
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accounting frameworks) discussed in Chapter 2. Section II theorizes the emergence of 
calculative capabilities of private actors. It begins with an account of the flourishing 
offset verification and validation industry in the Clean Development Mechanism, 
contrasting the development of standards for CDM-eligible projects with the 
development of standards for REDD+. 
 Section III uses this theory to make sense of the production of civil regulations for: 
1) calculating carbon credits, and 2) owning carbon credits. The case material reveals 
how standard-setting organizations (e.g. VCS and close associates in transnational 
conservation groups like The Nature Conservancy and Conservation International) acted 
as critical intermediates between project developers (e.g. Wildlife Works and Terra 
Global) and donors and financial investors (e.g. US Government and BNP Parabis). 
 I use these cases to illustrate: 1) how third-party certification emerged first for 
private demand in the voluntary carbon market (especially for efficiency and financial 
risk mitigation), and 2) how those projects were part of a strategy to create regulatory 
demand for expertise. The conclusion underscores that the different demands of private 
actors and public regulators introduced potential tensions over the shape and purpose of 
knowledge—an issue that Chapters 4-6 elaborate in the initiative to create a common 
REDD+ market in Chiapas and California.  
 
II. Theorizing the Emergence of Calculative Capabilities 
II.1. A Problem for Prototypes 
“‘No, it’s not abstract, up there in the clouds!…I can see it. I can measure it.” So begins 
the cover story of a 2010 article in Harper’s Magazine quoting Talita Beck, an emissions 
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assessor for a company called the SGS Group, one of the biggest in the multi-billion 
dollar carbon trade business. While invisible planet-warming emissions might be mere 
apparitions for most people, they are almost tangible for Beck. As an emissions assessor, 
her job is to measure the greenhouse gases issuing from farms, factories, and other sites 
that host projects seeking to turn emission reductions into carbon credits, and carbon 
credits into cash. Few professions are so grounded and practical as the accountant, nor as 
critical to the smooth-running of the machinery of the modern world (Power 1999). 
 Beck is not an evangelizing scientist stirring the global environmental imagination 
in her daily affairs. She is not a younger James Lovelock (2007) heralding The Revenge 
of Gaia, or even a lesser-known member of an ‘epistemic community’ trying to persuade 
nations to save the global environment with targeted appeals to scientific fact (Haas 1990, 
Adler & Haas, 1992). Beck and the thousands of other auditors, verifiers, technicians, and 
statisticians who keep the carbon market running are regularized professionals in an 
industry barely a decade old. Without their measurement protocols, accounting 
techniques, and industry standards, the US$50 billion carbon economy that emerged with 
the trade in carbon offsets through the Kyoto Protocol’s CDM would quickly come 
grinding to a halt. That a multi-billion dollar market in a commodity as intangible as 
carbon has emerged in a few short years speaks to an impressive capacity for professions 
and practices to create order and economic value from what a decade earlier were 
scientific abstractions. 
 An industry for the third-party certification of carbon offsets in the compliance 
market of the CDM did not spring up overnight. In 1997, eight years before the CDM 
came into force, the SGS Group became the first company to offer forestry-related offset 
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projects independent, third-party verification (Moura-Costa 2000). After the CDM rules 
were agreed to in 2001, the SGS Group became one of the chief companies delegated 
authority to monitor and verify offset projects for the CDM. Before 1997, efforts focused 
on demonstration projects designed as experiment with options for offsetting emissions 
for an anticipated carbon market. Experimental projects like Noel Kempff and Scolel Té 
were left behind when Parties excluded avoided deforestation from the CDM in 2001 (see 
Chapter 2). 
 As a result, third-party monitoring and verification standards for monitoring and 
verifying avoided deforestation projects never became embedded in the institutions of the 
CDM—in the language used here, they never became more than proto-capabilities in the 
CDM or any other compliance market. The voluntary carbon market, however, tells a 
different story. Around 2007—the same time Parties to the UNFCCC recognized REDD+ 
in the Bali Action Plan—third-party certification for avoided deforestation projects 
gained steam in the unregulated, voluntary carbon market. Ever since, proponents for 
local avoided deforestation projects have sought to reintroduce them into the international 
rules and regulations for REDD+. Santilli’s proposal for compensated reductions for 
national-level emissions—the precursor to REDD+ (Chapter 2)—offered the opportunity 
to do so. 
 The proposal for national compensated reductions had the unintended effect of 
renewing incentives for private actors to advocate and implement demonstration projects 
for avoided deforestation. Private actors expended significant resources on demonstration 
projects and third-party monitoring and verification standards in the voluntary market in 
the absence of any agreement by Parties to issue performance-based payments for 
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REDD+. In principle, fund-based payments might materialize, but this money was far 
from guaranteed and unlikely to arrive in the sums needed to incentivize project 
investment.  
 This poses a puzzle for three reasons. First, private actors did not make serious 
investments in third-party standards until after countries agreed to create a compliance 
market in 1997 with the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol. By contrast, ten years later— 
when the Bali Action Plan recognized REDD+ as a key agenda item in the climate 
negotiations—standard-setting for avoid deforestation was already well underway in the 
voluntary market. 
 Second, early discussions on ‘reducing emissions from deforestation’ (when 
REDD+ was still RED) centered on national-level accounting in large part because of 
technical uncertainties at the project level. Once bitten, project-proponents might then be 
twice shy. This is not what happened. They instead saw a moment for innovation and 
investment, which required a strategy to convert skeptical nations into project believers. 
Demonstration was the voluntary market’s raison d'être. 
 Third, and the focus of this chapter, before private groups could plausibly argue 
their case, they had to demonstrate fully functioning calculative capabilities in the 
voluntary market. Thus the voluntary market was to be a nursery where proto-capabilities 
could be tested and shown to work, and, from there, instigate full-blown public 
legislation for market-based REDD+. 
 To make the case that this intermediate stage is a key part of the story in its own 
right, I distinguish between the demands for expertise by public and private actors, as 
well as kinds of private actors, and the influence different demands have on the content of 
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expertise. The following sub-section elaborates the concept of civil regulations to 
understand the process by which private rules for carbon accounting emerge, take shape, 
and are adopted by private actors, before being authorized by public law.  
 
II.2. Civil Regulation 
Third-party certification standards like those devised by the SGS group in the CDM refer 
to the civil regulations, or “codes, regulations, and standards that are not enforced by any 
state and that address the…environmental impacts of global firms and markets, especially 
in developing countries” (Vogel 2008). Civil regulations are examples of what Jessica 
Green (2014) calls private entrepreneurial authority, or “situations in which private actors 
create rules without the explicit delegation of authority by states”. Green offers a theory 
of supply and demand to account for the emergence of civil regulations: 
 
My basic contention is that private authority emerges because actors in world 
politics—states, private actors, and institutions comprising both types of actors—
anticipate that they will benefit from deferring to private authority. In other words, 
the effect, private authority, can be explained by its anticipated benefits. 
  
This idea offers an entry point to understand the relationship between global law-making 
and global calculation. The somewhat remarkable reintroduction of avoided deforestation 
projects into the international agenda, however, shows the extent to which non-state 
actors not only respond to but actively shape demand by influencing the content of 
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international law. This goes beyond overt lobbying or the subtle ways epistemic 
communities (Haas 1992) shape state interests by framing complex and uncertain issues.  
 I argue that to understand how specific proto-capabilities gain authority in fully-
fledged systems of calculation (including civil regulations in the voluntary or compliance 
market) requires a close look at the content of law and calculation themselves. To 
understand the relationship between the content civil regulations and global 
environmental law, we must look at how that process unfolds. In this chapter, I aim to do 
this by: 
 
1) Distinguishing demand for civil regulations for purely private reasons (e.g. eco-
labeling schemes targeting green consumers) from civil regulations created in response to 
current or anticipated government regulation (e.g. corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
efforts aimed at persuading public agencies that binding regulations are unnecessary); 
 
2) Differentiating between the demands of private actors. In the current case, this 
includes conservation organizations seeking to finance conservation initiatives; offset 
project developers attempting to build a new industry; and large financial investors 
looking for lucrative investment opportunities; 
 
3) Examining how the content of civil regulations reflects (possibly competing) private 
demands; and 
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4) Comparing the content of civil regulations with the content demanded by public 
regulations. (This is the task of Chapter 4.) 
 
Methodologically, this means tracing the process that translates proto-capabilities into 
bonafide civil regulations.  
 
III. Building Capabilities for Civil Regulation 
By 2010, REDD+ credits accounted for roughly one-third of all transactions in the 
voluntary carbon market. Given the above theorization of the emergence of calculative 
capabilities through civil regulation, the task of the following cases is to account for how 
those regulations consolidated around a few core standards and a transnational network of 
standard-setters, project developers, and financiers. The cases are broken into two main 
sections. Section III.1 focuses on standards for measuring and verifying REDD+ credits, 
which emphasized reducing transaction costs to project developers (through efficient and 
credible third-party certification). Section III.2. centers on techniques for accounting for 
the ownership of credits, with an emphasis on capital risk mitigation for large investors 
(through insurance, accounting innovations, and legal protections against foreign 
‘government risk’). 
 
III.1. Calculating Carbon Credits 
III.1.1. A Babel of Standards 
Despite the high-level endorsement of REDD+ in 2007, a babel of standards posed a 
challenge for the budding market by sapping confidence from potential buyers and 
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project investors in the integrity of REDD+ offsets. The Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) had already experienced this impasse years earlier, when onerous measurement, 
reporting and verification requirements proved insurmountable for scores of forestry 
projects, very few of which succeeded in gaining certification. 
 It was a biting lesson for the carbon market lobby, leading the International 
Emissions Trading Association (IETA) to remark, “the whole process is hugely complex, 
discouraging its integration in the normal course of business processes” (Backstrand & 
Lovbrand 2005). Robert O’Sullivan, head of North American operations at the carbon 
market consultancy Climate Focus, lamented that the CDM led to the development of: 
 
a bunch of project-specific methodologies that cost a lot of money that cost a lot 
of money [but] that didn’t help the market development in general….We thought 
[that we could foster project investment] if we took a different, modular approach 
where you had a broader applicability…[which is] helpful for market 
development and means that project developers don’t have to go through that 
massive cost and upfront exercise of developing their own methodologies.48 
  
A major 2007 survey of forest carbon projects illustrates the problem. The survey was 
prepared by Forest Trends, a coalition formed in 1996 by leaders from the forest industry, 
private donors, and major environmental groups to promote market-based approaches to 
conservation. As the go-to organization for project developers and conservationists 
                                            
48 Ecosystem Marketplace. ‘New Methodology Sets Building Blocks for REDD’. 3 Dec 
2010. 
http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/pages/dynamic/article.page.php?page_id=7869&
section=home 
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hoping to get into the carbon trade, the study was the first in an ongoing, widely-read 
series of reports on ‘The State of the Forest Carbon Market’ based on surveys of market 
participants. The review looked back to the mid-1990s, when projects began to produce 
forest carbon credits through conservation, tree-planting, or other activities for both 
voluntary and compliance markets. The results, gathered from a survey of 61 project 
developers of 226 projects in 40 countries, highlighted “significantly varying project 
designs, methodologies and implementation strategies to create credits.” 
 Before 2007, most projects adopted internal standards but later underwent a rapid 
shift towards consistent, reputable benchmarks verified by third-parties. In 2002, only 
15% of offsets were third-party certified. By the first half of 2009 the number grew to 
96%, and 23% of all third-party certified offsets were validated under the CCB standard 
for environmental and social co-benefits. The demand for reputable third-party 
certification winnowed the hodgepodge of standards in earlier projects in a short amount 
of time. This consolidation signaled the perception that rigorous measuring, verification, 
and reporting of emission reductions were critical to prepare for the global compliance 
market thought to be only a few years away. 
 Even after third-party certification largely replaced the earlier practice of self-
certification, a maze of standards remained. These included the American Carbon 
Registry Forest Project Standard, CarbonFix Standard, Climate Action Reserve (CAR), 
Australian Greenhouse Friendly initiative, ISO 14064 GHG project accounting standard 
developed by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), Plan Vivo, 
Société Générale de Surveillance (SGS) Carbon Offset Verification Standard, and 
SOCIALCARBON. The lack of common standards imposed a roadblock for projects 
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seeking financial support from international donors and, increasingly, the carbon market 
departments of big firms like Bank of America and BNP Parabis, which had expressed 
interest in investing in REDD+ projects. 
 Within a few short years, however, the VCS and CCB had emerged as the 
undisputed leaders in standards and methodologies for the voluntary carbon market. From 
2008 to 2009, the share of projects combining the CCB with the VCS or American 
Carbon Registry standards more than doubled from 15% to 35%.49 By late 2014, over 
1200 projects registered under the VCS, claiming more than 160 MtCO2e in emission 
reductions,50 and the CCB had certified 23 of 85 project applications across 35 
countries.51 That same year, the VCS Association, the organization operating the VCS, 
assumed authority over the CCB in the name of increased efficiency and reduced 
transaction costs, and California elevated the Association’s legal status to one of three 
entities authorized to register carbon offsets under the state’s cap-and-trade program. 
 
III.1.2. Consolidating Standards and Standard-Setters in the VCS 
The VCS drew the ‘who’s who’ of people building the voluntary carbon market. The 
organization was founded in 2005 by a group of high-profile players in the carbon 
market, including the Climate Group, International Emissions Trading Association 
                                            
49 Forest Trends. 2010. State of the Forest Carbon Market. 
50 VCS Project Database, http://www.vcsprojectdatabase.org/, accessed 24 November 
2014. 
51 Ecosystem Marketplace notes, “After handing off the management of CCB, 
representatives from the Alliance’s five member organizations – CARE, Conservation 
International, The Nature Conservancy, the Rainforest Alliance and Wildlife 
Conservation Society – will continue to offer guidance through a steering committee co-
chaired by Durbin and VCS Sustainable Landscapes Director Toby Janson-Smith.” see 
http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/pages/dynamic/article.page.php?page_id=10651
&section=news_articles&eod=1 
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(IETA), and World Economic Forum. The World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development (WBCSD) joined soon thereafter. Other early supporters included two 
major carbon market auditors: a subsidiary of the global business and engineering 
services firm Lloyd’s Register Group Limited (LR) and the world’s second biggest 
professional services network, PricewaterhouseCoopers. 
 The founders recognized the need to fortify the standard with scientific and 
technical expertise. As a first step, they created a Steering Committee composed of 
nineteen carbon market professionals to draft the initial VCS52 guidelines for issuing 
VCS-certified Voluntary Carbon Units (VCUs).53 (One VCU represents one ton of 
carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) that has been removed or prevented from entering the 
atmosphere.54) However, these were high-level guidelines and left much fleshing out in 
the detailed methodological rules and practices needed to verify and validate emission 
reductions for a number of specific offset-types, spanning forestry, energy, industrial 
processing, agriculture, waste, livestock and manure, wetlands, grasslands, mining, 
construction and transport. The forestry category alone contains nearly a dozen individual 
methodologies, such as Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU) for 
afforestation, reforestation and revegetation (ARR), agricultural land management 
(ALM), improved forest management (IFM). 
 Professionalization helped to address the VCS’s growing need for credible 
expertise. In 2009, the organization incorporated as a non-profit in Washington, D.C., 
                                            
52 The Voluntary Carbon Standard changed its name to the Verified Carbon Standard in 
2011. 
Yoshito Izumi (Observer), Taiheiyo Cement 
54 Eligible greenhouse gases are: Carbon Dioxide (CO2),  Methane (CH4),  Nitrous 
Oxide (N2O), Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs),  Perfluorocarbons (PFCs), Sulphur 
Hexafluoride (SF6). 
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replete with a professional staff and expert committees overseeing a multi-year 
Methodology Approval Process. The organization also established expert advisory 
committees for REDD+, with representation from some of the most active players in the 
voluntary market. The committees included individuals from iconic REDD+ mega-
projects, including two introduced in the preceding chapter (Wildlife Works and Terra 
Global), as well as representatives from a number of major financial institutions, such as 
BNP Parabis and World Bank Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF).55 
 One of the functions of these experts was to review and validate the methodologies 
submitted to the VCS under the organization’s double-validation Methodological 
Approval Process.56 A successful review would allow projects using these methodologies 
for different offset types to gain certification under the VCS. This meant that projects 
could be issued VCU’s for their offsets and gain access to buyers they would be unable to 
access alone. 
 
III.1.3. Terra Global, Wildlife Works, and a “Watershed Moment for REDD Projects 
Everywhere” 
The VCS REDD methodologies did not originate in the VCS Association but in a handful 
of mega-projects that had developed REDD methodologies for their own individual 
initiatives. (The VCS referred to REDD rather than REDD+ methodologies because their 
development preceded the formal adoption of the “+” at COP16 in 2010). The 
arrangement was of mutual benefit to project developers and the VCS. The imprimatur of 
                                            
 
http://www.v-c-s.org/node/283 
56 VCS Methodological Approval Process, v3.5. Issued 8 Oct 2013. http://www.v-c-
s.org/sites/v-c-s.org/files/Methodology%20Approval%20Process%2C%20v3.5.pdf 
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the VCS offered project methodologies an extra level of credibility, while enhancing the 
credibility of the VCS itself with project-developers’ on-the-ground expertise. Leaning 
on the reputation of its advisers, the VCS approved the first methodology for REDD in 
August 2010. Four more methodologies tailored to a range of ecosystems and project 
types soon followed, which stimulated a surge in project investment, true to the founders’ 
intent in 2005. 
 The first methodology, for Conservation Projects that Avoid Planned Land Use 
Conversion in Peat Swamp Forests, was prepared by Winrock International on behalf of 
the Hong Kong-based InfiniteEARTH for its Rimba Raya Project on the Indonesian 
Island of Borneo. 
 Announcing the new methodology, VCS CEO David Antonioli made a direct 
connection between it and finance: 
 
The carbon market can now have a role in REDD, and that’s a sea change from 
where we were last week…It is great news for the sheer benefit of helping to 
channel finance to real projects that have real impacts on the ground.57 
 
The first project to be issued VCUs, however, was not Rimba Raya’s peatland project in 
Indonesia but Wildlife Works’ Kasigu Corridor REDD project in Kenya under its 
methodology for Avoided Mosaic Deforestation of Tropical Forests. The project had 
already been validated and verified under the CCB and had over one million tons in 
                                            
57 Ecosystem Marketplace. ‘VCS Unveils its First Methodology for Generating Carbon 
Credits by Saving Trees’. 25 Aug 2010. 
http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/pages/dynamic/article.page.php?page_id=7694&
section=home. 
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annual carbon reductions certified after gaining VCS certification in February 2011. 
Although Plan Vivo had already issued third-party REDD credits the year before, 
Wildlife Work’s project was enormous, receiving more credits from the VCS under its 
first issuance than any other standard had issued altogether up to that point in time. 
Antonioli again drew a strong link between the standard and finance, saying: 
 
This is a watershed moment for REDD projects everywhere because it 
demonstrates they can attract private investment to this critical work. 
 
Funding did indeed roll in. In September 2010, just months before the Cancún COP, the 
commodities derivatives arm of the French banking giant BNP Parabis lent $50 million to 
the project.58 In turn, Wildlife Works agreed to grant BNP Parabis the right to purchase 
up to 1.25 million VCUs from the Kasigu Corridor over the next five years,59 echoing a 
similar deal the Russian gas giant Gazprom struck with Rimba Raya.60 South Africa’s 
Nedbank Group provided millions more to the project, and by the following summer 
Macquarie Bank of Australia and the U.S. forest management firm, International Finance 
Corp. raised a further US$25 million.61 
                                            
58 Ecosystem Marketplace. ‘BNP Paribas and Wildlife Works Ink $50 million REDD 
Deal’. 21 Sep 2010. 
http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/pages/dynamic/article.page.php?page_id=7717 
59 NY Tiimes, ‘A Slow Start for the Carbon Credit Market’, 24 July 2011. 
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 Years earlier, Korchinsky had been a successful businessman as co-founder of a 
leading management consulting firm. The sale of that firm in 1995 to the publicly-traded 
company Cambridge Technology Partners earned him millions and the opportunity to test 
business strategies in conservation projects like the Kasigu Corridor. It also afforded him 
personal connections with Wildlife Works’ financier BNP Parabis, including two former 
bankers who launched Athelia Climate Fund to drive new sources of finance for the 
preservation of natural capital. The Fund, which includes REDD+ projects among its 60 
million euro investments, prioritizes standards like the VCS and CCB to ensure the 
“highest calibre social, environmental and economic performance.”62 
 Korchinsky went on to found Code REDD, a non-profit whose mission is to “whose 
mission is to support and scale the REDD+ mechanism to realize its full potential to 
empower people, preserve forests, protect wildlife, and reduce emissions.”63 Heeding 
investors’ call for standards to ensure high-caliber performance, Code REDD “works to 
build long-term, sustainable demand for REDD+ Verified Emission Reductions (VERs)” 
with a “connects-the-dots” approach between investment and reporting standards such as 
the VCS. A business-based approach is central to the organization’s vision: 
 
We aim to create a world where the REDD+ mechanism is widely adopted within 
private sector practices, corporate business models, and regulatory frameworks to 
                                                                                                                                  
for-carbon-credit-market.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1& 
62 Athelia Ecosphere website. http://www.coderedd.org/members_all/althelia-ecosphere/ 
accessed 5 Mar 2015. Also see Forest Trends. ‘Keeping Grasslands Wild: Inside 
Althelia’s $10 Million Investment in Kenyan Wildlife Works Project.’  
http://www.forestcarbonportal.com/news/keeping-grasslands-wild-inside-althelias-10-
million-investment-in-kenyan-wildlife-works-project 
63 Code REDD. http://www.coderedd.org/about-code-redd/ accessed 5 Mar 15. 
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drastically reduce deforestation, value ecosystem services, promote low carbon 
development, and enable a transition to the green economy. 
 
In December 2011, the VCS approved a third REDD methodology for Carbon 
Accounting in Project Activities that Reduce Emissions from Mosaic Deforestation and 
Degradation. Following Rimba Raya and Wildlife Works, this methodology originated 
from the developer of a mega-REDD+ project, Terra Global’s 63,841 ha Oddar 
Meanchey project in Cambodia.64 And like Korchinsky at Wildlife Works, Terra Global’s 
director, Leslie Durschinger, bestrode the worlds of finance, conservation, and 
development. The two would also join the VCS expert advisory committees on REDD+. 
 Before founding San Francisco-based Terra Global Capital, LLC, Durschinger 
spent 20 years in the financial services industry, gaining experience in derivatives 
trading, investment advisory, algorithmic trading, risk management, and securities 
lending. During that time she worked for some of the world’s largest banks and 
brokers—JP Morgan, Merrill Lynch, Barclays Global Investors and Charles Schwab. 
 Like Korchinsky, Durschinger recognized the need for common standards to 
reassure investors that they would not be on the hook for false emissions. To this end, she 
worked to build Terra Global’s reputation for “proven carbon market expertise”, staffing 
the company with credentialed technicians and informing the readers of publications like 
                                            
64 Forest Carbon Portal, http://www.forestcarbonportal.com/project/oddar-meanchey-
forest-carbon-project, accessed 7 August 2014. Also see Code REDD, 
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Institutional Investor Magazine65 and The New York Times66 of her company’s growing 
track record in getting offset projects of the ground  Credibility is the lynchpin in the 
company’s press materials and company documents, underscoring that investments in 
Oddar Meanchey and other projects will deliver environmental and social benefits, and 
long-term capital returns. The ultimate goal, however, went far beyond the voluntary 
market to “emission reductions that are today verified under voluntary carbon offset 
standards but that will in the future be eligible under compliance standards or other 
payment-for-performance based bilateral offset schemes.”67 
 The firm linked expertise and finance to become a carbon market pioneer. One of 
its most notable accomplishments was the creation of the first private equity fund for 
REDD+ projects in 2011. Terra Global secured US$40 million from the Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation (OPIC) for the Terra Bella private equity and venture capital 
fund, “the world’s first globally diverse community-based REDD and land-use carbon 
fund.”68 Administered under Terra Global’s subsidiary, Terra Global Capital 
Management (TGIM), the Fund “provides early-stage project finance capital to high 
impact community-based forest and agricultural emissions reductions projects in 
                                            
65 Institutional Investor. ‘Pensions Consider the Rain Forest’. 
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developing countries.”69 Altogether, the Fund aimed for a capitalization of US$100 
million to invest in 60 projects, with 10-20 of those coming in the first three. 
 The elevation of Wildlife Works and Terra Global from individual project 
developers to VCS icons demonstrates the power of standards to jump-start investment 
by creating a common, credible link between carbon accounting experts, projects 
developers, and financiers. From their origins in a hodgepodge of projects, this coterie of 
transnational experts oversaw the emergence of the VCS as the foremost standard in the 
voluntary REDD+ market. The consolidation of standards and standard-setters in the 
VCS shows how the creation of centralized institutional and epistemic space can exert to 
coordinate far-flung market players. Such spaces offer knowledge brokers the power to 
shape the networks in which they are embedded (Gallemore & Munroe 2013). 
 
III.1.4. Shaping a ‘Vast Regulated Arena’ 
The consolidation of standards and standard-setters did much to boost the voluntary 
market by encouraging investment and easing the burden on project developers. An 
absence of a global compliance market, however, set limits on how much that demand 
might grow. Market participants were well aware of this fact. They were also aware that 
credible standards and standard-setters in the voluntary market could make them first-
movers in a regulated market by getting in early and setting the groundwork for the years 
ahead. 
 The VCS Association reflected its growing scope and ambition with a subtle name 
change when it changed the “V” from “Voluntary” to “Verified” in 2011. The 
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Association’s CEO David Antonioli and Chairman Gudmundur Sigurthorsson explain the 
change: 
 
After more than a year of consultation, we have concluded that the Verified 
Carbon Standard is a name that inspires trust and opens doors. It is a name that 
will position the VCS Program, and all those who rely on it, to better engage with 
new emerging sources of demand as carbon markets grow and change.70 
 
This passage hints at how verification builds trust, and how trust, in turn, is needed to 
help markets grow by coordinating market activities. It is also telling that they use the 
word position, for social network analysts likewise refer to the “advantageous positions” 
that confer power and influence to groups and individuals within a network. When it 
comes to REDD+, Gallemore and Munroe (2013) argue that knowledge brokers secure 
their advantageous position as a go-between for different kinds of groups who need each 
other to accomplish distinct but mutually dependent goals: 
 
knowledge and resources often outstrip what organizations can muster on their 
own. Development institutions need organizations with the technical capacity to 
undertake REDD+ projects. These organizations, in turn, require access to local 
knowledge and expertise, just as local organizations require access to technical 
facility and resources to carry out their objectives. 
 
                                            
70 VCS website. accessed 2.24.15. http://www.v-c-s.org/news-events/news/vcs-change-
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Here they are talking about REDD+ projects, but the same could be said at least as 
strongly of trust in the VCS brand, on which so many of those projects rely to substitute 
for the trust they themselves lack with prospective buyers and investors. What, though, 
do Antonioli and Sigurthorsson mean by trust—a word they repeat three more times in 
the space of a few paragraphs? And how does it serve to position the VCS within the 
growing market? 
 
We have decided to adopt the word 'verified' into our name to emphasize our core 
value proposition – trust in VCS quality assurance….Ultimately it is trust in VCS 
quality assurance that opens doors and spurs demand for the VCS Program and 
credits….Therefore it is trust we will emphasize in our work to strengthen VCS 
brand positioning. (Emphasis added.) 
 
Part of the answer is the emphasis on trust in the VCS, which, as previously discussed, is 
the trust of buyers and investors in the integrity of carbon offsets. Trust then is a relation 
between knowledge brokers and their clients, as well as a relationship between 
representation and reality. It is a relation that helps to position, or coordinate, their 
activities within a market where buyers and sellers are ready to do what buyers and 
sellers do but lack the capacity to do it alone. In the parlance of economists and market 
players themselves, it is a transaction cost resulting from incomplete information. More 
fully, it is the missing market infrastructure, which would otherwise lend confidence that 
carbon, not snake oil, is for sale. In the present discussion, the VCS aims to fill that gap 
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as a trusted third-party, thereby minimizing transaction costs and empowering the market 
to grow of its own natural accord. 
 Trust is a belief made possible by a collective understanding, in this case, of the 
VCS as the standard among standards. For REDD, and in all likelihood other offset types 
too, this shared understanding emerged from the snowballing of project expertise into the 
methodologies and advisory network of the VCS and vice versa. Antonioli and 
Sigurthorsson underscore this point in the passage above, emphasizing both collective 
and corporate descriptors: “our work”, “quality assurance”, the “VCS brand”. Their 
message is that the trust in the VCS is key to boosting demand because it credibly 
informs buyers that their purchases are secure and certified by an esteemed team of 
professionals. More subtly it informs project developers that, if they haven’t already, they 
too should become VCS certified to access the demand that will soon be flowing in. 
 That answer, however, leaves out an important part of the equation because the 
VCS brand was not just serving an economic function by convincing buyers that the 
credits they purchased were real (or at least that they might not be held legally, morally, 
and financially accountable if they were not). It was also serving a regulatory function by 
sending a message to governments that the voluntary market had already accomplished 
much of the accounting legwork that had tripped up earlier carbon markets, thereby 
easing government reluctance to create and support future carbon markets. 
 ‘State of the Forest Carbon Market 2009: Taking Root and Branching Out’ 
underlines the real prize at stake, and it is not the modest tens of millions of tons of 
carbon traded in the voluntary market. It is the tens of billions of tons that might be 
traded in the “vast regulated arena”: 
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When asked about the impact of standards on the forest carbon market, Jonathan 
Shopley, founder of the Carbon Neutral Company, describes the recent “leaps of 
progress in the underpinnings of the market and degrees of 
professionalization.”…These movements highlight both the commoditization of 
the OTC [Over-The-Counter] voluntary carbon markets and the influence of this 
relatively small marketplace on the potentially vast regulated arena. (Emphasis 
added.) 
 
The quote suggests that standards and standard-setters like the VCS were poised to shape 
the coming regulated market in much the same manner they had the voluntary market. 
Thus, the consolidation of standards and standard-setters—of knowledge and expert 
institutions—marks a moment when what was strictly a voluntary, private sector effort 
from the bottom-up set its sights on bolstering and expanding into a much larger, state-
sponsored program from the top-down. Indeed, the strategy of building private sector 
trust in the VCS had helped to secure tens of millions of dollars for REDD+ projects once 
the third-party certifier inspired well-pocketed financiers to be confident in the integrity 
of REDD offsets. 
 In the case of REDD+, organizations like the VCS would need to adopt language 
and practice aligned to the governments whose support they solicited. To follow Shapin 
(1995), they would need to create ‘vectors of credibility’ with governments in the 
regulated market as they had for financiers in the voluntary market. Doing so would 
enable them to build the ‘economies of credibility’ that would allow voluntary standards 
and professional standard-setting organizations to travel into state policies and 
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institutions. Recalling the idea that the authority of governments to coerce a compliance 
market into being, the discourse and practice of the voluntary market should not 
undercut, and should ideally support legitimate government. To do that, however, would 
first require voluntary market players to overcome the ambivalent and at times 
antagonistic attitude towards the state. 
 
III.2. Owning Carbon Credits 
III.2.1. Contesting Public and Private Domains 
Standards helped crack the finance puzzle, but a regulated REDD+ market still did not 
exist. Parties to the UNFCCC did not even agree that such a market should exist. They 
had, in principle, declared near-universal support for REDD in the Bali Action Plan in 
2007 but remained divided on whether it should take the shape of a market, dedicated 
fund, or some combination of the two. Private sector REDD+ proponents therefore 
depended much more on governments to reach their goals than the reverse, for 
governments had no common goal to be reached. 
 The lack of a global agreement remained a barrier to financiers like Abyd Karmali, 
head of carbon markets at Bank of America Merrill Lynch, who, when “testing the 
waters” in REDD investments in 2011, remarked, “Secure demand is all it would take to 
motivate more private sector interest.”71 Carbon market advocates attributed the lack of 
demand as a mismatch between government and the private sector, imploring the former 
to recognize and support the strides already well underway in the voluntary market. 
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According to Donna Lee, a lead US negotiator on REDD+ who went on to consult for 
Climate Focus: 
 
We are not going to get the scale of what we need without participation by the 
private sector…There is a disconnect between the understanding by countries and 
negotiators and the private sector of what the private sector needs in order to 
participate in REDD…When you look beneath that surface layer, you see the 
pieces that are there that will ultimately build the market for REDD. Slowly but 
surely you will see increased demand and successful and well-designed projects 
on the ground securing private capital.72 
 
Karmali and Lee understated the challenge. Securing demand required government 
support, which called for much broader strategy than the one used to build the voluntary 
market. 
 Part of the private sector efforts to spark demand took place at the international 
level, where Durschinger, Streck, Pedroni and colleagues asserted their role as advisers to 
the UNFCCC process, arguing that common standards were a proven route to scaled-up 
finance. IETA took an active role drafting numerous submissions and convening 
prominent side events at the COP. It also became one of very few non-governmental 
groups to claim an office and meeting space in the UNFCCC Delegates Pavilion 
alongside the EU, US, China and small group of other world powers. IETA used the 
                                            
72 NY Times, ‘A Slow Start for the Carbon Credit Market’, 24 July 2011. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/25/business/energy-environment/a-slow-start-for-the-
for-carbon-credit-market.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1& 
147 
annual COP to gain the ear of delegates through a great many side events, such as a 2013 
event paneled by Antonioli, Durschinger, and Korchinsky on the ‘Convergence of 
REDD+ Standards in a Fragmented Market: What Opportunities for REDD+ 
Financing.’73 
 Framing the problem as a simple lack of demand, however, statements like 
Karmali’s and Lee’s assume that the voluntary market had solved the problem of supply 
with projects like Rimba Raya, Oddar Meanchey, and the Kasigu Corridor. In actuality, 
IETA, VCS and other project proponents directed their outreach as much to developing 
countries that would supply REDD+ credits as the developed countries that would 
demand them, for many developing countries were skeptical of the superiority of a 
market over a dedicated fund for REDD+. 
 Just to the south of the Kasigu Corridor in Kenya, for example, Tanzania’s central 
government proved reluctant to pursue projects and the devolve rights and decision-
making over forest resources to local communities on the premise that Tanzania’s forests 
are a public good that should deliver benefits to the nation as a whole.74 In place of a 
market model, Tanzania drafted a National REDD+ Strategy proposing a centralized 
system that would feed payments directly into a National Trust Fund. The Tanzanian 
Forest Act of 1998 confers to communities owning Village Forest Reserves the right to 
the benefits accruing from them.75 From the perspective of influential actors in 
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Tanzania’s relatively weak central government, a National Trust Fund would ensure the 
government had access and control over REDD+ revenues.76 
 Tanzania’s National REDD+ Strategy is in line with the original 2005 proposal for 
RED. As discussed in the preceding chapter, the RED proposal was devised by Brazilian 
and American researchers in the Amazon Environmental Research Institute (IPAM), who 
called for national-level monitoring and reporting. The researchers intended this national-
level proposal to solve the scientific, technical, and political problems that had kept 
avoided deforestation out of the CDM. Among the most pressing of these problems 
stemmed from concerns over the reliability of emission reductions from avoided 
deforestation projects, which critics said simply displaced deforestation in space to other 
areas or in time through unforeseen forest fire, illegal logging, or some other threat. 
 Concerned about being left out of the global carbon market once again, project 
developers mounted a response with proposals of their own. They put forth projects as 
critical to getting REDD+ off the ground, couching their arguments in terms of the 
technical feasibility of advanced remote sensing practices to cheaply monitor carbon 
stocks at a local scale, as well as the economic efficiency of paying the relatively paltry 
opportunity cost of smallholders to pursue forest-friendly land use. In order to get 
governments on their side, however, market advocates had replace their portrait of the 
state as risky antagonist with a view of it as a constructive partner. 
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III.2.2. Managing Government Risk 
The VCS encouraged private capital investment by positioning itself as a credible 
knowledge broker between projects and financiers. Yet this was not enough to secure 
adequate investment due to uncertainties over government policy, which investors 
viewed as a form of risk, as they had with uncertified carbon credits. By defining public 
policy as a form of risk, they opened the possibility to quantify and manage that risk, 
rather than simply waiting for governments to make a final decision before investing in 
REDD+ projects. 
 A representative view comes from Ricardo Bayon, partner and co-founder of the 
environmental market advisory and investment firm, EKO Asset Management. As a 
panelist at the 2013 North American Carbon World conference, Bayon expressed 
wariness over handing too much power and control to governments: 
 
There are some downsides to that approach from the perspective of private 
capital, and one of the downsides of that approach is that you are essentially 
giving tremendous power to these jurisdictions in terms of allocating, measuring, 
monitoring and control over these credits. If you’re a private investor the question 
then becomes how do you deal with that government risk.77 
 
Speaking on the same panel, moderated by the VCS Director of Agriculture, Forestry & 
Other Land Use (AFOLU),78 Korchinsky shared his concern, drawing a line between 
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normal market risk that rigorous accounting standards had helped to solve and the 
abnormal government risk encountered in the regulated market: 
 
We’re certainly more than willing to accept market risk. There was no market 
when we started. That’s just about the ultimate risk. We’ve tried to create a 
market. We are creating a market, which we’ve been successful in doing at least 
at our level. We’re used to performance risk. We’re used to being held 
accountable for our own performance and only when we perform as an 
organization. We’re not necessarily being used to being at risk for other people’s 
performance. So one of the challenges when you’re trying to get investors 
involved in a jurisdictional program is now if the ultimate success or failure is at 
the jurisdictional level…We can succeed but somebody else can fail, and we 
won’t get rewarded for our success. That idea that we are now subject to other 
people’s risk is one of the challenges in attracting private investment.79 
 
Having singled out government risk, both Bayon and Korchinsky called for mechanisms 
to manage it. Bayon noted it was an obstacle but not a “deal killer”, and Korchinsky 
explained how a Wildlife Works’ 300,000 ha Mai Ndombe REDD+ project in the DRC 
ensured the two fundamentals for capital investment—“an opportunity to invest” and “an 
opportunity for return”—through an accounting structure that keeps the government from 
having direct access to the project’s credits: 
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We manage government risk in the countries we are working in. Hands up, who 
thinks the list of the top ten safest places to invest includes DRC? [Laughter] 
Okay, just checking. We manage risk because REDD as an international 
mechanism created a beautiful way for us to manage risk. That beautiful way for 
us to manage risk with the government with the DRC is that they don’t touch our 
credits. The credits go into an international registry approved by an international 
standards auditor and are sold internationally and then they get money back from 
the sale of those credits based on the contract that we have with them. That’s how 
we manage risk with countries like that that aren’t on the list of the top ten 
countries that behave themselves with money. If you go to an environment where 
all funding happens at the government level, you destroy that opportunity for us to 
manage risk that way. Now we’re at the mercy of them to represent our interests 
in the direct crediting for the efforts we’ve been successful with. I used to tell 
people [who asked], “How on Earth can you invest in the DRC?” And I always 
say REDD is a beautiful mechanism for managing that risk, and it has historically 
been true.  
 
What is exceptional about the concept of government risk instead of policy uncertainty is 
that it turns an uncertainty that can only be vaguely anticipated into a risk that can be 
actively managed (Voß and Kemp 2006; Leach et al. 2010). Especially telling is the 
quote’s last sentence: “REDD+ is a beautiful mechanism for managing that risk, and it 
has historically been true”, for “historically true” implies that in the future it might be 
not. The reasoning is that governments might change their REDD+ policies, and thereby 
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jeopardize capital investment. This is a very important point because it implies that, from 
the perspective of private investors, governments might do so arbitrarily and therefore 
illegitimately. 
 Following Yaron Ezrahi, liberal democracies uphold their legitimacy by wielding 
coercive state power for the greater public good. Unlike the private sector, this coercive 
power enables governments to legislate new markets into existence. Thus the term 
‘compliance’ or ‘regulated’ markets, could equally be called ‘non-voluntary’ or 
‘coercive’ markets. The power of governments to coerce, however, must be grounded in 
legitimate authority, which, by definition, the governed cannot perceive to be arbitrary. In 
the current case, the concept of government risk implies that the private sector can 
(through its technical and financial resources) and should (because of its moral standing 
as the engine of progress) manage that risk because government polices that undercut the 
market are capricious and illegitimate since the market can provide for the public good 
better than the government itself. The argument carries the paradoxical implication that 
the private sector is both the governed and the governor, which is made possible by the 
promise that the market will deliver public goods both to local communities and the globe 
as a whole. In practice, however, the imperatives of finance to reduce capital risk take 
precedence over other concerns and even undercut government legitimacy. The US 
government’s issuance of political risk insurance to Terra Global’s Oddar Meanchey 
REDD+ project in Cambodia clarifies this point. 
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III.2.3. Insuring Against Political Risk in Cambodia 
Terra Global orchestrated the Oddar Meanchey REDD+ project, the first in Cambodia, in 
partnership with country’s Forestry Administration and the Cambodian office of a global 
non-profit organization that works on behalf of poor and marginalized communities 
called Pact, and with additional support from the Danish International Development 
Agency, Clinton Climate Initiative, Rockefeller Foundation, and John D. and Catherine 
T. MacArthur Foundation. The project encompasses 58 villages in the northwestern 
province of Oddar Meanchey, a region devastated under the Khmer Rouge, where the 
regime held out until the late 1990s by selling timber to dealers across the border in 
Thailand. High rates of deforestation persisted through the 2000s, making its forests the 
most threatened in the country.80 In 2005, the London-based watchdog Global Witness 
was kicked out of the country over a report indicting the country’s timber trade. In 2007, 
Global Witness reported ties between illegal timber extraction and inside dealings among 
high-ranking government officials, army officers, and businessmen, an allegation the 
government denied. 
 At a signing ceremony held two years later in the provincial capital, Samraong, 
project partners pledged to develop and market credits from the project to “provide 
maximum benefit to local communities that participate in project activities”.81 The 
project received the Prime Minister’s backing, and Forest Administration Director Ty 
Sokhun reported to The Cambodia Daily that at least half of the profit from the sale of 
                                            
80 The deforestation rate of 2.1 percent was measured from 2002-2006. See Poffenberger 
et al. 2013. 
81 Terra Global Press Release. ‘Cambodia Signs Avoided Deforestation Carbon 
Agreements for Voluntary Carbon Standard Project.’ 23 Jun 2009. available at 
http://www.terraglobalcapital.com/sites/default/files/News24June2009.pdf 
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carbon credits would be dedicated to local communities to better their living standards 
and preserve the forest.82 The saffron-clad leader of the region’s Buddhist Monk’s 
Association voiced the monks’ support, who would take an active role in the effort. One 
monk later remarked to Time Magazine, "We have had success in protecting this land 
because we are monks…If they wouldn't stop, I would just take their chain saws and 
weapons."83 
 By working with local, provincial, and national authorities to mitigate impacts from 
mining operations, industrial agriculture, forest fires, commercial and illegal logging, 
military settlements, and local community conflicts, the project seeks to save Oddar 
Meanchey’s forests, reducing poverty among 10,000 households and keeping 7.1 million 
tons CO2 from entering the atmosphere over the course of 30 years (Figure 5, Table 4).84 
  
 
                                            
82 The Cambodia Daily. ‘Nine Communities To Begin Selling Carbon Credits.’ 4 May 
2009. available at https://www.cambodiadaily.com/archives/nine-communities-to-begin-
selling-carbon%E2%80%88credits-63372/ 
83 Time Magazine. ‘Battle of the Jungle.’ 20 Jun 2011. available at 
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2076597,00.html 
84 Poffenberger, M., De Gryze, S., Durschinger, L. 
January, 2009. Designing a Collaborative REDD Project: A Case Study from the Oddar 
Meanchey Province, Cambodia. available at: 
http://www.terraglobalcapital.com/news/designing-collaborative-redd-project-case-study-
oddar-meanchey-province-cambodia 
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Figure 5. Map of Oddar Meanchey with Community Forestry Sites (Terra Global 2010). 
 
Table 4. Summary of Oddar Meanchey Project Activities and Targeted Deforestation 
Activities (Terra Global 2010). 
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 What set Terra Global’s Oddar Meanchey project apart from other REDD+ projects 
was its status as the first carbon project ever to receive ‘political risk insurance’ from the 
U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and first global insurance of any 
sort to be issued for REDD+. OPIC issued the US$900,000 contract in 2011 as insurance 
for project investors.  
 It was an unusual move from OPIC. The development finance agency began as an 
offshoot of the US Agency for International Development in 1972. Under its mandate in 
the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act, the agency is required to base its financing decisions on 
demonstrable development benefits. Many of the expected benefits are typical for 
development projects OPIC supports—community forest patrols, sustainable farming 
systems, agricultural intensification, efficient cookstoves, stronger and clearer land 
tenure. A history of political corruption and violent conflict in the region also make the 
project a likely candidate for OPIC’s political risk insurance. The agency describes its 
criteria for designating political risk as follows: 
 
Investing in emerging markets can be unpredictable, even for the most 
sophisticated investors. While developing markets can offer great opportunity, 
they can also present a variety of political risks beyond an investor’s control. 
Among them: 
⁃ War, civil strife, coups and other acts of politically-motivated violence 
including terrorism 
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⁃ Expropriation, including abrogation, repudiation and/or impairment of 
contract and other improper host government interference 
⁃ Restrictions on the conversion and transfer of local-currency earnings.85 
 
In regard to Oddar Meanchey, Durschinger put the problem thus: 
 
The value of having political risk insurance as a mechanism to reduce investor’s 
risk cannot be overstated in this emerging sector…Expropriation and political 
violence insurance lowers the risk of investing in REDD host countries, 
improving the investment profile for private capital investments in the sector.86 
 
OPIC’s project description offers further details on what constitutes political risk and 
how it aims to reduce it: 
 
Challenge: Protect investor in a REDD project from unforeseen political changes 
that could put investment at risk. 
 
Solution: A new OPIC insurance product will protect investors in a REDD project 
from political risks such as changes in regulations, political violence and improper 
government interference.87 
                                            
85 OPIC website. http://www.opic.gov/what-we-offer/political-risk-insurance 
86 OPIC. OPIC Signs First Insurance Contract for REDD Carbon Reduction Project, 9 
Nov 2011. available at http://www.opic.gov/press-releases/2011/opic-signs-first-
insurance-contract-redd-carbon-reduction-project 
87 OPIC Terra Global project description. available at 
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Here, OPIC’s political risk insurance adds to war and civil strife precisely the kind of 
government risk Bayon and Korchinsky describe above. In a logic reminiscent of 
controversial provisions in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) that would allow 
corporations to sue governments over social or environmental regulations over potential 
financial damages, the risk is that Cambodian authorities will leave investors stranded by 
pursuing policies that make REDD offsets worthless. Durschinger again: 
 
Given the long-term nature of our investment, we believe it is prudent to reduce 
our exposure to future changes in national and local governments and laws by 
executing this insurance policy.88 
 
The implications of OPIC’s interpretation of policy change as a risk worthy of insurance 
is not lost on critics of the project. In a paper titled ‘Precedent-Setting Insurance REDD 
Project in Cambodia Raises Concerns’, three environmental justice NGOs—Pacific 
Environment, FERN, and Focus on the Global South—contest that such insurance puts 
the interest of investors over that of the government and local communities: 
 
Perversely, OPIC’s political risk insurance may protect against actions that the 
Cambodian Government may take to defend its own interests in the event that the 
project fails to deliver promised benefits. Moreover, OPIC’s political risk 
insurance is designed to protect project investors, and not necessarily local 
                                                                                                                                  
http://www.opic.gov/projects/terraglobal 
88 OPIC. OPIC Signs First Insurance Contract for REDD Carbon Reduction Project, 9 
Nov 2011. available at http://www.opic.gov/press-releases/2011/opic-signs-first-
insurance-contract-redd-carbon-reduction-project 
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communities, in the event that the covered political risks manifest themselves. In 
fact, local communities residing around the forests—whose forest protection 
efforts have made the REDD project possible—seem to be the last in line for 
receiving project benefits, making decisions about the project, and protection 
against market and political risks.89 
 
OPIC provided no equivalent insurance for local communities or the project’s 
Cambodian partners if the project failed to deliver its promised benefits. Nor is there any 
indication that in the case of a payout Terra Global would be required to pass on its 
payments to other parties. One potential consequence is split incentives among project 
partners. Another is an incentive for the U.S. Government to pressure the Cambodian 
Government to avoid policies that would trigger a payout, even if those policies were in 
service of Cambodia’s citizens or its international legal obligations under the UNFCCC. 
 
III.2.4. Checks and Balances in Integrated REDD Offsets Program 
OPIC and Terra Global were not concerned over just any regulations but over one 
REDD+ policy proposal in particular. An OPIC press release specifically targets ‘nesting 
regulations’ as the risky policy in question: 
 
One particular concern among investors in REDD projects is the possibility that 
additional regulations, known as ‘nesting regulations,’ will be imposed in the 
                                            
89 Pacific Environment, FERN, and Focus on the Global South. 2012. ‘Precedent-Setting 
Insurance REDD Project in Cambodia Raises Concerns’. available at http://www.redd-
monitor.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/OPIC-Risk-Insurance-REDD-Cambodia.pdf 
160 
future, thus changing the way that REDD targets are measured and preventing 
existing projects from earning carbon credits. 
 
Recall the previous chapter’s discussion of the concept of nested-REDD+ and its origins 
in the work of two carbon market consultants, Lucio Pedroni of the Tropical Agricultural 
Research and Higher Education Center (CATIE) and Charlotte Streck of Climate Focus. 
These advisers, who would later join Durschinger as VCS REDD advisers, crafted the 
proposal as a way to integrate avoided deforestation projects into national-level 
discussions in the UNFCCC. Under UNFCCC rules, however, there was still no 
assurance that projects would escape the risk that governments might adopt policies or 
accounting systems that, in Korchinsky’s words, might take control of “our credits”. 
 OPIC’s political risk insurance was one mechanism to mitigate capital risk. Other 
carbon offset projects, including one to reforest degraded pasture on the Atlantic coast of 
Nicaragua with native bamboo, subsequently adopted similar insurance plans, but project 
developers still felt the need for more durable measures.90 One tactic Terra Global 
pursued was to tweak the proposal for nested REDD+ in a way that would allay its 
concerns. In effect, the proposal called for a certain kind of state to support the market 
project proponents were trying to build. 
 Like Streck and Pedroni’s earlier idea, Terra Global’s ‘Integrated REDD Offset 
Program (IREDD) for Nested Projects Under Jurisdictional Accounting’ sought to 
harmonize projects within a broader national or state level framework. Described as a 
                                            
90 Ecosystem Marketplace. ‘How Forest Carbon Projects Protect Themselves From 
Political Risk’. 27 Aug 2013. available at: 
http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/pages/dynamic/article.page.php?page_id=9916 
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“'nested REDD’ blueprint”, the proposal is remarkable for the lengths it goes to protect 
investments from government appropriation.91 In doing so, it paints a stark contrast 
between the rightful place of the market and the state, a contrast that ultimately 
contributed to its failure to become the blueprint it was intended to be. 
 Under the proposal, projects would have exclusive rights to all carbon credits 
generated within a jurisdiction, based on a peculiar combination of empirical and 
normative statements about causality and responsibility. IREDD is a system where: 
 
(1) credits can only be generated from formally registered project areas, 
 
(2) incentives are built-in to maximize the formally registered project area within 
a given jurisdiction, and 
 
(3) funding mechanisms are in place to support government programs and policies 
that promote reductions in deforestation but have no direct and causal relation 
with empirically observed emission reductions. 
 
Governments would be ineligible to claim carbon credits for jurisdiction-wide reductions 
on the premise that a “causal relationship does not necessarily exist [italics added]” 
between emission reductions and government policies and programs like improved land 
tenure, agricultural subsidy reform, or stronger enforcement. On the other hand, it implies 
                                            
91 Carbon Positive. ‘Terra Global offers ‘nested REDD’ blueprint’. 24 Sep 2010. 
available at http://forestindustries.eu/content/terra-global-offers-%E2%80%98nested-
redd%E2%80%99-blueprint 
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that such policies and programs necessarily have no effect on reductions in project areas, 
which assume full responsibility for all reductions within their boundaries. One of the 
consequences of this arrangement would be to incentivize projects to cover a region’s 
forests in their entirety, from tip to toe, and the political and economic conditions for this 
to happen. That is not to say that IREDD leaves no role for non-market tools for 
conservation; it offers a number of non-market examples: political pressure from 
international donors, a domestic political culture that values its forests, concessional 
funding, and development assistance. It denies that any of these tools of the state, though, 
could be causally linked to forest conservation and therefore market payments for that 
conservation. 
 What is noteworthy is the antagonism the proposal poses between the market and 
the state, invoking bare political terms like “checks and balances” and a “balance of 
power”: 
 
These outcomes center on maintaining the balance between the power of 
Jurisdictional Governments and project proponents, fostering the role of markets, 
and safeguarding land tenure and carbon rights. 
 
And elsewhere:  
 
…rules must contain careful checks and balances so that the roles, rights and 
responsibilities of all stakeholders are clarified and in balance. 
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IREDD is designed to act as a kind of accountant’s constitution to dispense the basic 
rights and responsibilities of a transnational community of unlike actors, where, as a 
political community, the potential for conflict constantly looms. The market, on the other 
hand, is cast as an apolitical domain, where clear lines can be seen running causally 
between rational economic agents and carbon savings they have been incentivized to 
produce in a neatly delineated project area. Based on what IREDD needs to work, it even 
offers support for the wholesale decentralization of the fiscal, administrative, and 
political authority, which it defines as: 
 
(1) transferring the power of selecting political leadership and representatives 
from central governments to local governments, and 
 
(2) transferring the power and authority for making socio-politicoeconomic [sic] 
decisions from central governments to local governments and communities 
 
This is perhaps not surprising given that the proposal came out of a group that thought it 
necessary to take out an insurance policy against its government partners. But as a tactic 
to grow the voluntary market to fit the shoes of a full-fledged regulated one, the IREDD 
proposal and political risk insurance gained limited traction. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
This chapter has continued to complicate the dominant narrative around REDD+ by 
discussing the emergence of calculative capabilities for REDD+ in the voluntary carbon 
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market. In doing so, it also complicates institutionalist findings that private expertise 
emerges in anticipation of demand from public policymakers (in the current study 
understood as the need for private expertise to supplement global law-making). The case 
studies in this chapter illustrate how private expertise for REDD+ grew out of the pre-
existing capabilities and demands of diverse private actors. 
The chapter underscores the close ties between the consolidation of REDD+ 
standards and the emergence of a transitional network of private actors, drawn from three 
broad groups: standard-setting organizations, project developers, and large donors and 
financial investors. The cases describe the entwined production of two kinds of civil 
regulations—for calculating and owning carbon credits. The chapter finds that one of the 
key objectives of standard-setters (and related conservation groups) was to consolidate a 
transnational network of experts and expertise in order to bring project developers and 
financiers into the voluntary carbon market. The chapter therefore argues that an account 
of the emergence of private networks and expertise must consider not only the demand 
for knowledge by public actors but the demand from private actors as well. This requires: 
1) distinguishing demand for civil regulations from public and private actors, 2) 
differentiating between the demands of different private actors, 3) examining how 
demand shapes the content of knowledge, and 4) comparing the content of civil 
regulations with the content of the knowledge needed to implement public policy. 
The next three chapters take up the fourth point in California and Chiapas. 
Although public and private actors alike hoped that a global compliance market would 
soon be in the cards, their immediate goal was to consolidate the credible third-party 
standards needed to scale-up the carbon market. By way of demonstration, the calculative 
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capabilities nursed in the voluntary market would shape the regulated market yet-to-be. 
The demands of regulators and lawmakers, however, are not the same, raising questions 
about the configuration of markets and states, alongside territory, authority, and rights.  
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CHAPTER 4 
CARBON TERRITORY: RISK, SCALE, AND FINANCE IN  
JURISDICTIONAL VS. PROJECT-BASED REDD+ 
I. Introduction 
Hundreds of initiatives around the world are devising Monitoring, Reporting, and 
Verification (MRV) systems for REDD+. These encompass an array of technical and 
administrative practices, including measurement protocols, verification and validation 
standards, remote-sensing technologies, greenhouse gas compliance systems, social and 
environmental safeguards, forest monitoring systems, deforestation baselines, and 
emission reference levels. Among these many initiatives are global reporting protocols in 
the UNFCCC, as well as national capacity-building programs in dozens of tropical 
countries funded with hundreds of millions of dollars from the World Bank Forest 
Carbon Partnership and UN-REDD Programme. At the same time, they include the great 
many private sector projects scattered across three continents that are devising their own 
carbon accounting standards or adopting the verification and validation procedures of 
third-party certifiers like the VCS. 
Section II provides an overview of California’s cap-and-trade program and the 
state’s interest in REDD+. The section describes the MOU with Chiapas and related 
REDD+ advisory process. Section III theorizes jurisdictional REDD+ in terms of carbon 
territory, building from the idea that territory itself is a political technology itself that 
must be understood in through technical and legal practice. Section IV then contrasts the 
territorial implications of jurisdictional REDD+ from project-based REDD+, stressing the 
uneasy affiliation of the two.  
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II. Overview of Carbon Offsets Regulations in California 
II.1. California’s Cap-and-Trade Program 
California’s Cap-and-Trade program launched in January 2012. Each year, the cap 
shrinks by 2-3 percent to deliver 15-20 percent of the total emission cuts through 2020 
mandated under the Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (AB32). Some 600 capped 
installations and 350 businesses covering about 85 percent of the state’s emissions are 
required to surrender one California Carbon Allowance (CCA)—granted from the state or 
purchased on the open market or in quarterly auctions—for every ton of carbon dioxide 
(GtCO2e) emitted per year.92 Alternatively, these ‘covered sources’ may buy compliance-
grade offset credits from an uncapped source to cover a portion of its compliance 
obligation from one of five project types in the U.S.: U.S. Forests Projects, Urban Forest 
Projects, Livestock Manure Projects, Ozone Depleting Substances, and Methane Mine 
Capture Projects.93 
In addition to domestic, project-based offsets, ARB’s final regulation order for 
Cap-and-Trade program, issued in October 2011, singles out REDD for consideration as 
a potential source of international, sector-based offsets,94 defined as emission reductions 
across an entire economic sector in a developing country. The role for REDD+ offsets 
would be limited. Sector-based offsets could comprise up to 2 percent of an entity’s 
                                            
92 Allowances, together with offsets, are the two kinds of ‘compliance instruments’ 
eligible to meet emissions from covered sources. 
93 ARB Compliance Offset Program website. accessed 11 April 2015: 
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/offsets/offsets.htm; Offsets can be of two forms: 
California Carbon Offsets (CCOs), issued by ARB, and Climate Reserve Tonnes (CRTs), 
issued by CAR. 
94 Cal. Code Regs. tit. 17, § 95993. Available at: 
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/finalregorder.pdf 
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compliance obligation in the first and second compliance periods (2015-2017) 95 and up 
to 4 percent in the third (2018-2020).96 
Cost-containment was a major driver of ARB’s interest in domestic and 
international offsets alike (Leuders et al. 2014). Early estimates saw a potential shortage 
of offsets yielding a price surge to $60 per ton, promoting regulators to double the upper 
limit of offsets an entity could use to meet its compliance obligation from 4 to 8 percent. 
More recent estimates set that figure closer to $15 per ton, easing concerns over a 
shortage in the near-term.97 Nonetheless, REDD+ offset prices of $2-9 per ton in the 
voluntary market compare favorably with an allowance price of around $12 and average 
just half of the $10 price floor set by ARB (Leuders et al. 2014)98 and could become 
much more important if the cap-and-trade program is extended beyond 2020 to meet an 
ambitious executive order issued by Governor Jerry Brown to bring the state’s emissions 
40% under 1990 levels by 2030. 
By early 2015, California's compliance offset program admitted 110 projects 
accounting for 18.8 million99 of the 80-120 million total offset credits estimated for 2012-
2020. Yet none were from REDD or international, sector-based credits of any kind. For 
                                            
95 Transcription of American Carbon Registry transcription of ACR webinar - Update on 
Key Elements of California's Compliance Market. accessed on 11 April 2015 at: 
http://americancarbonregistry.org/news-events/news/news-
files/Update%20on%20the%20Key%20Elements%20of%20Californias%20Compliance
%20Carbon%20Offset%20Market%20-%20webinar%20transcript.pdf/view 
96 California Code of Regulations § 95854 
97 Point Carbon. (2013). New California Emissions Model and Revised WCI Price 
Forecast. 
98 Leuders et al. (2014) derive this comparison, citing: Maria Kolos and Ashley Lawson. 
(2014). ‘What determines the fair price for REDD credits?’. Point Carbon; and California 
Carbon Dashboard, accessed 25 June 2014 at http://carbondash.org 
99 Argus Media. ‘California issues 608,000 carbon offset credits’. 9 April 2015. available 
at: http://www.argusmedia.com/News/Article?id=1020605 
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that to happen, additional ARB rulemaking and public review would have to occur, and 
final approval by the Governor would have to “determine that the linkage partner has 
adopted a greenhouse gas reduction program that is at least as stringent as AB 32; that the 
linkage agreement contains certain enforcement measures; and that the linkage will not 
submit California to significant liability for any failure associated with the linkage” 
(Leuders et al. 2014).100 
 
II.2. The MOU 
REDD+ took one step closer to entering a compliance market for the first time in 
November 2010 at the third Governors’ Global Climate Summit in Davis, California, 
when California, Chiapas, and Acre signed MOUs to work together on technical, legal, 
and institutional design issues for linking California’s cap-and-trade program with 
REDD+ programs in its two tropical partners.101 The agreement calls for the partners to 
begin a process to develop a “state to state sectoral REDD linkage recommendation”, in 
                                            
100 Cal. Gov't. Code § 12894(f) 
101 The memorandum’s key text, Article 2, is the only text outside of the preamble 
specifying the form of environmental management in question. It indicates the states will 
coordinate and cooperate on “environmental management, scientific and technical 
investigation, and capacity building”, expressly on: 
 
a. Reducing greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and land degradation - 
otherwise known as "REDD" - and sequestration of additional carbon through the 
restoration and reforestation of degraded lands and forests, and through improved forest 
management practices. 
 
b. Developing recommendations together to ensure that forest-sector emissions 
reductions and sequestrations, from activities undertaken at the sub-national level, will be 
real, additional, quantifiable, permanent, verifiable and enforceable, and capable of being 
recognized in compliance mechanisms of each party's state. 
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line with placeholder provisions for REDD in the regulation order for California 
Greenhouse Gas Cap-and-Trade Program issued by ARB.102 Their immediate intent was 
to inform the link between California, Acre, and Chiapas, while also seeking to serve the 
wider goals of facilitating a common platform for sub-national states of the GCF and 
beyond. 
 The appeal of carbon markets for REDD+ went far beyond global climate change. 
For California, the rubric of global climate change presented the opportunity to become a 
leader abroad, garner political acceptance for its carbon market at home, and foster 
innovative climate mitigation in sectors unregulated under the cap-and-trade program. 
Disney, Pacific Gas & Electric, Southern California Edison, and other businesses favored 
REDD+ offsets as a flexible, least-cost option to meet their compliance cap, while 
conservationists saw in them the chance to conserve biodiversity and deliver other 
environmental co-benefits.103 
 For Chiapas and Acre, the link was an engine to reduce poverty, promote 
sustainable development, and generate revenue. Moreover, it offered a platform to join 
California on the global stage as an environmental leader, with both Chiapas hosting the 
GCF Annual Meeting in 2012 and Acre doing the same two years later. Like their US 
partner, these states made new laws, regulations, institutions, and investments to build the 
market. Acre’s REDD+ program was by far most advanced of any GCF member and 
among the most sophisticated of such programs the world over. Considered an icon of 
                                            
102 CCR, Title 17, Sections 95991-95997 
103 See, for example, letter of support submitted to ARB by Code REDD. Key Global 
Stakeholders Sign Letters of Support for REDD+ in California’s Climate Policy. 18 July 
2013. available at: http://www.coderedd.org/news/key-global-stakeholders-sign-letters-
of-support-for-redd-in-californias-climate-policy/ 
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progressive environmental politics ever since Chico Mendes united Brazilian rubber 
tappers in the name of human rights and forest protection in the 1970s, Acre passed 
landmark legislation in 2011 establishing the State System of Incentives for 
Environmental Services (SISA), a far-reaching act designed around an explicitly 
jurisdictional approach devising new forms of public-private partnerships to transform 
that state’s extractive industries towards sustainable, low-carbon development. 
 Chiapas was a less likely candidate. Its turbulent past of revolution and civil unrest 
culminating in the Zapatista Rebellion in 1994 remained unresolved, and its legal, 
technical, and institutional infrastructure for REDD+ lagged that of its Brazilian 
counterpart. Nevertheless, the highest state offices in Chiapas and California endorsed the 
plan to build a common REDD+ market. Chiapas had elevated efforts to reduce 
deforestation with its 2009 passage of the state’s Climate Change Action Program 
(PACCCH). California, meanwhile, sought to strengthen political and economic ties with 
Mexico, its largest international trading partner. Professional connections between the 
two administrations and Chiapas’ status as a GCF member sealed the partnership.104 
 
II.3. The ROW 
Exactly how these links were to be forged was and remains an open question, for never 
before or since have sub-national governments from the developed and developing 
worlds attempted to forge a cross-border carbon market. To this end the, the MOU called 
for the creation of a sub-national REDD Offset Working Group (ROW), tasked with 
developing recommendations to ensure such reductions are “real, additional, quantifiable, 
                                            
104 As noted in separate personal interviews. 
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permanent, verifiable and enforceable, and capable of being recognized in compliance 
mechanisms in each state.” The 11-member advisory committee first met in February 
2011, with volunteers recruited from the GCF, CAR, Stanford University, Ford 
Foundation, and several conservation groups. The panel also included observers from key 
agencies in each of the partner states: California’s ARB, Chiapas’ Secretary of 
Environment, Housing, and Natural History (SEMAHN), and Acre’s Institute of Climate 
Change and Regulation of Environmental Services (IMC).105 
 After two years of internal discussions, in January 2013 the group released ‘The 
ROW Report: Recommendations to Conserve Tropical Rainforests, Protect Local 
Communities and Reduce State-Wide Greenhouse Gas Emissions’. The report centered 
on three questions: 
 
                                            
105 ROW Participants: 
 
» Daniel Nepstad, International Program Director, Amazon Institute of Environmental 
Research 
» Derik Broekhoff, Vice President for Policy, Climate Action Reserve 
» Greg P. Asner, Professor of Geological and Environmental Sciences, Stanford 
University; Scientist at Carnegie Institution’s Department of Global Ecology 
» Ludovino Lopes, Consultant to the Secretary of Environment for the State of Acre in 
Brazil 
» Michelle Passero, Senior Climate Policy Advisor, The Nature Conservancy 
» Peter Riggs, Independent Consultant, formerly of Ford Foundation 
» Rosa Maria Vidal, Director, Pronatura Sur, Chiapas, Mexico 
» Steve Schwartzman, Director for Tropical Forest Policy, 
Environmental Defense Fund 
» Toby Janson-Smith, Senior Director of Forest Carbon Markets, Conservation 
International 
» Tony Brunello (Facilitator), Green Technology Leadership Group 
» William Boyd, Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School, 
Colorado; Senior Advisor and Project Lead: Governors’ Climate and Forests Task Force 
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(1) what legal and institutional mechanisms are required to enable California to 
recognize international REDD-based emission offsets for compliance purposes; 
 
(2) what are the key policy considerations a sectoral REDD program should 
address to achieve the level of performance needed for California to recognize the 
REDD-based offsets for compliance purposes; and 
 
(3) what should be the bases for judging the performance of the states in reducing 
carbon removals from forests? 
 
One of the most central (and contentious) topics in ROW’s report was MRV systems for 
jurisdictional REDD+. The original impetus for a jurisdictional approach came from 
California regulators. (The State Legislature makes no mention of REDD+ in AB32; 
Governor Schwarzenegger only brokered the MOU after ARB had considered the 
proposal.) Measuring and circulating carbon value at the level of the political jurisdiction 
was a means to overcome the technical uncertainties that plagued project-level 
approaches. This argument, first presented at the national level in Chapter 2, brought 
forth new territorial implications at the sub-national level, as the technical 
recommendations spilled over into direct administrative, political, and economic 
questions about how and where carbon value resides in the landscape and who can lay 
claim to it (civic, public, sovereign, private). 
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 The next two sections theorize MRV systems as a calculative capability, highlight 
the political implications of linking MRV systems to political jurisdictions, and inquire 
into why those implications were downplayed in the REDD+ design. 
 
III. Theorizing Carbon Territory 
III.1. MRV Systems as a Calculative Capability 
Whether as planned in the REDD+ Rulebook, or practiced in the voluntary carbon 
market, MRV systems rely heavily on civil regulations—those rules and practices that 
non-state actors devise and state or non-state actors willingly abide (as described in 
Chapter 3). Without the calculative capabilities such civil regulations afford, the 
prospects for market-based REDD+ would rapidly recede. Consensus-based global law-
making proceeds more slowly than civil regulations, and few governments possess the 
technical monitoring and verification capabilities that the well-heeled private industry has 
honed over the span of two decades. Whether authorized in the letter of public law or de 
facto rule of private use, civil regulations are indispensable to the carbon trade. 
 Observers accordingly register no essential distinction between civil regulations 
employed in compliance markets or voluntary ones. Carbon is carbon, and no matter the 
public or private motive, the goal of calculation is the same: accurate and efficient 
emission cuts. 
 This view, I argue, is misplaced, and not for the reason carbon markets’ many 
critics most often give. Critics charge that accurate carbon tallies fall victim to conflicting 
interests.106 The conflict, they say, stems from public lawmakers’ need for instrumental 
                                            
106 see, for example, Amy Miller’s feature-length documentary, ‘The Carbon Rush’. 
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credibility to justify their rule, and private standard-setters’ desire to gain credibility by 
dint of public imprimatur. I bracket the question of accuracy. (Here, I neither dispute nor 
affirm the charge but simply note it sidesteps serious inquiry into the effect of long-
standing institutional pressures to—in principle if not always in practice—improve the 
accuracy of knowledge for decision-making over time.) 
 Here, I am interested in more fundamental questions about the goals of calculation 
itself, which exceed (though do not negate or ignore) concerns over accuracy or 
institutional learning. This becomes apparent when we consider MRV systems and other 
calculative capabilities to be political technologies—a concept I discuss next. 
 
II.2. Territories vs. Territoria 
 
jurisdiction 
n. 
1. the right, power, or authority to administer justice by hearing and determining controversies. 
2. power; authority; control: to have military jurisdiction over the occupied territories. 
3. the extent or range of judicial, law-enforcement, or other authority: a case under the jurisdiction 
of the local police. 
4. the territory over which authority is exercised. 
[1250–1300; Middle English jurediccioun < Old French juredicion < Latin jūris dictiō (see jus, 
diction)]107 
 
                                                                                                                                  
http://thecarbonrush.net/ 
107 http://www.thefreedictionary.com/jurisdiction 
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When civil regulations unite buyers and sellers, they make the market. When civil 
regulations become incorporated into the body of public law, they make the state. What 
then do civil regulations do when adopted in the union of public and private spheres? 
 The short answer gives a lead but does not suffice. To think about how a market 
makes a state, and a state a market, is not a new ambition. But to think about how the 
very meaning of markets and states arises together is nearly so. In regard to carbon 
markets and global governance, the vocabulary to do so scarcely exists. Without the 
words to speak about the entwined meaning of global calculation and law, some of the 
most pressing constitutional shifts underway today recede into a pall of unintelligibility. 
 Fortunately, we do not need to venture further than “Jurisdictional” REDD+ to find 
a starting point. “Juris” signifies rule, and jurisdiction very often denotes the rule over 
political territory. In his novel genealogical study, The Birth of Territory (2013), Stuart 
Elden finds that the modern sense of jurisdiction—as that exclusive authority a sovereign 
exercises over area—arose relatively recently, with the fashioning of the modern state. 
Eden stresses the poverty of understanding about how territories are made. The term 
shares the political-economic features of land, as well as the political-strategic ones with 
terrain. Yet, neither the terms alone or together, he argues, suffice because they leave out 
critical questions about how territories are made. To do this requires understanding 
territory as a political technology (i.e. as something that shapes authority, citizenship, and 
other basics of political order) wed closely to technical and legal capabilities (in the 
language here), as well as economics and geopolitical statecraft. 
 This is striking in light of the current discussion for reasons that go beyond the 
semantics of jurisdiction and territory—most notably the suggestion that jurisdictional 
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REDD+ might fruitfully be conceived of as a political technology for re-making national 
configurations of territory, authority, and rights into novel global assemblages through 
the extant though partial political authority of sub-national states and governments. 
 This immediately invokes questions about the capabilities for making global law 
and global knowledge at the core of the dissertation. With this we gain added resources to 
more incisively broach the complex constitutional questions introduced in the previous 
chapters. 
 To think of jurisdictional REDD+ as a political technology is to think of project-
based REDD+ as something else. Eden offers the term territorium as a term that was in 
circulation before the word territory existed, and which only in later became associated 
with the modern political sense of territory today. In older uses it designates something 
like private authority over land not necessarily tied to the state, though prior to private 
and public gained their modern meanings as separate spheres as well. 
 Therefore I leave carbon territory to describe jurisdictional REDD+ (at any level) 
and propose carbon territorium to designate project-based REDD+. Like cartographic 
and political innovation enabled the modern territory-based state, MRV systems and 
global laws are carving new spaces of governance today. Only carbon territory though is 
explicitly linked to the production of (again partial) sovereign political authority. When 
the nested carbon accounting and ownership is thrown in the mix, the relation of the two 
becomes more complicated but perhaps more interesting and important as well. This, at 
least, gives some conceptual purchase to proceed. 
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IV. Building Capabilities for Carbon Territories 
Heeding Elden’s attention to meaning and genealogy, the following sections consider 
how expert advisers to California and Chiapas conceived of REDD+ based on projects 
versus jurisdictions. Close attention to meaning is critical because the practices and ideas 
for REDD+ themselves are in flux. The following cases explore these topics by: 1) 
reviewing how regulators and ROW experts from different organizations and disciplinary 
background themselves emphasized projects and jurisdictions in different and sometimes 
contradictory ways, 2) how regulators and private actors were concerned with different 
kinds of risk, which, in turn, enabled or ignored the possibility of leveraging very 
different financial instruments, and 3) how the well-established networks and calculative 
capability for project-based accounting in the voluntary market, combined with 
skepticism from REDD+ opponents over any meaningful distinction between project- 
and sub-national jurisdictional-approaches, contributed to the slow progress political and 
technical progress on jurisdictional approaches and their poor integration with projects. 
 
IV.1. Interpreting “Jurisdictions” and “Projects” 
IV.2.1. Drawing Boundaries 
MRV systems like those being developed in Chiapas and Acre were a key focus of the 
ROW recommendations and of direct relevance to stringency criteria required under 
California’s climate legislation. In principle, these six criteria—real, additional, 
quantifiable, permanent, verifiable, and enforceable—are equivalent to those already 
required for project-based offsets.108 In practice, however, the application of these criteria 
                                            
108 HSC §38562(d)(1) and (2) 
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to the jurisdictional scale called for entirely new techniques grounded in radically 
different notions of how to measure and value the carbon stored in tropical forests. 
Indeed, ARB itself underscores the distinction. The agency, in its Proposed Draft 
Regulation (PDR), echoes a rationale first heard for nation-based accounting for RED, 
reasoning that a jurisdictional approach could remedy the technical deficiencies that 
plagued forest projects in the Clean Development Mechanism: 
 
While the CDM has created a vibrant market for international offsets, its project-
based approach has not fostered significant policy changes in developing 
countries. Further, some questions have been raised about the sustainability and 
additionality of certain projects and project types.109 
 
The ROW is careful to distinguish projects and jurisdictional REDD+, detailing the 
differences between the two and elaborating why, when it came to international offsets, 
the latter was superior to the former in regard to ARB’s criteria: 
 
By defining performance at the level of the entire jurisdiction, the state or 
provincial government gains a strong incentive and the necessary flexibility to 
achieve a number of important goals. It can align policies, improve law 
enforcement, institutionalize stakeholder consultation processes and compliance 
                                            
109 ARB PDR Background. available at: 
http://www.gcftaskforce.org/resource_library/laws_and_policies 
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with social and environmental safeguards and strengthen or build new institutions 
to increase the likelihood of success.110 
 
During the outreach process that followed the January 2013 release of the 
recommendations, ROW members underscored the difference between jurisdictional 
approaches and the project-based ones that had come to be seen as the crux of a REDD+ 
market. As part of its outreach efforts, ROW held three public workshops at major 
universities in California. Speaking at the first workshop at Stanford University, ROW’s 
Daniel Nepstad—founding President of the Amazon Environmental Research Institute 
(IPAM), former Senior Scientist at the Woods Hole Research Center, and Chief Program 
Officer for the Moore Foundation’s Environment program—made it clear that 
jurisdictional REDD+ was a “very different beast” that required a mental shift on behalf 
of even California regulators: 
 
                                            
110 The ROW Report reads: From an environmental perspective, jurisdictional or sectoral 
approaches to REDD have important advantages over standalone projects. Jurisdictional 
crediting accounts for potential “leakage” (shifts of deforestation and emissions) from 
one location to another within a jurisdiction in a way that is not possible at smaller scales. 
Similarly, aggregating emissions provides greater certainty that reductions achieved are 
“additional,” as there is greater certainty over the trend in overall deforestation across a 
large region versus the likely fate of any particular piece of forest. In addition, concerns 
over the “permanence” of any particular project are diminished when the focus shifts to 
the aggregate performance in a jurisdiction that is managing its total emissions and that 
has the ability to enforce liabilities for any reversals. Monitoring and measuring forest 
carbon at a state or national level offers economies of scale and will reduce per-unit costs. 
There are also important economies of scale in terms of quantifying and managing risks 
that will reduce costs. For example, costs will be lower when risks of forest fires can be 
pooled over large regions, rather than requiring each project to insure against such risks 
independently. 
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We all see REDD through a different lens and perspective. Much activity on 
ground is with REDD projects that have little to do with government. Another 
type of REDD, which is the kind California has possibly decided to link with is a 
very different beast….In our initial conversations with some of the representatives 
of the California Government we realized that this point is not clear. We are really 
talking about a new type of rural development that is pushing forward the poverty 
alleviation agenda, it is pushing forward food security, greater yields, greater 
economic growth as we lower deforestation, degradation, and emissions. 
 
Nepstad had been, alongside fellow ROW member, Steve Schwartzman, Director, 
Tropical Forest Policy, Environmental Defense Fund, among those advocating for 
national-level compensated reduction (Chapter 2) that had seeded the idea for RED in the 
international negotiations in 2005. Schwartzman and Nepstad drew on decades of 
research and conservation work in the Brazilian Amazon to underscore the difference 
between project and state-wide approaches and, in particular, stress the authority of 
governments to enforce contracts and protect rights. 
 Before Schwartzman became Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)’s Director of 
Tropical Forest Policy, he was a conservationist and indigenous-rights advocate working 
in communities in the Brazilian state of Paraná and, in 1986, published with the Sierra 
Club the provocatively titled book ’Bankrolling Disasters: International Development 
Banks and the Global Environment’. Trained as an anthropologist, Schwartzman had 
been a friend and colleague of Chico Mendes, helping to organize two of the iconic 
activist’s trips to the U.S. before his assassination in 1988. In the 1980s, EDF undertook a 
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major shift from an oppositional, litigious approach to a market-incentive based one, 
becoming a key force in getting cap-and-trade onto the federal and state-level policy 
agenda in the U.S. 
 Schwartzman’s view of REDD+ combined EDF’s market-based approach with a 
soft version of the leftist, legalist, union-based style of politics that Mendes and EDF 
itself had emphasized in the past. He stressed the strength of a jurisdictional market, 
where governments exercise special authority to enforce contracts and implement policies 
on behalf of indigenous rights, saying: 
 
Jurisdictions can do things that project developers and NGOs can’t.…For 
example, in Brazil, each state is constitutionally responsible for protecting the 
environment and the rights of Indigenous people. And Brazil's Federal Public 
Ministry enforces these public interest laws.111 
 
In a workshop talk titled ‘REDD+ vs. The California Forest Project Protocol’, ROW 
member and CAR Vice President for Policy, Derik Broekoff, explicitly distinguished 
REDD from forest projects in terms of scale, scope, coverage, and approach. CAR was 
no stranger to projects: In 2002, the state legislature directed it (then called the California 
Carbon Action Registry) to develop a protocol to certify forest project offsets in the U.S., 
which became the Forest Project Protocol (FPP) and subsequent basis for ARB’s 
domestic forest offset protocol in 2011. Broekoff described both REDD and the FPP as 
                                            
111 Kelli Barrett. ‘Indigenous People Call For REDD+ Safeguards In California's Carbon 
Market’. Ecosystem Marketplace. 28 March 2013. available at: 
http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/pages/dynamic/article.page.php?page_id=9656&
section=news_articles&eod=1 
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“carbon offset programs of different sorts” that must meet a “common set of criteria” to 
preserve environmental integrity, be credible, and perform in a cap-and-trade program. 
He stressed that in an international context, however, that a jurisdictional approach 
conferred key advantages over a project-based approach to California and its partners. 
 In regard to the criterion that offsets be ‘real’, jurisdictional REDD offered more 
tools to deal with the leakage problem—the concern that deforestation deferred in one 
place would simply shift to another. The reason, he said, was that large-scale programs 
made it technically easier to account for deforestation across much broader swathes of 
land, while relieving pressure on the underlying drivers of deforestation, for instance, by 
intensifying agriculture on already cleared lands. In terms of ‘additionality’, he said that 
REDD meant that “you don’t have to be concerned with the individual motivations of 
project developers or individual actors”, instead presenting a more credible and accurate 
“collective approach” focused on reviewing performance against sectoral trends. On 
‘verifiability’ Broekoff contrasted expensive on-the-ground sampling of carbon stocks 
with the economies of scale, and cheaper offsets, achieved through remote sensing 
technologies. On ‘permanence’, he said REDD is akin to a cap-and-trade program, 
describing the Reference Level of emissions as a metric to be ratcheted lower over time. 
And unlike projects, he stressed that a jurisdictional approach encourages deep policy 
changes that projects do not, thereby locking in long-term reductions by relieving 
pressures and removing opportunity costs that might otherwise cause such reductions to 
be reversed. 
 Despite the ARB’s doubts about the ability of projects to deliver large-scale 
emission cuts, nowhere does it imply that international project-based offsets are 
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incompatible with a jurisdictional approach. In fact, the ARB’s staff report underscores 
the importance of private sector engagement and indicates that the agency would consider 
issuing international project-based offsets as a temporary measure to containment costs in 
the initial phase of its cap-and-trade program. 
 
IV.2.2. Erasing Boundaries 
In addition to championing the conceptual case for a jurisdictional approach, the GCF 
and affiliates conceived and promoted new institutions to link state-issued securities with 
state-wide emission reductions. Above all, they highlighted Acre’s SISA program, 
describing the Amazonian state as a “sub-national leader” and “model pioneer in tropical 
forest protection”. In SISA, they noted, the PES schemes that typify most projects play a 
lesser role. Instead, the program centers on high-level policies such as ecological zoning, 
logging sector reform, and a rural property licensing and certification system.112 
 The GCF and the ROW were by no means anti projects—indeed the ROW 
described them as important “laboratories of innovation” and dedicates substantial space 
to options for including projects in higher-level systems. Yet Acre remained one of the 
few states to pursue such an approach in earnest. IPAM, the Amazon research group 
Nepstad founded 1995, voiced a seldom heard caution on the project-centric approach 
that had dominated the discourse on the REDD+ carbon market. In a paper circulated in 
the GCF on lessons from Acre, IPAM cautions on an “excessive focus on projects”, 
saying: 
                                            
112 IPAM. (2012). ‘Acre State's Progress Towards 
 Jurisdictional REDD+’. available at: 
http://www.gcftaskforce.org/documents/acre%27s_progress_towards_jurisdictional_redd.
pdf 
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Most REDD+ programs are still a collection of REDD+ projects that are isolated 
from the policies and institutions of the state and federal governments. Projects 
are an important source of innovation and benefit delivery on the ground, and can 
operate more efficiently sometimes since they do not depend upon government 
bureaucracies to function. However, emissions reduction across entire 
jurisdictions is very difficult to achieve with projects alone. Acre is to be 
commended for developing the framework of its state-wide program before 
encouraging forest carbon projects.113 
 
The report cites “a lack of progress in taking advantage of the flexibility that is conferred 
to states by adopting the jurisdictional approach REDD+”, noting “Acre is an exception 
to this pattern.” In another paper on financing options titled ‘REDD+ in the Post-
Copenhagen World’, Nepstad and co-authors who included ROW’s Schwartzman, Boyd, 
and facilitator, Tony Brunello, recast the agility and independence of projects as a 
potential impediment to the flexibility described above: 
 
Projects also have the potential to impede the progress of national and 
state/provincial-level REDD+ program development for the very reason that they 
are simpler and quicker to implement. By operating relatively unencumbered 
from governmental policies and institutions and by moving quickly to 
establishment of cash payments to forest stakeholders, projects have the potential 
                                            
113 IPAM. (2012). ‘Acre State's Progress Towards 
 Jurisdictional REDD+’. available at: 
http://www.gcftaskforce.org/documents/acre%27s_progress_towards_jurisdictional_redd.
pdf 
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to draw away from the sector-level program development, policy alignment, and 
institutional innovation that are necessary for the long-term foundations of 
REDD+.114 
 
Not all ROW members towed the line, however. ROW’s Toby Janson-Smith, director of 
VCS’s Agriculture, Forestry & Other Land Use program, and former lead for 
Conservational International’s Forest Carbon Markets, erased the boundaries between 
projects and REDD when speaking at prominent venues such as CAR’s Navigating the 
American Carbon World (NACW) Conference: 
 
There’s been great progress, at least in the voluntary space….We’ve seen over the 
last five years or so, REDD has really matured in terms of high-quality project 
development, high-quality carbon accounting frameworks and standards and just 
good implementation.115 
 
Janson-Smith was responding to a concern that projects would be left out of the future 
market, also expressed in a 2013 paper by his former employer, Conservation 
International, on the ‘REDD+ Market: Sending out an SOS’.116 The paper sought rapid 
interventions to rescue the rush of speculative projects that between 2007 and 2010 led to 
                                            
114 Nepstad et al. (2010). ‘REDD+ in the Post-Copenhagen World: Recommendations for 
Interim Public Finance’. available at: 
http://www.whrc.org/resources/essays/pdf/Interim_Finance_Recommendations.pdf 
115 Gloria Gonzalez. (2013). ‘Could California Make or Break REDD?’. Forest Trends. 
available at: http://www.forestcarbonportal.com/news/could-california-make-or-break-
redd 
116 Conservation International. (2013). ‘REDD+ Market: Sending out an SOS’. available 
at: http://www.redd-monitor.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/REDD-Market-SOS.pdf 
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an oversupply in voluntary market with no compliance market in sight to relieve the 
pressure. Flooding the market with cheap jurisdictional offsets posed a threat, and the 
paper’s sole reference to the GCF casts it in these terms. Whereas IPAM called for 
interim public finance to prioritize flexible state-level programs over local projects, 
Conservation International pressed for public money to keep private projects afloat, and it 
did so by flipping IPAM’s argument on it head: 
 
Although jurisdictional approaches to REDD+ remain a key objective in the 
development of longterm strategies to address the drivers of deforestation, site-
based projects are an important stepping stone to achieving this goal. Projects 
provide a tangible demonstration of the approaches and mechanisms that can be 
realistically adopted to effectively reduce deforestation on the ground, providing a 
platform for success that can be gradually scaled up to encompass the adoption of 
strategies that operate at a broader socioeconomic and political level. Vital lessons 
can be learned from these initiatives and much progress can be made in pursuing 
the transition towards jurisdictional REDD+ frameworks by ensuring that project-
level activities are able to thrive, thereby demonstrating their credibility as 
effective contributors in the safeguarding of a country’s forests.  
 
Like IPAM, Conservation International promoted new institutional models to shape 
jurisdictional approaches towards their desired ends. Yet, they went much further, 
working closely with the VCS and other project proponents to devise and accredit 
projects under an entirely new VCS framework for Jurisdictional and Nested REDD+ 
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(JNR). The VCS announced the framework in December 2010, around the same time 
California, Acre, and Chiapas signed their MOU, and released it in October 2012, a few 
months before the ROW issued its draft recommendations. 
 Naomi Swickard, who, like Janson-Smith, worked at CI before joining the VCS, 
explained that their major motivation was to make sure that projects pioneered in the 
voluntary market did not get left out of the jurisdictional approaches being developed by 
California, the World Bank, and the UNFCCC:117 
 
A lot of our reason for getting into this initially was to ensure there was a pathway 
for projects to be integrated into these systems that we saw emerging at higher 
levels.118 
 
With JNR, the VCS positioned itself for crediting project, jurisdictions, or any nested 
combination of the two. 
 Swickard served on the VCS JNR secretariat alongside ROW’s Toby Janson-Smith. 
The two other secretariat members, Charlotte Streck and Robert O’Sullivan, came from 
VCS’s partner, Climate Focus. The reader will recall from Chapter 2 Streck’s earlier 
work with CATIE’s Lucio Pedroni on ‘nested’ REDD+. Pedroni’s nesting concept was 
                                            
117 Many national and sub-national governments sought to adopt their core carbon 
accounting framework on the VCS JNR because it was compatible with a number of 
sources of demand and finance, including not only California but also the UNFCCC and 
World Bank Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) Carbon Fund; Winrock 
International. (2014). A Gap Analysis of the FCPF’s Carbon Fund Methodological 
Framework and the UNFCCC REDD+ Rulebook relative to the VCS Jurisdictional and 
Nested REDD+ Requirements’. available at: http://www.v-c-s.org/sites/v-c-
s.org/files/CF%20VCS%20JNR%20UNFCCC%20Comp%20Analysis_20141204_CLEA
N%20%282%29.pdf 
118 VCS JNR 2012 Requirements Webinar. available at: http://www.v-c-s.org/JNRI 
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central to the JNR framework, and he joined the advisory board alongside representatives 
from key conservation groups and project developers at the heart of the voluntary market, 
including Terra Global, Wildlife Works, and EDF. The new committee also reached 
outside the NGOs and private sector groups on its earlier REDD+ methodology 
committee (Chapter 3) to include representatives from CAR and national and sub-
national governments, including Chiapas and Acre.119 
 In public, the ROW registered zero internal dissent, and, by all indications, its two-
years of deliberations were collegial, “fun” even, and immersed in technical detail. 
Indeed, the ROW report is fully compatible with the VCS JNR and devotes significant 
attention to options for nesting as a way to build bridges between projects and 
jurisdictional programs. 
 
IV.2. Two Models of Risk 
The end goal of both project and jurisdictional approaches was the same: the creation of a 
new tradable asset type. Each was an interchangeable unit in two giant pools: the global 
biogeochemical cycle that circulated carbon between the forests and atmosphere and the 
global pool of money that channeled capital to profitable investments. Regulators and 
their advisors spoke of the need to “build bridges” between these two pools, linking 
buyers in California’s market and sellers in Chiapas and Acre. To do so, they would need 
to reduce two kinds of uncertainty: the uncertainty of emission reductions that concerned 
regulators and the uncertainty of capital investment that worried financiers. 
                                            
119 Acre became the first jurisdiction to received VCS JNR. VCS JNR pilot programs 
exist at the sub-national level in Acre and Amazonas in Brazill, and national level in 
Costa Rica, Peru, Democratic Republic of Congo, Vietnam, and Laos. 
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 To address the former, the ARB devised the criteria laid down in the previous 
section that would allow offsets from Acre and Chiapas to flow into California. Bringing 
finance over a bridge south, however, posed an even greater problem. A report prepared 
by Terra Global for USAID on ‘California Cap-and-Trade and International Forest 
Carbon Offsets for Institutional Investors’ details five ways investors can gain exposure 
to the emerging REDD+ market: 
 
1) direct investment into offset project development, with financing structured as 
equity, debt or advance payment for credits; 
 
2) direct purchase of offsets from a project developer either via long-term forward 
purchase agreements or spot transactions, or lending against long-term purchase 
contracts; 
 
3) investment through a fund managed by specialist investment managers 
investing in a well-diversified portfolio of projects; 
 
4) secondary market trading (directly or via a hedge fund), which will in time 
offer trading opportunities as market liquidity and fundamental price drivers 
develop; and 
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5) structured products such as a REDD+ bond, which are new and yet-to-be-
issued instruments.120 
 
The first three pathways center on projects. Only the fifth pertains to the kinds of offsets 
expected to issue directly from jurisdiction-wide policies and programs. This is because 
forest offset projects, backed by hundreds of examples and a market infrastructure born 
up over the past decade, had shaped the way individuals and institutions thought about 
offsets. Structured REDD+ products of the kind that might be issued for state-wide 
programs remained a fiction. As a result, government policies and programs were 
typically seen as remunerable through public fund-based payments, while private sector 
projects were most often associated with the sale of offsets in the carbon market.121 
 An objective of the GCF and the ROW was to challenge these assumptions and 
devise techniques and institutions capable of generating economic value not only in a 
project area but also across an entire political jurisdiction. This entailed an inversion of 
the usual discourse on risk and scale. During the first ROW workshop, for example, 
Broekoff noted: 
 
The larger the scale the less risk there is. You may see more frequent events 
across an entire state-wide jurisdiction, but collectively the risk that you’re going 
                                            
120 The report was conducted by the Forest Carbon, Markets and Communities (FCMC) 
Program, a USAID-funded initiative led by Terra Global. December 2012. ‘‘California 
Cap-and-Trade and International Forest Carbon Offsets for Institutional Investors’. 
available at: http://www.fcmcglobal.org/documents/AB32_Report.pdf 
121 Climate Focus and Forest Trends. (2011). ‘Nested Approaches to REDD+ An 
Overview of Issues and Options’. available at: 
http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/pages/dynamic/article.page.php?page_id=8285 
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to get a reversal so large that emissions go above the reference level. That risk is 
relatively small. It is much easier to manage across a wider area. 
 
The statement is about reducing the uncertainty of emission reductions by shifting to 
bigger scales, which, in turn, translates into lower financial risk. As a result, capital risk 
mitigation is to open the door to risk averse institutional investors able to command pools 
of capital magnitudes greater than venture capitalists at hitherto mustered for small-scale 
projects. 
 The idea that bigger scales are less risky flips project developers’ conception of the 
problem, reflecting two distinct risk paradigms entailing different understandings about 
uncertainty and causation. As previously discussed in regard to Terra Global’s IREDD 
proposal, developers invoked uncertainty as a reason to not issue jurisdictions credits, 
arguing that it is impossible to attribute avoided deforestation to specific reforms and 
therefore wrong to allocate ownership of carbon credits to governments for those 
reductions—the exact opposite rationale jurisdictional proponents gave to encourage 
government buy-in needed to secure the sweeping policy reforms. 
 This same skepticism over the role of governments in a REDD+ market continued 
the tenor established in the voluntary market. Project proponents doubted governments’ 
ability to act quickly enough to avert an impending environmental crisis and cast moral 
aspersions, with much justification, over the integrity of corrupt, untrustworthy 
governments whose anti-poor, anti-environmental policies had contributed to make 
deforestation the cause célèbre. Far from interpreting government turpitude as a reason to 
stay out of risky, problem-prone regions, they leveraged it into a call for the private 
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sector to green the state and introduce good governance. And they did so with significant 
support from Northern countries and large financial institutions, facilitated by technical 
and administrative measures to mitigate risk to speculative capital investments in local 
projects, such as political risk insurance and novel forms of carbon accounting. Against 
this backdrop, California’s proposal for a new kind of jurisdictional REDD+ met 
skepticism from the project developers and conservationists, reinforcing the ROW’s 
unspoken ambiguities around finance, risk, and scale. 
 
IV.3. Tipping the Scales from Jurisdictions towards Nested Projects 
IV.3.1. Too Hot to Handle 
The ambiguities concealed in the ROW recommendations and broader GCF discourse 
exposed the partnerships to criticism from environmental groups and social justice 
advocates critical of the MRV systems thus proposed. Technical critiques attached issues 
related to political authority and rights to the technical uncertainties the jurisdictional 
approach set out to redress. Regulators did not convince critics to draw the line between 
the political jurisdiction and project in the same way as they had themselves, speaking to 
profound and unresolved civic, cultural, and ethical transformations making such a 
market entails. The reason, I argue here and in the following two chapters, is partly 
because of a latent ambiguity in state regulators’ relationship to the private sector and the 
distribution of knowledge, authority, and rights between the two. 
 The friction between project and jurisdictional approaches, elided within the ROW 
and VCS, spilled over into the public discourse about REDD+ in California’s market. 
The voluntary market’s major research and public relations hub, Forest Trends and its 
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affiliated project, Ecosystem Marketplace, delivered a media blitz celebrating California 
as “The great REDD hope”. Their message, however, collapsed the distinction between 
projects and REDD+ that certain ROW members had painstakingly raised. Media 
increasingly cast private projects in a moral light as climate champions, while insinuating 
that governments were leaving pro-active businesses “in the lurch.”122 Outlets like 
Ecosystem Marketplace and Huffington Post aired growing anxieties like those of the 
CEO of CE2 Carbon Capital, a leading investor in North American carbon offsets, who 
argued that the legal, technical, and political “complexity of getting international credits 
of these types into a state-based system is overwhelming”.123 One consultant presaged: 
 
REDD has a zero percent chance of ever getting into California within my kids’ 
lifetimes…REDD is just very, very politically difficult. It would be nice to have, 
but it’s just not going to happen.124 
 
The ROW’s effort to draw a boundary between projects and REDD+ did little to dislodge 
the close association between project-based REDD+ on the one hand and national-level 
fund-based REDD+ on the other. Its celebrity notwithstanding, Acre’s model for a new 
kind of REDD+ failed to be replicated in other states and provinces. Meanwhile, Chiapas 
                                            
122 Forest Trends. (2013). ‘Key Companies Have Stepped Up on Climate Change. Will 
Governments Leave Them in The Lurch?’. 7 Oct 2013. available at: 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/forest-trends/companies-on-climate-
change_b_4058553.html 
123 Gloria Gonzalez. ‘International REDD Faces Uphill Battle in California in 2014’. 
Ecosystem Marketplace. 8 Oct 2013. available at: 
http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/pages/dynamic/article.page.php?page_id=9988 
124 Gloria Gonzalez. (2013). ‘Could California Make or Break REDD?’. Forest Trends. 
available at: http://www.forestcarbonportal.com/news/could-california-make-or-break-
redd 
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became roundly criticized as an example of how not to do jurisdictional REDD+. 
REDD+ proponents attributed Chiapas’ lackluster REDD+ preparations to a changing 
governorship and unavoidably slow process of building a technical, legal, administrative 
infrastructure from scratch. 
 Environmental justice and indigenous rights groups were far harsher, singling out 
Governor Sabines’ signature REDD+ initiative, the Pact for the Respect and 
Conservation of Mother Earth (PACT), as the poster child for anti-REDD+ activists 
everywhere. Greenpeace made the biggest splash, and it did so in full agreement with the 
project proponents that, if a REDD+ market were to pass, it would be built on the backs 
of local projects. In 2012, Greenpeace transmitted a report across global wires, just 
REDD+ supporters and detractors alike turned their eyes to the GCF Annual Meeting in 
Chiapas. ‘Outsourcing Hot Air: The Push for Sub-national REDD offsets in California’s 
Carbon Market from Mexico and Beyond’ blasted the GCF for being: 
 
…more focused on creating sub-national REDD+ offsets for large industrial 
polluters in California than on promoting and adopting effective, people-centered 
forest protection policies among its members. This current preoccupation on sub-
national REDD+ offset schemes risks wasting finite resources on a policy 
mechanism that will not deliver real benefits for the climate, forests or people – 
and could even make matters worse.125 
 
                                            
125 Greenpeace. (2012). Outsourcing Hot Air: The Push for Sub-national REDD offsets in 
California’s Carbon Market from Mexico and Beyond’. available at: 
http://www.greenpeace.org/international/Global/international/publications/forests/2012/R
EDD/OutsourcingHotAir.pdf 
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Like the private sector, anti-REDD+ activists did not buy into the vision for a different 
kind of REDD+ secured through state and provincial governments. For REDD+ 
opponents, California’s carbon market was just old wine in new bottles. These groups 
had long fought against market environmentalism of any stripe, most especially carbon 
offsets, which they saw as irrevocably a matter of the same kind of local projects they 
had charged with perpetuating social injustices and environmental harm. Greenpeace 
cited the ‘nested approach’ as evidence to indict California and wider the GCF of sneak 
projects through the backdoor through loopholes in UNFCCC rules that allowed interim, 
sub-national. “The aggregation of projects that have failed individually to deliver real 
climate benefits”, they said, “does not make for sound public policy.” 
 Greenpeace cited a checkered history of six forest carbon projects running from 
Scolel’Te in 1997 (Chapter 2) to the PACT Sabines began in the Central America’s 
largest rainforest in cooperation with Conservation International in 2011. The group 
called Chiapas’ sub-national experiment “fundamentally flawed” and full of “problems 
and risks” stemming from social injustices (Chapters 5 and 6) and inaccurate large-scale 
MRV systems. Ironically, Greenpeace reiterated the skepticism some foresters had 
expressed: 
 
Although large-scale deforestation can be measured reasonably accurately by 
satellite and ground-based efforts, monitoring emissions from forests cannot 
currently be done with a high degree of certainty, and is far and away more 
difficult (and less certain) than monitoring end-of-pipe fossil fuel emissions. 
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Citing a preliminary study conducted on reference emission levels in Chiapas, the report 
said the estimates had an unacceptably high uncertainty level of 44% due to the state’s 
complex topography and mosaic land use. As a consequence, the report argued, the lack 
of “strong and reliable measures”, “a continuous source of funding”, and “transparent 
land use planning and monitoring program” nullified any claims to additional, permanent, 
and real reductions. 
 Ultimately, a public discourse sedimented around the idea that any REDD+ market 
would be made up of a great many projects proved impenetrable to GCF’s jurisdictional 
alternative. An exchange between Boyd and an individual from Terra Global at the 
Annual GCF Meeting underlines the point. At issue was the ability of jurisdictional 
efforts to attract private finance, with the latter expressing skepticism about the 
plausibility of governments creating a low-risk environment for private investors. To this 
Boyd responded that “the label project is almost as misleading as the term REDD+”, 
suggesting it might be time rethink models for private sector engagement along entirely 
new lines by crafting channels for private investment directly in jurisdictional programs. 
Terra Global replied by acknowledging that both scales were important—but missing 
Boyd’s bigger provocation that the lines between projects and jurisdictional programs 
should be drawn anew. 
 
IV.3.2. Too Cold to Hold 
The idea that large-scale REDD programs and local projects are both, in ROW’s words, 
simply carbon offset programs made credible and comparable through a “common set of 
criteria” obscures the fact that they are high-level principles that, when broken down, 
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yield very different assumptions about what is being valued and measured, and how one 
should go about valuing and measuring it. And behind these assumptions lie yet deeper 
notions about who has the authority, ability, and right to intervene, measure, and claim 
the value so produced. 
 As Paul Edwards (in Miller & Edwards 2001) terms them, distinct epistemic 
lifestyles—in this case among the foresters and project developers on the one hand and 
remote-sensing scientists on the other—play out across the intellectual-organizational 
setting of each, including the “set of intellectual questions and problems, and the 
accompanying set of practices, that provide a sense of purpose, achievement, and 
ambition to a scientist’s work life, as well as the more mundane sense of carrying out 
those activities necessary to ‘getting the job done.’” In regard to REDD+, I use the term 
simply to point out the ties between the evidentiary standards a discipline uses to define 
and settle uncertainty, and the problems that discipline is tasked to address in order to 
build the carbon market. 
 The default project orientation revealed itself through the subtlest of slips. Just after 
hearing Broekoff’s presentation at the first ROW workshop on the differences between 
projects and REDD, one representative from The Nature Conservancy implied that 
carbon accounting at the project level could be directly translated to jurisdictions, 
commenting that ROW’s recommendations take the “rigor” and “lessons learned from 
project activity and apply that at a bigger scale.”126 
 At other times, these differences appear quite consciously. At the Annual GCF 
Meeting held in Chiapas in 2012, Gregory Asner, a ROW member and Stanford-based 
                                            
126 Comments made at the first ROW workshop on MRV, February 2013. 
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earth system scientist, argued that the “technology is so far beyond” the “old thinking” of 
IPCC’s 2006 Greenhouse Gas inventory guidelines for Agriculture, Forestry and Other 
Land Use that are the basis of international discussions. “Ultimately the things that you 
think are expensive are inexpensive when brought to scale,” he said contrasting 
“practicable, reportable, verifiable uncertainties” of 1% possible for 3-5 cents/ha every 5-
10 years at the jurisdictional level with the lower uncertainty obtained from US$2000-
4000 per plot per year for 800 field plots in the Amazon. Moreover, Asner (2011) wrote, 
in a scientific paper titled ’Painting the World REDD’, the sub-national level is the level 
where MRV systems can reduce uncertainty the fastest, making the GCF states the ideal 
to scale to make these systems operational. 
 Others did not reach the same conclusion. One forester with years of experience 
working on local conservation projects found it “hard to believe the technology was so 
advanced” and wanted to follow-up with Asner to learn more. A representative from 
Terra Global saw MRV systems as presenting “creative opportunities” to integrate 
projects into jurisdictions but was concerned about private capital risk and, noting a 
dearth of private sector participation in the room, questioned why governments weren’t 
putting public money at risk too. Another private sector participant said the jurisdictional 
approach was fine in theory but warned that “forests will disappear” because 
governments are “too slow” act.  
 Wedding skepticism over the technical feasibility of state-wide MRV with concerns 
about government capacity and trust, many project proponents doubted that REDD+ 
would ever see the light of day in California. One interviewee—a forester working for a 
major offset project verification company in California—insinuated that proponents of 
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jurisdictional MRV were promising more than they could deliver, questioning not only 
the accuracy of such techniques but the plausibility of operationalizing them in a high-
stakes carbon market. For this person, setting rigorous jurisdictional standards meant 
going through “growing pains” and a long process to establish “replicability”, while in 
the meantime making it “too easy to game the system” with false claims to real and 
additional reductions. Some people reported that forest ministries found it too 
complicated to incorporate site-specific carbon accounting at higher-level.127 Some even 
believed that long-time collaborators like Conservation International “weren’t going to do 
projects anymore” in favor of a higher-level approach.128 
 Overall, though, these differences were muted. Both sides were in broad agreement 
about the need for a REDD+ market that to a greater or lesser extent made room for 
large-scale programs and local projects. Discussions in open meetings held by the ROW 
and GCF were general enough that the skepticism voiced above never rose to the level of 
the high-stakes credibility struggles Steven Epstein (1996) finds, for instance, in the 
politically charged research and activism around AIDS. The GCF surely did, however, 
raise the hackles of certain environmentalists and social justice activists who vehemently 
opposed carbon markets of any sort. Interestingly, they shared many assumptions with 
the project developers they opposed, while disbelieving claims that sub-national REDD+ 
offered an alternative conducive to forest governance reforms they themselves promoted. 
 
                                            
127 Ecosystem Marketplace Interview with Heru Prasetyu, head of Indonesia’s REDD+ 
Management Agency. available at: 
http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/pages/dynamic/article.page.php?page_id=10354
&section=news_articles&eod=1 
128 interview. 10 Feb 2014 
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V. Conclusion 
Two visions for the REDD+ market fit comfortably in the partnership between California 
and Chiapas. On the surface, each proposed a more or less efficient path to combat 
deforestation and climate change by creating new kind of tradable environmental asset. 
As ancillary benefits, both claimed green leadership, biodiversity protection, good 
governance, and community well-being. 
 On closer inspection, however, the two visions put forth radically different 
assumptions about the epistemic and normative guarantors of economic value. Rarely 
articulated tensions over if and how to calculate carbon value contributed to the inability 
of the ROW and ARB to convince project proponents and anti-REDD+ activists that 
jurisdictional REDD+ really was a “very different beast” speaks to the jeopardy global 
projects face in the light of entrenched discourses and practices. By latching onto the idea 
for a carbon market being discussed globally and designed in California, the ARB 
justified its interest in REDD+. But it also bound itself to a much bigger set of beliefs and 
politics that had trouble seeing, much less accepting, its proposal to create a carbon 
market where states and provinces, not project developers, were the central economic 
actors. Thus, the California-Chiapas MOU fell short of its goal to build capabilities—the 
techniques of globalization—needed to produce new carbon territories and thereby 
realize its vision for a different kind of market.  
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CHAPTER 5 
CARBON AUTHORITY: THE AUTHORIZATION OF  
TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE EXPERTISE 
I. Introduction 
On December 8th, 2009, Governor Juan Sabines Guerrero told a hall packed with 700 
delegates to COP16 in Cancún that Chiapas was ready for business. The event on 
Advancing REDD+: New Pathways and Partnerships brought Chiapas into the 
international limelight, alongside the likes of UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, Nobel 
Peace Prize Laureate Wangari Maathai, and World Bank President Robert Zoellick. 
Sabines made full use of the stage to announce to the world that his state was preparing to 
sell millions of carbon credits to California issued from the “best inventory of soil, forest, 
and jungle” in Mexico. 
 Two weeks later, Governor Sabines, along with the Secretary of the SEMAHN, 
Lourdes López Moreno, and the Country Director Mexico of Conservation International, 
Tatiana Ramos, signed the Pact for the Respect and Conservation of Mother Earth 
(PACT)—a REDD+ project in the largest remaining rainforest in North America. Photos 
of the Governor with long-haired Lacandón men clad in traditional white tunics at the 
signing held in the San Javier municipio of Ocosingo appeared in one of Mexico’s 
leading newspapers, La Jornada. Sabines entrusted the comuneros to take care of “our 
great lung” in Central and North America for “all of the planet, all of Chiapas, for all of 
mankind”.129 The global press lauded Chiapas’ pioneering spirit, echoed in Sabines’ 
                                            
129 La Jornada. ‘Suscriben gobierno y comunidades pacto para conservar la Lacandona,’ 
23 December 2010.  available at: 
http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2010/12/23/politica/012n1pol 
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public appearances with Governor Schwarzenegger and Harrison Ford, Vice Chair of 
Conservation International’s Board of Directors (Figure 6). The GCF and ARB took it as 
the sign of a strong and promising partnership, Chiapas having signed the MOU with 
California and Acre only the month before. 
 
Figure 6. Governor Sabines and Governor Schwarzenegger  
 
 Two years later, however, Chiapas’ REDD+ program was hobbling along and 
looked little closer to joining California’s market than it had at the Cancún COP. Amid 
heated opposition from some environmental and social justice groups at home and 
abroad, in July 2013, incoming Governor Manuel Velasco Coello canceled Sabines’ 
signature REDD+ project, which had the ignominious fortune of making the top ten list 
of worst projects put out by Carbon Trade Watch, Indigenous Environmental Network, 
and several other groups opposed to REDD+. 
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 During the same period, by contrast, California successfully weathered a series of 
legal, political, and technical challenges to its carbon market. Dour predictions alternating 
between skyrocketing costs and collapsing prices were both proven wrong, as the carbon 
market rolled out more smoothly than any before. ARB even expanded the types of 
offsets allowed into the program. But REDD+ offsets were not among them. By and 
large, California dodged the negative associations plaguing its partner in Chiapas. The 
media at times portrayed the state as a victim, asking, “Will California fall into the 
REDD trap?”130 REDD+ proponents worried that the state might opt to preserve its green 
image over the salvation of dwindling forests. Yet even after much public outcry, 
regulators saw minimal risks to keeping REDD+ on the table, deciding to retain it as a 
possible future offset option in the First Update to the Climate Change Scoping Plan 
released in February 2014. 
 California established authority over its carbon market, while Chiapas did not 
secure the authority it needed to supply credits to that market. Why did this happen? And 
what does it tell us about the ability of sub-national governments to collaborate on global 
problems? Many reasons might explain the contrasting fates of California and Chiapas, 
and their failure to build a common carbon market—a turnover in the Sabines 
administration, returning Governor Jerry Brown’s Asia-Pacific Pivot, weakening demand 
for offsets in California, technical difficulties of building a carbon inventory from 
scratch. Here, I am interested in one that has received little attention to date, which I call 
‘carbon authority.’ 
                                            
130 Al Jazeera. ‘Will California fall into the REDD trap?’. 7 May 2013. available at: 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/05/20135613232989660.html 
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 The full discussion will take two chapters to unfold. Here I set the groundwork 
with case studies identifying the role played by networks of private expertise in both 
California and Chiapas. I propose this complex category, carbon authority, to account for 
how these networks orchestrated knowledge for the production and circulation of new 
forms of carbon value (i.e. carbon territories) in and between the two states. 
 The cases discussed in this chapter and the next recount critical moments where 
carbon authority was tested in the two states: crossed lines of state and federal forest 
administration in Mexico, persistent conflicts over land in the Lacandon rainforest, legal 
challenges to the veracity of California’s offsets, and the procurement of expertise for 
California policy-making. In each case, government officials from the two states made 
moral and scientific claims to domestic and global audiences to assert themselves as 
legitimate global actors, yet those claims were resolved very differently. This chapter 
asks why, by identifying how those claims were challenged; the discursive, technical, and 
legal resources used to defend them; and the failure and successful authorizations that 
resulted. The chapter then goes on to discuss what these sites and (mis)alignments mean 
for the stabilization of a market in REDD+ credits between the two states, and the 
theorization of carbon authority. 
 
II. Theorizing Carbon Authority 
The previous chapter discussed how California sought to produce a new form of 
economic value through jurisdictional REDD+. Doing so required far greater 
interventions than required to produce carbon value at the much smaller scale of local 
projects. Unlike projects in the voluntary market, the version of REDD+ envisioned in 
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the MOU between California, Acre, and Chiapas corresponds to all forests contained in a 
state or province—a carbon territory. I extend the idea of carbon authority to argue that 
establishing new forms of economic value linked to the carbon stored in a political 
territory also require new forms of carbon authority to go with it. 
 Carbon authority does not simply exist. It is a capability that is made part and 
parcel of the socio-technical market infrastructures that generate carbon value. Those 
techniques must be sanctioned and integrated into administrative practice by political 
authority. This chapter examines the role of authority in fastening territory-making 
techniques into broader legal, epistemic, and administrative frameworks in California and 
Chiapas. Yet, we cannot say at the outset precisely how authority is made and what it is 
made from. We know this because the public controversies that arise and are resolved, or 
not, as those infrastructures are being built can appear anywhere where the technical, 
administrative, or legal links needed to hold them together are weak. 
 Realist approaches to political theory are ill-equipped to grasp this problem 
because they see political authority as the exclusive legitimate power that a sovereign 
may exercise over its citizens living within a defined geographic territory. Read against 
carbon territory, however, the notion of carbon authority prompts several empirical and 
theoretical considerations, namely: What is being authorized? How? By and for whom? 
These general questions lead to an additional set of concerns, showing that carbon 
authority is a complex category constituted by heterogeneous elements linked across 
multiple sites: How do sub-national governments frame global problems as their 
problems to solve? How do they portray themselves as legitimate global actors to local 
constituencies, national superiors, and international partners? How do they secure the 
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expert credibility needed to understand and manage complex environmental issues? Who 
challenges their new-claimed authority and how? 
 While carbon authority may be disaggregated across the carbon market, the 
market will not exist unless that authority coheres in some kind of stable order. This 
requires orchestration of some sort. To understand this process, we need to know: 1) what 
elements to look for, 2) how they are assembled to create stable market institutions within 
a political jurisdiction, and 3) how they are linked to create common market institutions 
across political jurisdictions. 
 
II.1. Constituents of Carbon Authority: Public Authority - Private Authority - Expertise 
- Norms - Exceptionalism 
I offer the following quote taken from La Jornada to illustrate the complex claims-
making needed to secure carbon authority. During his international REDD+ press 
campaign in late 2010 and early 2011, Governor Sabines declared that the: 
  
entirety of the surface [of Chiapas] will enter into the market for carbon credits 
and methane credits, beginning through agreements with polluting sub-national 
states, like California, which is the biggest polluter in the world….The objective 
of polluting governments is to clean their conscience by paying for carbon credits 
for REDD+” from the “best inventory” of carbon in the country.131 
 
                                            
131 La Jornada. ‘Chiapas apuesta por el futuro sustentable al entrar al mercado de bonos 
de carbono y metano.’ 11 May 2011. available at: 
http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2011/05/17/politica/004n1pol 
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Sabines’ quote provides a number of clues about how to think about the creation of 
carbon authority. First, the quote highlights both the state and the market. Carbon markets 
are chimeras of each. They are clearly markets, in the sense that they involve the 
exchange of economic goods between buyers and sellers. Yet, they are also quite 
obviously state programs, with all the debate, politicking, and horse trading that go with 
any controversial public policy. While it is not novel to point out the state-market 
dichotomy as a false one, carbon markets very clearly belie the limits of this distinction, 
which makes them ideal candidates to explore the relationship between markets and the 
state, specifically in regard to public and private forms of authority. This corresponds 
with the general observation that in ‘new governance’, “regulatory authority is 
decentralized, with regulatory responsibilities shared among private actors as well as state 
agencies” (Abbott & Snidal 2009). 
 Second, Sabines invokes expert authority, declaring that Chiapas has the “best 
inventory” of forest carbon in Mexico. Scientific knowledge for measuring and 
monitoring carbon, as well as legal and administrative knowledge for designing and 
implementing a carbon market, features critically in the efforts of both California and 
Chiapas. Moreover, these forms of expertise draw heavily on the private sector, thereby 
extending new forms of epistemic authority to private actors, also corresponding to the 
finding that, “Expertise is essential for effective regulation and is a major source of 
authority for private actors as well as for the state” (Abbott & Snidal 2009). 
 Third, he claims moral authority by stating, “The objective of polluting 
governments [like California] is to clean their conscience”. Here, Sabines alludes to the 
existing discourse on ecological debt between the Global North and Global South. 
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Carbon credits for REDD+ are portrayed as reparations from California, the eight biggest 
economy in the world, to Chiapas, the second poorest state in Mexico. 
 Finally, he hints at sub-national exceptionalism, mentioning “the country” but not 
Mexico by name. Nor does he say anything about the United States, instead assuming the 
authority of sub-national states like Chiapas and California to enter into transnational 
agreements without permission or support of the national government. These 
heterogeneous elements of sub-national authority—on the role of the market, state, 
expertise, morality, and sub-national exceptionalism—recur in both Chiapas and 
California. 
 The case studies in this chapter follow these elements of carbon authority as they 
come together and fall apart in particular controversies in the two states. Before moving 
on, however, it is important to highlight that these elements are not free-floating but 
combine to form very particular lines of authority, making it crucial to specify to whom 
the arguments are directed. To frame this idea, I elaborate the idea of political 
performance, which may be directed both inwardly to secure authority within a given 
polity and outwardly to extend authority by gaining recognition by political actors 
outside the state. 
 
II.2. Inward- and Outward-Facing Performances 
Sabines’ portrayal of California as “the biggest polluter in the world” is hardly the epithet 
befitting an esteemed partner. Sabines, however, is not addressing his Californian 
collaborators. He is performing for Chiapenecos, assuring his people at home that their 
governor, not the giant to the north, is at the helm. To clarify the multiple lines of 
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authority in play, I distinguish between inward- and outward-facing claims to carbon 
authority. I refer to inward claims as those expressed within a given political system, for 
example, to the people of Chiapas or the regulatory discretion mandated by the state 
Legislature to California’s Air Resources Board (ARB or CARB), while outward claims 
are directed vertically towards higher-level governmental authorities or horizontally 
towards other sub-national governments in or outside the country. 
 The distinction confers several advantages. First, it allows for the disaggregation 
of carbon authority across multiple sites, which helps to structure the following case 
material to map the complex lines of authority involved in assembling a common market 
across multiple political jurisdictions. This approach is in line with Anne Marie 
Slaughter’s (2004) notion of a “new world order” bound though networks of 
disaggregated state functions. It also corresponds to the idea of polycentric governing 
arrangements, where authority is something generated by influential and committed 
participants, rather than received from some external source (Abbott 2014). The case 
studies contrast these arrangements in Chiapas and California but are not strictly 
comparative because the states represent two very different socio-political situations, 
with distinct roles and responsibilities in the market. Moreover, a strictly comparative 
approach ignores the relationship between political jurisdictions, which is critical given 
that the market requires the coordination of multiple polities and is beyond the authority 
of any one sovereign. 
 Second, the distinction between inward- and outward-facing claims makes it 
possible to ask how the heterogeneous constituents of carbon authority are configured 
differently in different political cultures. This underscores the need to attend to the way 
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inwardly-directed statements, like Sabines’ above, re-frame and re-interpret global 
problems to authorize sub-national climate policy, where “responses have also been 
coupled with efforts to design policy that ‘fits’ the economic and political realities of a 
particular state” (Rabe 2007). This is true in Chiapas, for instance, where the impacts of 
climate change and investments in forest monitoring are rhetorically tied to devastating 
forest fires the state experienced in 1998, much like in California in 2015 the worst 
drought in historical record is increasingly used to justify the state’s ambitions to lead 
global climate policy. Furthermore, inward- and outward-facing claims often differ and 
are differentially received when directed towards outside audiences, with the intent of 
expanding sub-national authority into new spaces of governance independent from their 
national sovereigns. As Barry Rabe (2008) notes, sub-national climate policy often 
pushes “Constitutional bounds in ways that allow for direct negotiation with other 
national heads of state or subnational governments outside the United States.” 
 Third, inward- and outward-facing political performances offer an alternative to 
the language of top-down and bottom-up, lending apt metaphors for thinking about 
networked governance, transformational politics, and the green economy. California and 
large conservation groups, for instance, gained outward influence by occupying key 
positions in a network rather than their direct coercion in a hierarchy. The distinction also 
speaks to the ways carbon markets bring people and areas of the economy under 
distributed forms of political regulation, which seek to internalize economic externalities 
by bringing natural and economic processes into the economy. 
 Finally, inward and outward recall the dramaturgical ideas of onstage and 
offstage, where the authorization of a scientific or political claim calls for a performance 
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audiences are willing to believe, or act as if they are willing to believe (Hilgartner 2000). 
Successful performances, however, always keep some things hidden while revealing 
others, which introduces additional difficulties when inward- and outward-facing claims 
are inconsistent or span unfamiliar political cultures. 
 
III. A Memorandum of Misunderstanding 
III.1. Mixed Signals: De-Authorization of the Project or the Program in Chiapas? 
When Governor Velasco canceled Sabines’ signature REDD+ project in the Lacandon 
rainforest in 2013, the future of a partnership, first hailed as a sign of sub-national 
leadership on REDD+ and the green economy, was thrown into doubt. In an article in El 
Heraldo announcing the cancelation of Chiapas’ REDD+ program, Environment 
Minister, Carlos Morales Vazquez, made no apologies: 
 
It was a failure, and the strategy has already been canceled. It did not have the  
results that were announced. I believe that environmental problems must be dealt  
with using real strategies, not just on occasion.132 
 
The incident offers an entry point to a complex account of the carbon authority and its 
relationship to carbon territory, which goes beyond the narrow conception of authority as 
the purview of governments to a more expansive view of authority as the legitimate 
exercise of power in various forms. From this perspective, the distinction between 
                                            
132 El Heraldo de Chiapas. (2013). 'Suspendido el programa REDD plus, dice SEMAHN'. 
8 July 2013. Available at: 
http://www.oem.com.mx/elheraldodechiapas/notas/n3045308.htm 
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projects, programs, and jurisdictional REDD+ (Chapter 4) gains new importance, for the 
boundary work different actors employed to treat the terms as separate or near-
synonymous indicates broader struggles around authority and responsibility for 
operationalizing the MOU between California and Chiapas. This chapter highlights the 
connection between expert and private authority and technical notions of carbon territory, 
and how that relationship can help explain why the carbon market failed to gain hold.  
 Anti-REDD+ activists immediately jumped on Velasco’s cancellation. In a 
statement titled ‘Chronicle of a Failure Foretold’, the Mexican branch of Friends of the 
Earth, Otros Mundos, said the cancellation vindicated its opposition. (I italicize programs 
and projects to highlight their usage.): 
 
“The failure of the REDD+ program shows why projects that attempt to 
commercialize nature can’t work in Chiapas," said Claudia Ramos-Guillén of 
Friends of the Earth-Mexico. "This project has had tremendous costs for the 
indigenous and peasant communities of the state. Programs by which the 
tropical nations of the global South are paid to absorb the climate pollution of 
the industrial North are destined to fail as long as real solutions to the climate 
crisis are not put into practice.”133 
 
But the new Governor came back, issuing a statement two days later to clarify that the 
PACT project had been suspended but reaffirming that the Chiapas REDD+ program 
                                            
133 Friends of the Earth. (2013) 'Chiapas Cancels 'Disastorous' Forest Plan Linked to Cali. 
Cap-and-Trade Program'. 18 July 2013. Available at: http://www.foe.org/news/news-
releases/2013-07-chiapas-cancels-disastrous-forest-plan-linked-to-cal 
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remained very much intact. Supporters of Chiapas’ REDD+ program in the GCF and 
ROW entered the debate, agreeing with the Velasco administration and activists that the 
PACT was in error but vehemently denying it had any connection with California or 
jurisdictional REDD+. 
 I will provide more details on the particular problems that plagued the PACT in 
later sections and the next chapter but here discuss how perceptions of Velasco’s 
cancelation in California reveal how Sabines’ failure to gain authority for his REDD+ 
project served to undo the outward authority Chiapas had begun to accrue for its REDD+ 
program. It also shows how California nevertheless maintained and even extended its 
authority as a REDD+ leader at home and abroad. 
 
III.2. A Close Reading of Public Comments Made in the Earth Island Journal 
To begin the exploration of carbon authority, I dissect public comments to an article 
published in the popular environmentalist magazine, the Earth Island Journal, posted by 
three prominent voices on the issue. The first is Tony Brunello, the chief facilitator of the 
REDD Offset Working Group (ROW), the advisory group mandated by the MOU. The 
second and third are the two journalists who had written the most about the REDD+ and 
carbon markets in the two states: Steve Zwick of the pro-carbon market website 
Ecosystem Marketplace and Jeff Conant, who had traveled to Chiapas with the Global 
Justice Ecology Project to cover the issue. I offer the quotes at length, to convey the tone 
and centrality of the program/project distinction to the debate.  
 I analyze this passage to make two key points about authority and suggest an 
alternative way to the think about the problem, which I take up in the subsequent cases. 
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The first point is about the boundary work over REDD+. We saw an indication of this in 
the previous chapter, where certain ROW and ARB members went to great lengths to 
separate jurisdictional REDD+, the kind of REDD+ stipulated in California regulations, 
from the forest carbon projects many people associated with the idea. The second is that 
the stakes of that boundary work is the division of responsibility and authority among 
those involved in the design and implementation of the market infrastructure in Chiapas 
and California, as well as the harmonization and integration of the market between the 
two states. 
The following quotations are comments made in response to a critique of the 
Chiapas-California agreement published in the Earth Island Journal, titled 'California's 
Interest in Overseas Carbon Offsets Schemes Makes Some Greens See Red'134. [Bold 
added for emphasis]: 
 
By Tony Brunello on Wed, July 24, 2013 at 5:42 pm 
Unfortunately, I have to stick with my original comment here that you should 
do a bit more homework. 
 
                                            
134 Mitra, Maureen Nandini. (2013). 'California's Interest in Overseas Carbon Offsets 
Schemes Makes Some Greens See Red'. Earth Island Journal, 24 July 2013. 
<http://www.earthisland.org/journal/index.php/elist/eListRead/california_interest_in_ove
rseas_carbon_offset_schemes_makes_greens_see_red/> 
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1 - We released our report at stateredd.org July 17th, a week before your 
article. You state it has not been released yet. 
 
2 - If you read the ROW report, you will see we focus on STATE-WIDE 
deforestation and GHG reductions, not specific projects like La Candone.  
All projects must feed up to STATE-WIDE (or titled JURISDICTIONAL-
WIDE) deforestation and GHG targets to ensure there is no “leakage” and 
reductions are real. Your article confuses projects and state-wide programs.  
 
3 - Our group, the ROW, is simply a group of non government experts 
making recommendations to the states. Period. We collectively have never 
supported any project anywhere. See the ROW report and website at 
stateredd.org.  
 
3 [sic]- The ROW recommendations encourage states to support good 
programs and not support bad ones. If Chiapas decides to not support a bad 
one (as everyone in your article agrees) isn’t that a good thing? Your article 
implies we supported the project, now we don’t support the project. Not true. 
Again, you confuse support for projects and state-wide programs. Big 
difference. 
 
If you actually want to talk about this, you should just call me at [phone 
number]. My multiple calls to you just never seemed to get through. Having 
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worked with EII for the last 20 years (Baikal Watch) with Gary Cook and Bob 
Wilkinson, I found this article very disappointing. 
 
By Steve Zwick on Thu, July 25, 2013 at 11:34 am 
Nandini; 
This is a well-written piece, but your contention that “partisans on each side of 
the issue can’t even agree on which programs are supposed to be involved,” is 
dead wrong, as is your contention that REDD advocates are sending mixed 
messages. 
 
Indeed, if anyone is sending mixed messages in this whole thing, it’s Jeff 
Conant – who, as you quite clearly demonstrate, just spent two years trying to 
equate the “the REDD+ project being worked out in Chiapas’ Lacandon 
Jungle” with jurisdictional REDD while then differentiating that project 
from “a program more fully integrated into the ROW process” when he 
got called out. 
 
Your own quotes from Conant and the link to the story he wrote for your 
publication nearly two years ago 
(http://www.earthisland.org/journal/index.php/eij/article/do_trees_grow_on_
money) show that the confusion and mixed messaging that you’re 
highlighting come not from those engaged in the legitimate REDD debate, 
but from efforts by Friends of the Earth to equate the Lacandon Jungle 
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program with jurisdictional REDD – despite the fact that they clearly knew it 
was NOT a REDD project at all. 
 
Yes, it uses the REDD acronym, but it has about as much to do with 
jurisdictional REDD as the Democratic Party of Albania has to do with 
Barack Obama’s climate policy, or that my Individual Retirement Account 
(IRA) has to do with the Irish Republican Army (IRA). 
 
In our coverage 
(http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/pages/dynamic/article.page.php?page
_id=9848&section=news_articles&eod=1), we gave Conant the benefit of the 
doubt when he insisted that last week’s release was an honest mistake based 
on poor phrasing by the Chiapas government and the el Heraldo newspaper. 
But the piece he wrote two years ago and that you linked to indicates this 
“mistake” is part of a systematic pattern of distortion. I say this because 
Conant clearly knew that the Lacandon Jungle program followed no carbon 
standard, that it employed no structured methodology, and that it involved no 
input from indigenous people. He clearly knew that it was just a poorly-
conceived mechanism that funnels $200 or so a month from auto fees to 
landowners, and he rightly and roundly criticized it (as has pretty much every 
REDD advocate who has encountered it), but then he employed a bit of 
verbal sleight of hand to link that program with jurisdictional REDD – a 
link that he clearly knew was wrong. 
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In last week’s release, he makes the implicit explicit – a tactic I’d expect from 
the Heartland Institute or the National Review Online or the Competitive 
Enterprise Institute (the latter two of which are being sued by climate scientist 
Michael Mann for defamation of character – and rightly, I’d add). 
 
I’m also wondering what purpose your other sources serve. You quote 
Kathleen McAfee, for example, as saying that REDD is “basically making 
nature itself into a kind of tradable commodity”, which is, quite frankly, silly. 
People who buy REDD credits aren’t purchasing nature; they are paying to 
preserve it. REDD simply make that easier to do. 
 
You also cite Carbon Trade Watch as saying that “REDD+ projects have 
already proven to be fundamentally unjust,” but where? 
 
Yes, there is a legitimate debate around REDD, and even this legitimate 
debate can be confusing, but the people you’ve cited here appear more intent 
on derailing that debate than engaging in it. 
 
By Jeff Conant on Fri, July 26, 2013 at 5:12 am 
Steve – I don’t know that your IRA analogy quite stands up, as both ‘versions’ 
of REDD in Chiapas stand for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
Degradation. The chief difference between them is that the cancelled state 
REDD program was – we all agree – sloppy, subsidy-based, and not 
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‘jurisdictional,’ while the new version is jurisdictional and will be, 
presumably, much more well designed, thanks to the hard work of the ROW, 
as well as to the bird-dogging of a few NGOs who did a lot of work to bring to 
light the complex social issues at play and the need for better oversight. 
 
The other thing that the two ‘versions’ of Chiapas REDD have in common 
is that neither would have come about were it not for the emergence of 
the California offsets market and the 2010 MOU between California and 
Chiapas. It is in this sense – the broader sense – that the flawed and failed 
REDD project initiated by Governor Sabines (3 months after signing the 
MOU) was linked to California’s emergent cap-and-trade scheme. And it 
is precisely an understanding of the broader context that, I’d argue, is required 
to comprehend the real impacts that such projects can have, as well as their 
potential uptake by stakeholders. 
 
Market advocates are well aware that ‘price signals’ – the promise of future 
economic benefits – can have a profound triggering effect on social policy. 
When California signed the MOU with Chiapas – a state with a long and well 
documented history of conflict between the government and a wide swath of 
the indigenous population – this sent a ‘price signal’, if you will, to the 
Chiapas administration that led that administration to initiate a project that 
manifested all of the potential fatal flaws of REDD. The fact that this was 
carried out with no MRV, no baselines, no crediting pathway, no safeguards, 
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no nothing – does not obviate the fact that it was, in principal and in intent, 
tied to California’s burgeoning market. 
 
Is it good that the new version of REDD in Chiapas will be more closely tied 
to responsible policies that may have a dampening effect on such abuses? 
Absolutely, and I congratulate ROW for having helped rein it in. Will it 
include a well-thought out social assessment and a process of free, prior and 
informed consent to allow the local population to determine if and how the 
program meets their needs? I hope so. I wonder, though, how such a process 
will go when proponents such as yourself respond to critics by calling them 
‘idiotic’, as you once did of my counterparts at Otros Mundos in Chiapas, or 
by dismissing their concerns as ‘silly’ as you did of Kathleen Macafee in your 
previous missive. That doesn’t bode well for an inclusive and informed 
consultation process that allows for reasonable dissent, as global best practice 
dictates. 
 
While the facts about Chiapas’ REDD plans have been at times difficult to 
ascertain – (a little like putting a price on hot air, or measuring and monetizing 
the hypothetical absence of a forest) – I have made an effort to do a service to 
both forests and human rights by sticking my neck way out through the 
investigation that I’ve carried out. Clearly some of my findings have been 
contentious; clearly some of the language I’ve used to share these findings has 
raised a few hackles; and clearly the opposition of a number of NGOs and 
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social movement groups has thrown a few red flags up in what could have 
been a much less visible process. With so much at stake, I think it’s been 
worth it. 
 
The article, titled ‘California’s Interest in Overseas Carbon Offsets Schemes Makes Some 
Greens See Red’, took a sympathetic view to the Friends of the Earth's highly critical 
statement at a sensitive moment, appearing 16 days after Vazquez statement in El 
Heraldo and 7 days after the release of the ROW’s Final Report.  
 Neither Brunello nor Zwick mention California by name, disassociating the state 
from REDD+ in Chiapas. Brunello strongly contested the insinuation that the PACT 
debacle had anything to do with the ROW and, by proxy, California. “The ROW,” he 
said, “is simply a group of non government experts making recommendations to the 
states. Period.” Brunello, irritated by a “very disappointing article”, twice states that the 
problem lay instead with those like Friends of the Earth who “confuse projects and state-
wide programs. Big difference.” 
 Zwick similarly denied any wrong-doing by REDD+ advocates, charging Friends 
of the Earth with willfully obfuscating “the legitimate REDD debate” by sowing 
“confusion and mixed messaging” with “a bit of verbal sleight of hand to link that 
program with jurisdictional REDD….despite the fact that they clearly knew” otherwise. 
Even in the writings of a journalist versed in the topic, though, we see how unclear the 
distinction between REDD+ projects, programs, and jurisdictional REDD+ can be. Zwick 
refers to “that project” in one place and “the Lacandon Jungle program” further on. To 
further complicate matters, Zwick stressed that due to a lack of technical rigor, the project 
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in the Lacandon was “NOT a REDD project at all” (in contrast to a real REDD project), 
deviating from ARB’s usage of REDD+ to refer only to jurisdictional REDD+ and never 
to projects (Chapter 4). 
 For Conant, the only one of the three to explicitly reference California, a hands-
off approach bordered on negligence: “Indeed, I find it troubling that no official in 
California has shown concern for the fact that the Schwarzenegger administration entered 
into this territory without doing its homework on a governor (Sabines) who ended up 
leaving Chiapas bankrupt and riddled with failed development projects.” Conant argued 
that California bore some responsibility for the events in Chiapas, regardless of the 
technical distinction between project- and jurisdictional-REDD+. Neither of the “two 
‘versions’ of Chiapas REDD”, he said, “would have come about were it not for the 
emergence of the California offsets market and 2010 MOU between California and 
Chiapas.” He insists that a full account of the “broader context” demands the 
consideration of “the real impacts that such projects have” because the fact that the PACT 
did not meet California’s technical standards “does not obviate the fact that it was, in 
principal and in intent, tied to California’s market.” Sending a signal, he cautioned, “can 
have a profound triggering effect on social policy” for which little oversight existed 
outside the “bird-dogging of a few NGOs.” 
 California presented a ‘field of dreams’ model of leadership: Build the carbon 
market, and enterprising states like Chiapas will come to sell carbon credits. Brunello and 
Zwick performed boundary work in this vein, drawing stark boundaries (project/program, 
legitimate debate/deliberate confusion, California/Chiapas policy, technical 
advice/decision-making) that allowed California to claim green leadership when things 
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go right, while avoiding accountability when things go poorly by conceiving of the states 
and provinces it partners with as prudent, independent, and accountable political agents.  
 ROW members encouraged this model, urging California to send a signal by 
adopting a strong REDD+ policy. The ROW report itself states that California’s cap-and-
trade program “could provide positive incentives to these nascent jurisdictional REDD+ 
programs” and “greatly multiply the global impact of AB32 by sending a signal to other 
states that their hard work and political leadership in mitigating climate change will be 
recognized and rewarded” (ROW 2013). Conant agreed that the signal California sends is 
critical, yet asked how is it possible to square the claims to leadership on the one hand, 
and a lack of responsibility on the other? He suggests that the political and economic 
asymmetry between California and Chiapas calls for the former to take responsibility for 
the relationship. 
 Therefore, both sides invoke the phrase ‘sending a signal’ to describe California’s 
role as an environmental leader, albeit to opposite conclusions. The notion of sending a 
signal is limited, however, because it assumes a broadcast model, as if referring to radio 
signals transmitted unmediated through the air. It is better to think of telegraph signals 
traveling over carefully laid wires, where authorized operators interpret and transit them 
at key points along the way. In this line of thought, the memorandum of 
misunderstanding between California and Chiapas cannot be chalked up simply as a 
communication breakdown but as the failed orchestration of private, epistemic carbon 
authority. 
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IV. Accounting for Networks of Private Expert Authority 
The signal that money could soon be flowing into Chiapas and other tropical states and 
provinces at the forefront of REDD+ policy came with a flurry of excitement around 
‘early action’ funding for climate mitigation. One of the notable developments at the 
climate negotiations in Cancún was the adoption of text committing developed countries 
to provide developing countries some US$30 billion in ‘fast-start’ climate finance 
through 2012. The text included specific language on results-based demonstration 
activities eligible for early action REDD+ funding. Forest carbon projects in the 
voluntary market had already placed Chiapas on the radar of international donors as a 
candidate for early action funding. A working paper for the World Bank’s Forest Carbon 
Partnership Facility (FCPF), for instance, identifies the “promising experience” of 
Chiapas’ Scolel Té project as an example of the financial innovations that “need to be 
widely inaugurated in countless villages and regions for this approach to work for 
national-scale REDD-plus.”135 
 California was reading signals as much as it was sending them. The MOU with 
Chiapas made no mention of early action funding, nor did the ARB give any indication 
that it sanctioned or was even aware of the PACT. At the time, however, the ARB was 
considering allowing international project-based offsets into the California market as a 
temporary measure to build an early offset supply136. Regulators decided to consider 
                                            
135 FCPF. (2010). ‘Harvesting Knowledge on REDD-plus: Early Lessons from the FCPF 
Initiative and Beyond’. available at: 
http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/sites/fcp/files/Documents/tagged/FCPF%20Harv
esting%20Knowledge%20Nov%2019%202010-revised.pdf 
136 ARB’s Preliminary Draft Regulations (PDR) for AB32 stipulate that international, 
early action credits come from an already accredited source, such as the Kyoto Protocol’s 
Certified Emission Reductions (CERs). Although the language does not offer much 
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international REDD+ offsets as well, following the advice of private organizations like 
Climate Focus, which argued that too large a share of donor money was going to REDD+ 
readiness capacity building programs at the national level and that more of it should go 
towards rewarding short-term emission reductions, especially reductions claimed by local 
private sector projects.137 These experts not only helped California regulators interpret the 
broader REDD+ domain but also promoted California’s reputation back out into that 
domain via their global networks, including into Chiapas and other sub-national 
jurisdictions where they were working. 
 It is therefore impossible to understand how REDD+ came to and took shape in 
California and Chiapas with reference to government authority and responsibility alone. 
Networks of private expertise played an essential role. Conservation International, The 
Nature Conservancy, and the Environmental Defense Fund were particularly active 
advocates for linking early action funding to REDD+ projects, accelerating and 
coordinating their efforts at all levels—international, national, sub-national, and local. 
These organizations seized the opportunity that early actions presented, advising sub-
national jurisdictions with tropical forests to step up their REDD+ efforts. In some 
jurisdictions, like Chiapas, these groups had already acquired the status as informal 
conservation science and policy advisers, including on a number of ongoing forest offset 
projects, which would be potential recipients for early action funding. The critical 
                                                                                                                                  
further guidance, the COP 16 negotiating text on early action credits might be interpreted 
to suggest that credits from REDD+ projects might soon qualify as well. 
137 See for example: Climate Focus. ‘The Challenge of Urgency Incentivizing Private 
Sector Early Action in REDD+’. available at: 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/about/pifs/symposia/fcfs/2010-fcfs-briefing-
materials/challenge_of_urgency.pdf 
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advisory and mediator roles played by private actors thus invalidate the idea that 
California simply sent a signal to prospecting partners. 
 The following sections examine the role these groups played in the design and 
implementation of carbon markets in the two states, arguing that their orchestration of 
transnational policy-making amounted to an emerging form of carbon authority. 
 
IV.1.1. Sending and Receiving Signals 
The specialized and highly technical nature of REDD+ afforded private actors significant 
clout even among highly sophisticated but overstretched regulators like the ARB, as they 
crafted and disseminated policies and technical standards for REDD+. In simpler or more 
familiar policy domains, governments typically possess in-house expertise or, if not, 
solicit expert recommendations through a structured advisory process. REDD+, by 
contrast, posed a specialized and fast-moving policy environment, where the expert 
reputation private groups acquired in the voluntary market imparted a level of technical 
and policy competency on REDD+ far beyond their government partners. Increasing 
policy complexity allowed transnational standard-setters to exercise proportionally 
greater influence in the national and sub-national space that was impossible to achieve in 
the painstaking UNFCCC negotiations. The Kerry-Boxer bill circulating in the US Senate 
cited the Action Reserve Protocol, and an amendment proposed to the bill contained text 
to incorporate other voluntary standards like the Verified Carbon Standard (VCS). In 
Australia, the Department of Climate Change announced that its National Carbon Offset 
Standard (NCOS) would recognize credits verified by the VCS and Gold Standard. 
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 The sub-national arena, in particular, allowed these transnational groups to punch 
above their weight. California’s cap-and-trade program and the potential for early action 
funding in Chiapas proved an attractive space for these groups to promote, test, and shape 
REDD+ policy. Terra Global, VCS, and other pioneers in the voluntary carbon market set 
up offices in California as it was setting up its compliance market, positioning themselves 
as third-parties between the state’s REDD+ proposal and other sub-national efforts 
worldwide. This ability of private groups to act as brokers between California and 
Chiapas cannot be seen in isolation; it was one part of a much broader global strategy to 
centralize REDD+ expertise, which grew out collaborations among financiers, project 
developers, and conservation organizations in the voluntary market (Chapter 3). 
 The strategy called for a common set of standards to reduce transaction costs 
between California and other carbon markets and “create a more efficient, fungible 
marketplace for REDD+ credits and allow forest countries to build single systems that 
can access multiple sources of potential finance.”138 Common standards would also make 
it possible for one REDD+ supplier to feed buyers in multiple markets—easing concerns 
that a single supplier like Acre could generate more credits than California’s entire 
market could absorb due to the limit the ARB set on the total number on international 
credits permitted under the program. Common standards proved attractive to major 
national and international REDD+ donors, most notably the Norwegian Agency for 
Development Cooperation (NORAD) and the World Bank, which contributed 
institutional and financial support for capacity building (though little direct support to 
individual projects). 
                                            
138 IETA COP 19 Side Events, 
http://www.ieta.org/assets/EventDocs/COP19rev_cop19_ieta_sideeventprogram.pdf
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 Private standards devised and tested in the voluntary market proved a valuable 
resource for regulators, with the ARB, for instance, basing its coal mine methane (CMM) 
protocol on two pre-existing VCS methodologies. The VCS and affiliated big 
conservation groups pressed for the state to accept international offsets from REDD+ 
projects using the VCS Jurisdictional and Nested REDD+ (JNR) approach, which they 
had developed to ensure that projects were not left out of jurisdictional programs 
(Chapter 4). Getting governments to adopt private standards for project offsets was but 
part of the strategy; the other was to gain public designation as a carbon offset registry 
with regulatory authority over offsets themselves. 
 
IV.1.2. Delegation or Orchestration of Expertise?: The Role of Private Networks in 
State Policy 
In an August 2014 press release, titled ‘California Here We Come!’, the VCS announced 
that the ARB had approved it as one of three official Offset Project Registries (OPR)—
entities qualified to list, report, and verify offsets (including early action offsets), and 
issue registry offset credits, under California’s cap-and-trade regulations.139 One of the 
other OPRs, the American Carbon Registry (ACR) likewise began as a private sector 
initiative in the voluntary carbon market, while the third, the Climate Action Reserve 
(CAR) was created by the state to oversee the voluntary calculation and reporting of 
emissions (Chapter 4). VCS CEO David Antonioli marked the moment as one where 
public and private players were coming together to solve global problems: 
 
                                            
139 VCS. 7 Aug 2014. ‘California Here We Come!’. available at: http://www.v-c-
s.org/news-events/news/california-here-we-come 
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The California system is on the cutting edge of figuring out how to tackle climate 
change….We feel it’s time to be part of the game and part of the solution.140 
 
Antonioli’s game and the solution represent moments of carbon authority in-the-making, 
where the ARB adopted standards from and delegated public responsibilities to private 
actors like the VCS, which possessed technical capabilities to regulate a domain far an 
excess of those the ARB possessed itself. 
 The relationship resembles one of delegation between a principal and agent when 
we limit the analysis to the policy-making and administration of the carbon market in 
California (or any one political jurisdiction). From this perspective, clear lines of 
accountability run vertically from the VCS (agent) up to the ARB (principal). 
 From the vantage point of sub-national networked governance, however, the lines 
of accountability are blurred, in many ways resembling orchestration more than 
delegation. Carbon authority offers a better way to understand this relationship by 
expanding the analysis from: 1) decision-making to knowledge-making, and 2) the 
regulation of private entities inside California or Chiapas to the coordination of 
government policy between California and Chiapas. 
 First, in a delegated relationship, principals typically empower agents to carry out 
the responsibilities they have assigned to them. Here, however, the ARB imparted the 
legal authority to the VCS because of its existing capabilities, which is more reflective of 
orchestrated relationships, where relatively independent agents are solicited based of their 
                                            
140 Ecosystem Marketplace. 8 Aug 2014. ‘VCS Sees REDD in California’. available at: 
http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/pages/dynamic/article.page.php?page_id=10478
&section=news_articles&eod=1 
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unique resources. Furthermore, it is not clear who was orchestrating whom. It is not 
simply that the VCS was selected to apply its expertise to verify, validate, and register 
credits; its expertise was also selected to be the basis of ARB regulations. Regulators 
retained—and exercised—the authority to reject or modify methodologies and other 
technical practices that originated in the voluntary market, but originate in the voluntary 
market they did, exerting a form of soft power over public regulations. This amounted to 
more than simply harnessing private capabilities to public ends because they deviated 
from or offered a narrow interpretation of those ends, which, in turn, shaped the structure 
of authority itself (a point I make in Chapters 2 and 3, and elaborate in section VI. 
below). 
 Second, private actors played a critical role themselves as knowledge brokers 
between California and Chiapas (see Chapter 3 for a discussion of knowledge brokerage). 
After the signing of the MOU, the two governments had nearly no direct and formal 
engagement, aside from the occasional role as observers to the ROW. The governments, 
for instance, did not send delegates to make contacts and build understanding in person. 
Nor did ARB representatives attend the 2012 Annual GCF meeting in Chiapas, delivering 
their regrets in a presentation over a scarcely audible weblink, which they said they could 
not deliver in person due to pressing policy matters at home. On a separate occasion two 
months later, California state Senator Kevin de León, (D) Los Angeles, did visit 
Chiapas—at the invitation of Environmental Defense to build political support for seeing 
through the MOU.141 
                                            
141 Sac Bee. 10 Mar 2013. ‘Crossing borders: California tries to cultivate green roots with 
Chiapas’. available at: http://www.sacbee.com/opinion/california-
forum/article2576832.html 
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 As knowledge brokers, private groups acted as critical liaisons in the absence of 
government-to-government interaction. The VCS and partners were particularly well-
equipped to assume this role, having boots on the ground in both states and the sole 
standard for jurisdictional and nested REDD+. VCS’ JNR approach and designation as an 
authorized registry for California’s carbon market promised a potent combination. 
Together, they positioned the VCS as potential setter of REDD+ offset standards, issuer 
of REDD+ offsets credits, and, by virtue of its extensive connections to developers and 
financiers in the voluntary market, catalyst of REDD+ projects across multiple political 
jurisdictions. 
 Thus, in contrast to simpler accounts of authority in the old model of governance 
(including those leading to the ‘sending a signal’ metaphor described above), in the 
model of new transnational governance, carbon authority presents a complex category, 
distributed across multiple sites and disaggregated into heterogeneous elements. In 
addition to standard-setting, carbon registries, and transnational knowledge brokerage, 
carbon authority appears in legislative and judicial confidence in the ARB’s technical 
expertise, which I discuss in the California case studies below. The next section discusses 
the role of conservation groups in shaping the REDD+ Program in Chiapas. 
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V. Building Capabilities for Carbon Authority 
V.1. Chiapas 
V.1.1. Early Action for Old Visions in the Lacandon Rainforest 
Decades of unmet promises by the government to provide locals with food, money, and 
other resources to conserve la Selva had bred the kind of cynicism expressed in one letter 
to La Jornada dating from 1988: 
 
The bureaucrats of SEDUE [Mexico Secretary of Urban Development and 
Ecology] brought us a box of postcards from children from Europe asking 
President de la Madrid to protect the Selva Lacandona, but this can only be 
accomplished with development for the people who live here. In whatever 
ministry of government, in whatever program, they tell us that there is no 
money, that the country is in a crisis. Well then, if the international 
community wants to save the forest, why don’t they bring the money to invest 
in the Selva? (Translation from O’Brien 1998) 
 
All this could change, the thinking went, with REDD+. Fast-finance for early action 
projects like the PACT142 was the most direct path to this funding. Unlike the years it 
would take to get a jurisdictional program up and running, fast-start finance could deliver 
money on the ground quickly and, it so happens, within the term limits of a typical state 
governor. Early action was a hot topic in the Cancún climate negotiations, California had 
said that it would consider allowing early action credits into its market (though with no 
                                            
142 Pacto por el Respeto y Conservación a la Madre Tierra 
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mention of REDD+), and conservation groups and carbon market entrepreneurs were 
drumming up the idea for early action projects worldwide, Chiapas included. 
 But the PACT came as a surprise. Not even Sabines’ own Secretary for the 
Environment and Natural History (SEMAHN) knew much about the proposal for a 
project deep in the Lacandon forest, despite being the agency charged with seeing it 
through. SEMAHN had little time to plan. In early 2011, the agency held meetings with 
from Tzeltal, Chole, and Lacandon representatives of the Lacandon Community—the 66 
Lacandon families who had been given settlement rights to over 600,000 ha of forest by 
presidential decree in 1971 and some members of Tzeltal and Chole groups who gained 
rights through decades of struggle (Figure 7). SEMAHN’s first goal was to get some 
semblance of a project up and running, and payments flowing that spring, intentionally 
well before the central government’s funds arrived in September. The state paid some 
1500 households $2000 pesos per month (about US$180, or total US$3.25 million per 
year), but the conditions for those payments were obscure, calling for the recipients to 
protect the area from illegal settlements and abstain from environmentally destructive 
activity. 
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Figure 7. Map of the Montes Azules Biosphere Reserve 
 
 
 The haste with which SEMAHN was forced to move forward with the PACT 
carried major repercussions for the state’s authority over not only the project but the 
whole of Chiapas’ REDD+ program. Funding for the project was pulled together from an 
existing state automobile ownership tax and failed to secure additional government 
support from either state or national coffers. The project also lacked several factors 
expected of compliance-grade offset projects: clear objectives, geographic boundaries, 
safeguards, and a robust MRV system. Nor did the project have any clear link to a 
jurisdiction-wide program as stipulated for any project generating offsets for California’s 
market or even the one to two year verification and validation process of a private third-
party standard like the VCS. And in a final coup de grâce, the payments issued for the 
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benefit of land-titled forest dwellers spawned allegations of land-grabbing among the 
landless or, in Sabines words, “the invaders” who already held deep suspicions of the 
alignment of the government, conservation organizations, and Lacandon Community. 
 Those payments reversed the logic of REDD+. Rather than first getting an MRV 
system up and running as the basis for ex-post payments for activities that avoided 
deforestation, La Jornada reports that the state government authorized the monthly 
payments: 
 
to allow the completion of the forest inventory so that comuneros can access 
federal and international funds, and further complement these funds with 
projects such as the conversion of agriculture outside of the reserve to crops 
like oil palm and rubber.143 
 
The PACT required very little of its recipients and had no direct connection with building 
an MRV system for the state. In effect, it was another subsidy carrying on a long-
standing patron-client relationship between the government and Lacandon Community. 
 Governor Sabines visited the Lacandon village of Frontera Corozal around the 
time the payments began flowing in March 2011. The visit caught the attention of the 
media, for it was the first time a Governor had visited the area since his father, Governor 
Juan Sabines Gutiérrez, made the trip 30 years before. Sabines used the opportunity to 
publicize the project, presenting it as part of a broader green development package for the 
                                            
143 La Jornada. ‘Reciben 600 comuneros de Frontera Corozal pagos por conservar la selva 
Lacandona’. 20 March 2011. available at: 
http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2011/03/20/index.php?section=sociedad&article=034n1soc
. 
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Lacandon Community. In addition to legitimizing it in local terms, he highlighted the 
global good it would provide by reducing a portion of the two-thirds of greenhouse gas 
emissions originating from land-use change in the state. Further underscoring the 
project’s legitimacy as a bonafide conservation initiative, Sabines signed the PACT 
agreement alongside Conservation International’s Mexico Country Director.144 
 Sabines further drew on the organization’s expertise to establish credibility for the 
PACT. While the state government lacked the capability to build a robust carbon 
inventory itself, Conservation International had amassed a wealth of data on deforestation 
and carbon stocks during two decades of work in the region. The government relied on 
the transnational expertise of The Nature Conservancy and Environmental Defense Fund 
as well. A number of prominent national and state environmental groups also advised the 
initiative, including Ambio (which was the project coordinator of Scolel Té, one of the 
earliest avoided deforestation projects based on a payments for environmental services; 
see Chapter 2) and Pronatura Sur (which was involved in REDD+ policy at state and 
federal levels in Mexico). 
 These groups’ global connections placed them in a key position to help Chiapas’ 
under-resourced agencies orchestrate the complicated initiative in the state, country, and 
abroad. Pronatura Sur and Conservation International were core contributors to one of the 
most important organs to REDD+ policy-making in the state—the Chiapas Technical 
Advisory Committee (CTC) for REDD+, the first state-level technical advisory 
committee for REDD+ in the country. And representatives from these groups were 
themselves exceptionally well-connected. One individual Pronatura Sur, for instance, 
                                            
144 Conservation International and its country affiliate, Conservation International-
Mexico. 
238 
was: an advisor in the REDD Offsets Working Group, the Mexico country coordinator 
for the GCF, and a member of the National CTC for REDD+.145  
 As the dominant transnational environmental group in Chiapas, Conservation 
International held a status gained through years of advocacy and research, including the 
negotiation of a landmark debt-for-nature swap that brought US$2.6 million to protect the 
Lacandon. The group also became de facto expert adviser to SEDUE and operated the 
influential Chajul Tropical Research Station (O’Brien 1998). With funding from the 
British Embassy in Mexico, Conservation International, together with SEMAHN and 
local and national universities, led the Climate Change Action Program for the State of 
Chiapas (PACCCH).146 One of the main objectives of the PACCCH was to “develop 
scientific-technical information on climate change in Chiapas including a state-level 
greenhouse gas inventory, a detailed REDD+ baseline and downscaling of climate 
change scenarios."147 
 For all their public profile, advisory services, and market savvy in developing 
Chiapas’ REDD+ program, these private actors offered little input to the design and 
implementation of the PACT. More than that, they actively distanced themselves from 
the REDD+ project in the Lacandon—though they were the essential REDD+ advisers to 
Chiapas. These groups had little involvement with the REDD+ project and cannot be said 
to have transmitted a direct signal from California that it should feature as the public face 
of early action in Chiapas. Indeed, the PACT proved a thorn in the side of Conservation 
International, The Nature Conservancy, Pronatura Sur, Ambio, and others spearheading 
                                            
145 Comité Técnico Consultivo REDD+ 
146 Programa de Acción ante el Cambio Climático del Estado de Chiapas 
147 PACCCH. 
http://www.gcftaskforce.org/documents/Chiapas_Climate_Change_Action_Program.pdf 
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early action initiatives of their own in and outside of the state, which came to be tarred 
alongside the Sabines’ state government’s project in the Lacandon. But, as the only de 
facto REDD+ experts in the state, they did interpret for the government how Chiapas 
REDD+ program could fit into California’s market for jurisdictional REDD+ credits. 
 Without these outside groups there would be no REDD+ to speak of in the state, 
which makes their failure to augur the fiasco to befall Sabines’ signature REDD+ project 
in the Lacandon all the more puzzling. Thinking through this puzzle in terms of carbon 
authority shows these groups to have certain delegated forms of authority within Chiapas, 
in particular, in the design and administration of the PACCCH, which institutionalized 
their agenda-setting authority for REDD+ in the state. To provide scientific and technical 
guidance, for instance, Conservation International and local and national partners 
prepared a ‘Feasibility Study for the REDD+ Mechanism in Chiapas'.148 The intent of the 
document was to provide technical input to the state REDD+ strategy under development. 
The Feasibility Study makes specific mention of the MOU with California but says 
nothing of substance on the new kind of jurisdictional REDD+ called for by California 
regulators and the ROW. Instead it falls back on the same projects that Conservational 
International and other partners in the state had long advocated. To the extent a 
jurisdictional approach is mentioned, it is only in regard to the imperative to nest projects 
within a state-wide accounting scheme under the VCS, the same standard key former 
staff from Conservation International helped advise. 
 Projects were what these groups knew and did. Sub-national jurisdictional 
REDD+ was altogether new. The question of how, or even if, projects (and early action 
                                            
148http://www.pmcarbono.org/pmc/descargas/proyectos/CI_Factibilidad_REDD+/Inform
e_Fase_B/Executive_Summary_Final_Report.pdf 
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projects in particular) should fit into that broader scale approach was never seriously 
asked. As a result, the development of individual projects and broader REDD+ program 
took place along two distinct tracks, with little thought about how to integrate the two. 
 
V.1.2. Contending for Turf: Struggles between Chiapas and CONAFOR 
Early action projects presented an opportunity for the Chiapas government to one-up 
national conservation and development initiatives in the region. Before the press 
conference in Cancún, Sabines declared that the state government would launch its own 
effort in la Selva wherever the national government would or could not, and it would put 
down double the money to do so.149 The announcement of the PACT came as a surprise 
to Mexico’s focal agency for REDD+, the National Forestry Commission (CONAFOR), 
which saw it as a wrinkle in the ongoing national REDD+ effort.  
 CONAFOR did not react favorably. Officials at the agency were angry with the 
state administration for sowing “confusion and bad information” about REDD+, and 
intended to retain the authority to manage funding and contracts to national authorities.150 
While no legal prohibitions prevented Chiapas from staking out its own designs on 
REDD+, the project crossed two major conservation and sustainable development plans 
for the region. 
 One conflict was with plans for the Mesoamerican Biological Corridor (MBC), a 
“territorial planning system” based on a system of transboundary conservation areas 
established by the heads of state of Mexico and Central American countries with support 
                                            
149 interview. 3 March 2013. 
150 interview. 6 March 2014. 
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from the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) in 1997.151 The MBC designated two 
priority areas in the Lacandon Community. Furthermore, officials at CONAFOR and 
Mexico’s National Commission for the Knowledge and Use of Biodiversity (CONABIO) 
saw the project as transgressing the turf national conservation leaders had drawn in the 
region. Mexico’s influential former Secretary of the Environment, Julia Carabais, had 
staked something of a personal claim on the Lacandon over the past two decades. As an 
unstated rule, few major conservation initiatives went forward without her approval or 
that of her protégés, including one high-ranking official at CONAFOR who took the 
unusual step of personally thanking activists working for the frequent foe, Greenpeace, 
for vocally opposing the PACT. 
 A second conflict stemmed from the state’s deviance from CONAFOR’s efforts 
to coordinate a nation-wide REDD+ strategy. While CONAFOR had no clear criteria 
guiding early action efforts in the country, around the same time plans were underway for 
three other pilot REDD+ projects in the state. The PACT was the first to issue payments, 
leaping ahead of two other initiatives in the Lacandon. One of these overlapped with the 
Sierra la Cojolita project in the Northern Lacandon communities of Lacanja, Frontera 
Corozal, and Nueva Palestina. Heading the project was the Na Bolom, the organization 
that first cast la Selva as a global conservation treasure in the 1960s. The other project 
was CONAFOR’s Special Program of the Lacandon Jungle (PESL), which linked a 
                                            
151 see: http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/Data/reports/mbc_rpr.pdf and 
http://www.tbpa.net/docs/62_Meso_American_Biological_Corridor.pdf and 
http://jpe.library.arizona.edu/volume_18/Ervine.pdf 
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federal payment for environmental services initiative to eight municipios in the southern 
Lacandon.152 
 Governor Velasco’s cancelation of Sabines’ project threw the future of REDD+ in 
Chiapas into question. To the consternation of groups opposed to REDD+, Velasco’s 
administration was quick to clarify it had stopped only the PACT project and not the 
program altogether. After a murky period the program emerged more closely aligned 
with CONAFOR’s broader national strategy. 
 The realignment of sub-national efforts by both the state Government and 
transnational conservation groups can be seen as an effort to regain credibility, 
legitimacy, and hence carbon authority under the much broader and better supported 
national efforts in Mexico. Conservation groups saw little lost in relieving themselves 
from what all agreed was a REDD+ project in name only. The Policy Director of WWF's 
Forest & Climate Initiative—a group working more with the central government than 
Chiapas—remarked that she was glad to see the new Governor to stop the subsidies to the 
Lacandon Community, and refocus on aligning the state and national strategies and 
visions for REDD+.153 Toby Janson-Smith, Conservation International’s Senior Director 
of Forest Carbon Markets, VCS advisor, and ROW member, who had long advocated for 
early action REDD+ projects offered a similar, if slightly rosier assessment, saying, “It’s 
hard to pin down, but in two to three years I would expect Chiapas to be in good shape in 
                                            
152 A longer list of communities in the PACT area includes  Naha, Metzabok, Lacanja 
Chansayab, Nueva Palestinia Frontera Corozal and Oja de Agua Chankin, and in the 
PESL area Marqués de Comillas, Maravilla Tenejapa, Benemérito de las Américas, and 
Ocosingo. 
153 Ecosystem Marketplace. 19 July 2013, ‘Chiapas State Government Says REDD Is 
Alive And Well And Far From 'Cancelled’’. available at: 
http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/pages/dynamic/article.page.php?page_id=9848 
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having a robust REDD program that is generating emissions reductions that could be 
verified.” He looked forward to a state-level strategy that still built upon the local work of 
early action projects and Conservational International’s MRV efforts in Chiapas, which 
were “coming along nicely”, but pointed to the value of re-aligning Chiapas’ efforts with 
national efforts.154 Governor Velasco himself pivoted towards these national efforts, 
tacitly renouncing Sabines’ vision of Chiapas as a REDD+ leader in its own right.  
 
V.2. California 
V.2.1. Securing Private Expert Authority in Court: Citizens Climate Lobby and Our 
Children’s Earth Foundation vs. California Air Resources Board 
Since the 1960s, California has acquired a reputation for environmental leadership by 
cleaning up some of the worst air pollution in the country. By the 2000s, the state 
catapulted into the status of global environmental leader, passing the most aggressive 
legislation to fight climate change in the world. In a preliminary study, environmental 
law scholar Ann Carlson (2014), finds part of the answer for California’s environmental 
leadership in the ARB’s regulatory expertise. Over the span of several decades, she 
suggests, the ARB’s success in regulating automobile emissions gained it the bipartisan 
trust of legislators, who passed far-reaching environmental protections and delegated 
increasing independence and authority to the ARB to see those protections through. A 
virtuous circle ensued between law-makers and regulators, where ambitious leadership 
yielded expert authority, and expert authority spurred ambitious leadership. Carlson 
                                            
154 Ecosystem Marketplace. 19 July 2013, ‘Chiapas State Government Says REDD Is 
Alive And Well And Far From 'Cancelled’’. available at: 
http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/pages/dynamic/article.page.php?page_id=9848 
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identifies three factors that fostered green leadership and regulatory capacity: agency 
structure, revenue sources, and history. When it comes to transnational global 
governance, however, the outsourcing of expertise to private actors complicates this 
account. To show why, in this section and the next, I explore the authorization of carbon 
authority in California in the: 1) courts and 2) legislature/regulatory agencies. 
 Doubts over the ARB’s legal authority to include offsets under its cap-and-trade 
program were quelled in February 2015 when the Court of Appeal of the State of 
California reaffirmed a Superior Court decision to deny a petition put forward by two 
California-based grassroots organizations disputing the additionality of offset reductions. 
In Citizens Climate Lobby and Our Children’s Earth Foundation vs. California Air 
Resources Board, the Petitioners charged the ARB with violating its legislative mandate 
that: 
 
any regulation adopted by the state board pursuant to [the parts of AB32 
governing greenhouse gas emission reductions and market-based compliance 
mechanisms] shall ensure…[that] the reduction is in addition to any greenhouse 
gas emission reduction otherwise required by law or regulation, and any other 
greenhouse gas emission reduction that otherwise would occur.155 [Emphasis 
added as in the Petition] 
                                            
155 As referred to in the Petition, ARB’s domestic Offset Provisions encompass: 1) the 
Offset Regulations and 2) four Offset Protocols for U.S. Forests Projects, Urban Forestry 
Projects, Livestock Manure Projects, Ozone Depleting Substances, and Methane Mine 
Capture Projects.  
 
Offsets can be of two forms: California Carbon Offsets (CCOs), issued by ARB, and 
Climate Reserve Tonnes (CRTs), issued by CAR. 
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The charge built on a critique against the claimed additionality of carbon offsets that two 
attorneys at the Environmental Protection Agency had leveled at pending federal climate 
legislation in 2008 and 2009. During the same period, the attorneys, Laurie Williams and 
Allan Zabel, a married couple living in San Francisco, extended their arguments to 
California’s nascent cap-and-trade program.156 Acting as private citizens on behalf of the 
Citizens Climate Lobby, Williams and Zabel submitted several public comments to the 
ARB as required by law during the AB 32 rulemaking process, in which they excoriated 
the Agency’s proposed Offset Provisions as a “fatally flawed and unworkable 
approach”.157 
 The Petitioners challenged neither the Legislature’s definition of additionality in 
the Act, nor the Board’s more detailed interpretation of that definition in the Offset 
Provisions. Rather, they claimed that the Offset Provisions were inadequate to ensure the 
board’s own definition of additionality, as: 
 
greenhouse gas emission reductions or removals that exceed any greenhouse gas 
reduction or removals otherwise required by law, regulation or legally binding 
                                                                                                                                  
 
Health and Safety Code §§ 38562(d)(2) 
 
ARB Compliance Offset Program website. accessed 11 April 2015: 
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/offsets/offsets.htm 
156 The media rarely failed to refer to Williams and Zabel as a “married couple”. The two 
made frequent media appearances in print and broadcast media, including the NY Times, 
Fox News, and Democracy Now—to the displeasure of their superiors at the EPA, who 
made sure they made clear that they did not speak on the agency’s behalf. 
157 Responses to Comments on the Supplement to the AB 32 Scoping Plan Functional 
Equivalent Document. accessed 6.24.15. available at: 
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/response_to_comments_on_supplement_to_fed.pd
f 
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mandate, and that exceed any greenhouse gas reductions or removals that would 
otherwise occur in a conservative, business-as-usual scenario. 
 
Consequently, the Offset Provisions, they argued, “were promulgated in excess of the 
authority delegated to the ARB and are therefore invalid”158 and in violation of California 
law, which: 
 
prohibits state agencies from expanding their authority when they promulgate  
regulations that do not meet regulatory standards for the particular activity. Under  
California law, an agency does not have the discretion to promulgate an  
administrative regulation if the regulation is not authorized by or is inconsistent  
with or enlarges the scope of an act of the Legislature. 
 
The Petitioners offered two main arguments. First, they contended that the ARB had 
wrongly expanded its authority by using ‘performance standards’ to determine 
additionality. Such performance standards were devised by the Climate Action Reserve 
(CAR), as well as other non-governmental standard-setters like the VCS, to overcome the 
notoriously slow, inaccurate, and expensive project-by-project standards that had clogged 
the verification and validation process for offsets under the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean 
Development Mechanism. The use of performance standards offered a way to reduce the 
                                            
158 This exact quote appears in the Petition’s arguments for the lack of validity of an 
individual Protocol, but appears in slight permutations throughout each of the first five 
Causes of Action: Protocols Fail to Ensure the Additionality of Offsets, Vague 
Regulatory Definitions Violate Government Code Section 11349.1, The Offset 
Regulations are Not Enforceable, Regulatory Provisions Violate AB 32’s Integrity 
Standards, 
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cost and increase the speed of this process by setting a universal threshold for all offset 
projects in a given category that were “significantly better than average” or beyond 
“common practice”. They alleged that such an approach was: 
 
flawed because offset activities which are merely “significantly better than 
average” or beyond “common practice” include, by definition, activities which 
already exist, are ongoing, and therefore, do not produce [additional] greenhouse 
gas reductions or removals. 
 
The Petition argued that the Offset Provisions therefore defied the Legislature’s intent 
that the term “additional” designates “any” reductions that “would otherwise occur.” The 
Petitioners asserted that the Act presented these terms—“any” and “otherwise would 
occur”—in “plain language”, which the Court of Appeal described as a common sense 
interpretation that the Act meant “each and every” reduction be additional. As a result, 
the Petitioners argued, the Offset Provisions threatened to undermine the integrity of the 
Act because “illusory” credits would “flood the system” since “no truly additional offsets 
will be financially viable until all non-additional activities have been exhausted.” 
 Second, the Petitioners asserted that individual Protocols were invalid because 
they could not reliably determine which projects were truly additional. The Petition 
challenged that the performance standard upon which the Protocols were based employed 
a “flawed” and “inherently subjective and uncertain” “profitability test” to separate 
projects that would otherwise occur without the financial incentive of offsets from those 
that would not. The test required knowing, among other things, the cost of all inputs for a 
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project, the potential liabilities that a project might avoid by engaging in a certain 
activity, the value of offset payments, and the generation of extra value, for example, 
through timber, electricity or “green” advertising. The Petition stated that, since such 
things are variable and unpredictable, performance standards suffered from the same 
subjectivity problems as project-by-project standards, meaning that any determinations of 
additionality are: 
 
at best, a guess about the future, which allows project proponents to “turn the 
knobs” in order to get the result they seek and to include activities that “would 
otherwise occur,” in violation of the AB 32 Integrity Standards.159 
 
The Court was not persuaded by either argument.160 Ruling in favor of the Respondents 
on all alleged causes for action, Hon. Ernest H. Goldsmith—the same judge who had 
ruled more favorably with grassroots groups in a prior lawsuit over the public input 
process to the ARB’s Climate Change Scoping Plan—determined that the ARB neither 
exceed its delegated authority by using a standards-based approach to set additionality, 
nor failed to achieve the purpose of the Act by applying such standards in the four 
individual Protocols (and early action credits). He made these determinations through a 
two-step judicial review, which is important to note because it highlights two aspects of 
carbon authority in-the-making. The first secures the legitimacy of the regulations by 
affirming their consistency with the intent of the publicly elected Legislature, and the 
                                            
159 Association of Irritated Residents, et al, vs. California Air Resources Board 
160 Statement of Decision Re: Petition for Writ of Mandate. Citizens Climate Lobby and 
Our Children’s Earth Foundation vs. California Air Resources Board. Case No. CGC-12-
519-554 
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second confirms their credibility as a mode of instrumental public reasoning needed to 
advance policy goals. 
 In the first step, he found that the Legislature had delegated authority to the Board 
to interpret the statute, and hence applied a de novo standard of judicial review to 
determine if the ARB had exceeded its delegated authority by interpreting the statute to 
allow performance standards. In this kind of review, the Court reserves the option to 
exercise its independent judgment on the interpretation of a statute, giving as little or 
much deference to the administrative agency as it sees fit based on the circumstances and 
relative expertise of the agency and the Court. Judge Goldsmith exercised de novo review 
in line with the preference of the Petitioners and against the Respondent’s desire for a 
much narrower interpretation that would require the Court only to determine if the 
regulations were “arbitrary and capricious”, and therefore inconsistent with advancing the 
purpose of the statute. 
 The de novo review required the Court to determine whether the Board had 
elaborated or expanded the meaning of additionality and other key statutory terms, which, 
in turn, raised the question of how to distinguish between additional and non-additional 
claims. The Petitioners likely favored a de novo review because they forwarded a 
common-sense interpretation of the Act, in which showing that performance standards 
were invalid simply required a literal interpretation of the Act as disallowing any 
existing, and hence, non-additional projects to receive credits. Judge Goldsmith, 
however, ruled that: 
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Determining additionality is difficult, and it is impossible to precisely delineate 
between additional and non-additional projects. Petitioners ignore this reality and 
insist Respondent must use a perfect additionality mechanism or none at all.  
 
The Court of Appeals used stronger language, saying the Petitioners took “the pedantic 
position that…[the] additionality requirement speaks for itself ”. To take to this position 
to its logical conclusion, the Appeals Court found, would lead to the full exclusion of 
hypothetical or counter-factual assessments of projects that “would otherwise occur”. 
This, in turn, would rule out market-based approaches altogether, which clearly was not 
the Legislature’s intent since it gave the ARB the option of enacting a market-based 
compliance mechanism, including “emissions exchanges, banking, credits, and other 
transactions, governed by rules and protocols” established by the Board. 
 In the second step, the Court applied a more restrictive “arbitrary and capricious” 
standard of judicial review to each of the four Protocols individually (as opposed to the 
general provisions on performance-based standards reviewed in step one). Here, Judge 
Goldsmith’s review was more circumscribed, in which he refused to substitute his own 
discretion for the presumed competence of the agency: 
 
When the Court inquires into such matters, it leaves the courtroom and enters the 
stakeholder meetings, laboratories, farms, and forests where Respondent’s 
expertise and experience far outstrips the Court’s. 
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The Court’s narrower review found that the Board had not exceeded its delegated 
authority because the administrative record demonstrated that it had: 
 
adequately considered all relevant factors and has demonstrated a rational 
connection between these factors, the policy implemented, and the purpose of the 
enabling statutes.161 
 
The Court stated that the Petitioners, having failed to see the problem of non-additionality 
as an epistemic problem (“All parties agree that each and every reduction must be 
additional. They disagree on how to determine additionality.”), subsequently offered: 
 
no evidentiary support upon which this Court can overlook Respondent’s 
technical expertise and delegated law-making authority in order to overturn their 
decision. 
 
Parties did not distinguish between the experience and expertise of the Board from that of 
its advisers. The presumption is that the difference is immaterial because the Board’s own 
competence afforded it sufficient discretion to determine relevant expertise and 
incorporate it on an as needed basis. This is not unusual for a delegated relationship, 
whereby the principal can lay claim to the capacities of its agents by virtue of the 
hierarchical terms of the arrangement. In legal terms, the precise identity of the advisers 
                                            
161 The decisions further specifies that an “arbitrary and capricious standard” calls for the 
agency to promulgate regulations based on its “best judgment based on the currently 
available information”, based on “its experience, expertise, and judgment” and “extensive 
research, stakeholder input, public input, and fact-based analysis.” 
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is immaterial to the content of the knowledge so long as it is arrived at through 
sanctioned channels. 
 The Board, as a public regulator, thus drew substantial legitimacy and credibility 
from an impressive array of private businesses, utilities, conservation groups, and carbon 
market proponents that joined as Intervenor-Respondents to case. The Board’s presumed 
independence made it possible for Antonioli, for instance, to at once declare, with no 
conflict of interest, that the VCS was a credible source of accounting standards and that 
its efforts would harmed if those standards were made invalid: 
 
The VCS Association has a clear interest in the above-captioned litigation. The 
VCS Association has spent a great deal of time, effort, and money, including 
convening a group of world-renowned experts, to draft rules and requirements for 
the development of consistent methods that standardize the determination of 
additionality for projects and streamline the quantification of reductions. These 
requirements are being considered for application to the carbon market being 
developed by the California Air Resources Board….If Plaintiff’s successfully 
challenge CARB’s regulations and obtain the declaratory and injunctive relief 
requested…the California carbon offset market will be eliminated, significantly 
harming the VCS Association’s efforts.162 
 
Other Intervenor-Respondents backing the Board forwarding a mixture of expert opinion 
and material interests included: CAR, Environmental Defense Fund, Southern California 
                                            
162 VCS declaration to the case 
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Edison, PG&E, San Diego Gas & Electric, World Oil Corp., Southern California Gas 
Company, CE2 CarbonCapital, NRG Energy, Carbon Offset Providers Coalition, and the 
International Emissions Trading Association. The Nature Conservancy, which played a 
major role in drafting the Urban Forest Protocol, filed an amicus brief with the Court. 
 These two steps of judicial review are illustrative of carbon authority because they 
represent two moments where new forms of legitimacy and credibility for defining and 
addressing global problems were secured. Contra the Petitioners’ argument, and as 
determined by the Court, the Board had not expanded its interpretive authority outside 
that delegated by the Legislature. Rather, per Carlson’s proposition about the mutual 
reinforcement of environmental leadership and regulatory capacity, the actions of the 
Legislature and Court served to expand the interpretive authority of the Board. 
 In regard to legitimacy, Judge Goldsmith said that the ARB had “vast discretion” 
under the Act “to promulgate any type of GHG reduction measure”. The Act included 
nine, potentially contradictory statutory guidelines, which permitted but did not require 
market-based approaches.163 The Board was tasked with interpreting, choosing, and 
balancing among these approaches. The comprehensive mandate to regulate emissions 
statewide not only recognized but also expanded the Board’s authority by substantially 
increasing its reach beyond its usual purview of mobile sources to stationary sources as 
well. Moreover, the Legislature sought to empower the Board to address explicitly global 
                                            
163 The guidelines are to attempt to: minimize costs, maximize benefits to California, 
encourage early actions to mitigate GHG emissions, avoid disproportionate impacts on 
low-income communities, award early voluntary reductions with appropriate credit, 
complement existing state and federal standards, consider cost-effectiveness, consider 
over all benefits, minimize administrative burdens from implementation and compliance, 
minimize leakage, and consider the significance of contributions to statewide GHG 
emissions from each source or category of sources. 
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issues—dubbing the legislation the Global Warming Solutions Act. The Court took this 
intent into account in determining the extent of Board’s mandate, quoting the Act as an 
effort to leverage California’s position as “a national and international leader on energy 
conservation and environmental stewardship efforts [to place itself] at the forefront of 
national and international efforts to reduce emissions of greenhouse gas.” Judge 
Goldsmith assumed this stance himself, smoothly parlaying California’s reputation as a 
national environmental leader into a “global leadership role to encourage other states, the 
federal government, and other countries” to take climate action. Thus, the Court and 
Legislature joined the Executive to define California as not just an environmental leader 
but an explicitly global one, and further harnessed that moral global authority as a reason 
for other sub-national and central governments to follow, even those of the United States 
itself. 
 In terms of credibility, the Court’s decision invoked “the science behind 
additionality” to counter the Petition, in what very likely was the first time that 
expression found its way into California legal writing and probably legal writing of any 
kind. The phrase has since reappeared in several commentaries on the decision, including 
one describing it as “interesting outcome” and “certainly one that will add to the ARB’s 
momentum in getting cap-and-trade successfully off the ground”.164 Another noted the 
                                            
164 http://legal-planet.org/2013/01/28/california-cap-and-trade-offsets-challenge-rejected/. 
Also see, for example: http://www.swlaw.com/blog/california-land-use-
developments/2013/06/20/california-scores-another-cap-and-trade-victory/ 
 
https://law.ucdavis.edu/centers/environmental/files/Recommendations-for-a-National-
Cap-and-Trade-System.pdf 
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34-page decision as presenting an “unusually detailed analysis of California law 
governing judicial review of agency action.”165 
Neither litigants nor observers have closely reflected, however, on why the case 
merited such a detailed review or the implications of that review for scientific claims-
making about additionality in carbon markets more generally. The Petitioner’s preference 
for de novo review, and the Respondent’s for an arbitrary and capricious one, indicate 
that each saw an advantage for the Petition in an independent judicial review because of 
the high degree of deference that would be given to the Board on technical matters. 
Furthermore, the Petitioners suggested but did not develop the argument that the agency 
exceeded its authority by acting outside its area of expertise, indicating that they correctly 
anticipated the deference of the Court to the Board’s competence and experience, and 
planned their case accordingly. 
 The case is instructive for what it says about the questions that were not raised, 
and hence the assumptions made, regarding the ARB’s own delegation of expertise to 
private actors. The simple answer is that the prior rulemaking process and public 
comment period were determined to be the appropriate step for dissenting groups to 
register other input into the advisory process. This, in fact, was the issue in Irritated 
Residents et al. vs. California Air Resources Board, in which Judge Goldsmith agreed 
with the allegation that the ARB had not conducted a sufficient analysis of alternatives to 
cap-and-trade in its preparations for implementing AB 32. 
 The difference between Citizens Climate Lobby and Irritated Residents is telling 
because in the latter case environmental justice groups succeeded in forcing the Board to 
                                            
165 http://www.swlaw.com/blog/california-land-use-developments/2013/06/20/california-
scores-another-cap-and-trade-victory/ 
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conduct (even if it did not adopt) additional expert analysis on non-market based 
alternatives. By contrast, in the former case, and earlier rulemaking process, 
environmental justice groups fundamentally opposed to market measures had no counter-
expertise to offer within a market logic. They could only deploy negative arguments 
against offsets altogether in the hope of a sympathetic de novo interpretation of the statute 
but lacked positive arguments for how to determine additionality using methods better 
able to deliver the statute’s objectives than the performance standards that the Court 
determined were within the ARB’s legal mandate. Sector-based offsets, for example, 
which the Court briefly mentioned in its opinion, were designed to overcome some 
credibility issues additionality raised in the Petition and could conceivably been argued 
for as a technical improvement over performance-based standards. Indeed, the ARB’s 
based its decision to use a sector-based approach for jurisdictional REDD+ on this very 
logic. 
 The use of alternative market logics was never entertained by the environmental 
justice community, which pulled back from a litigative strategy to redouble efforts to 
sway public opinion and introduce new legislation. I address these strategies in the next 
chapter but reserve the current chapter to elaborate what the case says about the 
authorization of private expertise. To further explore the relationship between private 
expertise, the ARB, and the “science of additionality”, I turn to the ARB’s advisory 
process, with a focus on the networks of transnational expertise championing REDD+ 
offsets in particular. 
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V.2.2. Composition of In-State and Transnational Expert Advice 
The legal case presented above pertained specifically to performance-based standards and 
the ARB’s four domestic Protocols. While the international sector-based offsets from 
REDD+ were not an issue, the Court’s ruling in favor of the ARB and the unsuccessful 
appeal that followed only served to shore up the agency’s expert authority to interpret and 
implementation offsets of whatever suit it saw fit. Yet, the passage of REDD+ regulations 
would have to proceed through further rulemaking, which might open additional judicial, 
administrative, or executive challenges to the ARB’s expert authority in this domain. To 
explore where such controversies might emerge, here I contrast the procurement of 
expertise for in-state and domestic measures in AB32 with that of transnational expertise 
solicited for the REDD+ through the ROW. I base the analysis on the three qualities 
mentioned above, which Ann Carlson (2014) tentatively attributes to the ARB’s 
substantial regulatory capacity: agency structure, revenue, and history. 
 The ARB convened five committees to provide the Board with advice, 
information, advice, comments, and recommendations for matters related to climate 
change166. Legislation for AB32 called the ARB to convene two of these—an 
Environmental Justice Advisory Committee (EJAC) and Economic and Technology 
Advancement Advisory Committee (ETAAC). Separate legislation created the third, and 
the ARB convened the remaining two to address specific subject areas, one of which was 
on market mechanisms at the request of the Governor. The ROW, by contrast, was 
mandated by the non-legally binding MOU signed by the governors of California, 
Chiapas, and Acre, and carried no such status under the law or direct ties to the ARB. 
                                            
166 http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/committees/committees.htm 
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 The distinction between the independent ROW, created by a transnational 
executive agreement, and the other committees, established by state law, executive 
direction, or regulatory discretion, is significant, in part, because of the committees’ 
selection process and composition. The ARB directly oversaw the selection of in-state 
advisers, often to meet specific requirements imposed by the legislature. These 
differences were present across all the in-state committees but most acute with the 
environmental justice advisory committee. AB32, for example, states that the EJAC: 
 
shall be comprised of representatives from communities in the state with the most 
significant exposure to air pollution, including, but not limited to, communities 
with minority populations or low-income populations, or both…..The state board 
shall appoint the advisory committee members from nominations receive from 
environmental justice organizations and community groups.167  
 
The composition of ROW stipulated in the MOU was less specific, and, in contrast to the 
in-state committees, did not guarantee a selection process accountable to marginalized 
groups: 
 
This group will weigh the legal, technical and economic considerations in 
developing sector-based credits generated by the Parties….This group should 
include no more than 15 representatives with experience developing sector-based 
REDD programs or directly involved with the states supplying the credits. 
                                            
167 AB32. fSection 38590. Available at: http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/05-
06/bill/asm/ab_0001-0050/ab_32_bill_20060927_chaptered.pdf 
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While the MOU also allowed for representatives “from the California state government”, 
no government members joined the voluntary board itself, though it did seat 
representation from the ARB’s close affiliate, CAR, and government observers from 
California’s ARB, Chiapas’ Secretary for Environment, Housing, and Natural History 
(SEMAHN), and Acre’s Institute of Climate Change and Regulation of Environmental 
Services.168 
 Brunello headed the ROW as its chief Facilitator and Executive Director, a choice 
based on his experience in the design on California’s climate and energy policy, and 
extensive ties in the private sector and policy worlds both in-state, in D.C., and overseas. 
Brunello, a Partner in the public strategies firm California Strategies LLC, had served 
                                            
168 The composition of the ROW deviates slightly from the text of the MOU, for instance, 
in the lack of a “national representative from the selected states”. Neither are the precise 
roles defined for the members. It is unclear, for instance, which member is the “one” 
“expert advisor” “on the social dimension of greenhouse gas mitigation.” See Article 3 of 
the MOU: 
 
ARTICLE 3 
In furtherance of the priorities referenced in Article 2, the Parties will develop the 
following method of cooperation, among others: a. The states will develop a Sub-national 
REDD Working Group that will convene monthly between December 2010 through 
October 2011 to begin the process for developing a state to state sectoral REDD linkage 
recommendation that will provide the foundation for an eventual submittal to the 
California Air Resources Board, as defined in California’s cap and trade program (CCR, 
Title 17, Sections 95991-95997) and to other necessary state entities to approve such a 
recommendation amongst the Parties. This group will weigh the legal, technical and 
economic considerations in developing sector-based credits generated by the Parties. This 
group should include no more than 15 representatives with experience developing sector-
based REDD programs or directly involved with the states supplying the credits, or from 
the California state government. The process should be led by a facilitator to ensure the 
group focuses on meeting the needs of ARB in their existing cap and trade regulations. 
Membership should be limited to a small number of representatives of each Party, a 
national representative from the selected states;, a limited number of NGO 
representatives and expert advisors including one on the social dimension of greenhouse 
gas mitigation, but no more than 2 project based standard organization representatives, 
and a facilitator. b. Other methods developed between the Parties. 
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under Governor Schwarzenegger as the California Natural Resources Agency’s Deputy 
Secretary for Energy and Climate Change, where he established the Governors Climate 
and Forests Task Force (GCF) in 2008. Other members of the 11 member advisory 
committee include representatives from California’s Climate Action Reserve (CAR), 
academics specialist in earth system science and environmental policy, and individuals 
from the Ford Foundation and three large conservation organizations, The Nature 
Conservancy, Environmental Defense Fund, and Conservation International (also see 
Chapter 4).169 
 The ROW also differed from the in-state committees in terms of funding. AB32 
states that the Board “shall provide reasonable per diem for attendance at advisory 
committee meetings by advisory committee members from nonprofit organizations.” The 
ROW, on the other hand, was independent of any state agency or state funding. Members 
volunteered their time, but the group received funding from its meetings and other 
                                            
169 ROW Participants: 
 
» Daniel Nepstad, International Program Director, Amazon Institute of Environmental 
Research 
» Derik Broekhoff, Vice President for Policy, Climate Action Reserve 
» Greg P. Asner, Professor of Geological and Environmental Sciences, Stanford 
University; Scientist at Carnegie Institution’s Department of Global Ecology 
» Ludovino Lopes, Consultant to the Secretary of Environment for the State of Acre in 
Brazil 
» Michelle Passero, Senior Climate Policy Advisor, The Nature Conservancy 
» Peter Riggs, Independent Consultant, formerly of Ford Foundation 
» Rosa Maria Vidal, Director, Pronatura Sur, Chiapas, Mexico 
» Steve Schwartzman, Director for Tropical Forest Policy, 
Environmental Defense Fund 
» Toby Janson-Smith, Senior Director of Forest Carbon Markets, Conservation 
International 
» Tony Brunello (Facilitator), Green Technology Leadership Group 
» William Boyd, Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School, 
Colorado; Senior Advisor and Project Lead: Governors’ Climate and Forests Task Force 
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activities from two private donors that also supported the GCF—The Gordon and Betty 
Moore Foundation and ClimateWorks under the Climate and Land Use Alliance. 
Administrative support came from the Greentech Leadership Group, a Sacramento based 
501(c)(3) organization with a mission to bring together California policymakers and 
clean technology innovators by fostering dialogue, providing education, and supporting 
economic development. Brunello was the Group’s Executive Director. 
 Finally, the ARB’s ability to provide financial support and requirement to solicit 
experts taken to be representative of a cross-section of society, including environmental 
justice groups, is an historical legacy, emerging over decades of interaction between the 
ARB and the Legislature. By 2013, the Board had a highly-competent and well-
compensated staff numbering nearly 1300. The Board’s ability to retain and even 
increase its staff during budget crises is made possible because it self-funds through the 
fees it collects from regulated entities—a capability conferring financial independence 
from the legislature and impeding capture by regulated entities (Carlson 2014). The 
transnational advisory structure of the ROW affords no such historical public capability, 
instead outsourcing expert authority to resourceful and well-connected private actors. 
 Thus, the ARB relied on two distinct advisory processes for offsets originating in 
the US, on the one hand, and international REDD+ offsets, on the other. Critics leveled 
similar attacks at both, especially over the veracity of claims to additionality and the 
effects of the signal California was sending by suggesting it might offer financial 
compensation to voluntary early action offsets. Yet, the ARB successfully secured 
authority for the former, through its discretion backed up by the Court, but stayed arms 
length from the latter, surely in part because of the hackles raised around Sabines’ 
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REDD+ project in Chiapas. One might argue that the ARB did not solicit a different 
advisory process for REDD+ so much as preliminary recommendations that would enter 
a legally sanctioned advisory process in California should the Board opt to move forward 
with international offsets. But such a view skirts around the reality that soliciting experts 
who are also practitioners to advise even a preliminary recommendations can exert 
something of a ‘reverse early actor’ effect, where well-networked private actors stand not 
simply as neutral observers but orchestrators of government policy towards a certain 
interpretation of policy goals. 
 That the different paths taken by domestic and international offsets might have 
something to do with the incorporation of private expertise through a legally sanctioned 
advisory process for domestic offsets for one, and an ad hoc working group for 
international offsets, has gone largely unrecognized. Calling attention to these 
arrangements makes it possible to see transnational private expert networks as active 
players orchestrating market-making between governments that lack the resources, 
expertise, or perhaps interest in taking on those responsibilities themselves. In this light, 
California did not simply ‘send a signal’ to Chiapas so much as cede certain 
responsibilities for the design of the program in exchange for access to nascent markets 
and the regulatory and legal sanction of private forms of carbon authority. 
 Few benefits come without a cost, however. To observe the unanticipated 
consequences of such ad hoc arrangements, one must only turn to the heated and starkly 
divided public comments the ROW received after over two years of uncontroversial 
internal deliberations on how to introduce REDD+ credits into California’s cap-and-trade 
program. In the next section, I discuss how the unanticipated blowback from the PACT 
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relates to the authorization of new forms of transnational private authority for designing 
and implementing a common carbon market between California and Chiapas, an 
arrangement that contributed to an outcome that benefited neither. 
 
VI. Discussion and Conclusion: Orchestrating Expertise for Public or Private 
Interest? 
The cases in this chapter have shown why the idea that the Government of California was 
sending a signal to which the Government of Chiapas responded through a problematic 
REDD+ strategy is inadequate to explain decision-making and knowledge-production 
processes linking the two states to each other and the much wider net of public and 
private actors vying to shape REDD+. I have presented the notion of carbon authority to 
describe these decentralized processes, highlighting key points where private 
organizations have gained formal and informal authority in Chiapas and California, 
which conferred certain influential transnational actors the status of de facto private 
experts tasked with coordinating standards, registries, agenda-setting and other key 
elements for governments proposing to build a REDD+ market. The resources and 
flexibility of these private groups helped to establish them as critical intermediaries 
between the two states, through strategies tailored to two very different socio-political 
situations. 
 In Chiapas, Conservation International, The Nature Conservancy, and 
Environmental Defense were especially active, joining local and national NGOs to 
become essential advisers to the state, crafting technical documents and other key 
elements of the Chiapas’ Climate Change Action Program. The officials, in turn, raised 
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the profile of these globally reputable environmental groups to demonstrate the 
credibility of its REDD+ efforts to California and international audiences. The strategy 
also aimed to set Chiapas apart as a REDD+ leader within Mexico, but a combination of 
the PACT’s running aground on long-standing land conflicts and competition with the 
Mexico’s National Forestry Commissions’ own plans for REDD+ and other conservation 
initiatives in the Lacandon proved insurmountable. Sabines’ efforts to gain independent 
sub-national authority gave way, and incoming Governor Velasco re-aligned the state’s 
REDD+ efforts with national ones, to the satisfaction of the conservation groups advising 
the state, which found the tarred PACT to be a liability to their broader REDD+ efforts, 
and which better leveraged their existing position in Mexico’s national-level REDD+ 
strategy. 
 In California, by contrast, regulators not only secured significant legal authority 
but also expanded that authority from the regulation of in-state air pollution from mobile 
sources to global greenhouse gas emissions across all sectors. And, unlike in Chiapas, 
government officials had no need to draw attention to outside expertise to authorize the 
carbon market. Indeed, doing so might itself have been perceived as a liability, for the 
Legislature and Executive, backed by the Courts, delegated substantial discretionary 
authority to the California Air Resources Board to see through the state’s increasingly 
ambitious environmental agenda. With AB32, that agenda reached global proportions, 
relying on many of the same transnational groups that advised Chiapas to draft provisions 
for the California carbon market. In regard to REDD+ offsets specifically, these advisers 
carried no legal status, offering only informal recommendations mandated in the ROW 
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by the MOU signed by Governors Schwarzenegger and Sabines, with funding support 
from private foundations. 
 This multi-sited account of carbon authority reveals a complex and shifting 
mosaic, where public officials in California and Chiapas heavily relied on private 
expertise to coordinate market-making across transnational, sub-national borders. The 
lack of a single sovereign to authorize those efforts required the creation of multiple 
interlocking lines of decentralized authority, assembling heterogeneous elements of 
carbon authority through sub-national legislatures, regulators, courts, and executive 
decree. While California succeeded in securing carbon authority inside and outside the 
state, Chiapas achieved neither. The partial authorizations that resulted advanced the 
aspirations of neither (at least in the short-term) policy-makers in Chiapas nor California. 
This failure to reach a stable arrangement begs the question: Who is responsible for the 
impasse?  
 To frame the responsibility as falling on governments alone—as pro- and anti-
REDD+ camps typically do—overlooks the discretion private actors exercised as 
authoritative experts. These groups did not simply transmit a signal from one jurisdiction 
to the next as neutral intermediaries but actively interpreted California’s proposal for 
jurisdictional REDD+ in a relatively narrow way that stressed the incentivization of local 
actors through payments for environmental services over alternative state-wide strategies 
to curb deforestation. As described in Chapter 4, the choice to emphasize local projects 
did not exhaust the possibilities for ROW’s policy options for reducing forest carbon and 
calculating and allocating carbon offsets—it represented one possible way to configure 
risk, scale, and finance for carbon territory. 
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 That does not mean transnational private experts opposed jurisdiction-wide 
approaches. But they did relatively little to advance technical or financial options for 
facilitating large-scale reductions in deforestation. Rather, they interpreted jurisdictional 
REDD+ as foremost an accounting architecture that would facilitate market-innovation 
through early action projects, without devoting much attention to how scattered local 
projects would scale up into either significant carbon savings or a comprehensive state-
wide REDD+ infrastructure. As Antonioli indicated, the priority of VCS’s accounting 
approach for Jurisdictional and Nested REDD+ (JNR) (Chapter 4) was more on the “N” 
and less on the “J”: 
 
There are a number of challenges that we are seeing with respect to measuring 
carbon. The underlying frameworks are already very well established. Right now 
there is a lot of effort being placed on developing what we call the new crediting 
mechanisms of the future, which may be more streamlined approaches for 
assessing whether projects are legitimate and can be brought forward and 
registered and the credit issuance process. And there is also a lot of interest in 
terms of REDD+ projects, and forestry level projects, for them to be done at the 
jurisdictional level. So we’re busy drafting new requirements that will allow those 
projects to nest and to fit within broader jurisdictional frameworks.170 [Emphasis 
added] 
 
                                            
170 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tz7G6_cw84o 
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By orchestrating market-making between California and Chiapas, conservation groups 
and carbon market entrepreneurs that had cut their teeth on projects in the voluntary 
market thus transformed the ‘government risk’ posed by nested and jurisdictional 
REDD+ (Chapter 3) into a strategic asset, where governments—in exchange for access to 
the extensive epistemic and institutional resources held by private groups—authorized 
private experts to build a carbon market safe for risky early action projects, venture 
capital, and the significant organizational resources expended in bringing the two 
together. 
 It is not clear that this project-first model favored by private actors was in the 
public interest. As discussed in the previous chapter, regulators in the ARB and certain 
ROW members saw value in the jurisdictional approach’s alternative configuration of 
risk, scale, and finance for its potential to reduce uncertainties over the mitigation of 
carbon emissions by measuring them at a large scale, thereby stemming the regulatory 
risk of issuing carbon offsets for ‘hot air.’ 
 The influence of private groups abdicates neither California nor Chiapas of 
responsibility for market-making, but it does suggest that they may have too eagerly 
ceded authority to private experts to coordinate the market infrastructure in and between 
the two states. The emphasis on early action projects promoted by project proponents in 
California and international REDD+ negotiations must be at least partly responsible for 
Sabines’ decision to move forward with his controversial project in the Lacandon. The 
experience of the PACT suggests that socially divisive projects present a ‘private risk’ to 
governments, mirroring the ‘government risk’ to private actors. The PACT undercut 
carbon authority not only because it lacked the rigorous MRV requirements supposed for 
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a compliance-grade REDD+ project. More critically, it exposed a quagmire of social 
tensions that caught all parties by surprise—and which Sabines sought to quiet, the ARB 
failed to anticipate, and the ROW opted to place outside its purview. 
 Responsibility and authority for navigating these social problems fell to no one. 
Before addressing carbon responsibility in the Conclusion, it is therefore imperative to 
consider the construction of not only technical and political capabilities for carbon 
territory and carbon authority but also normative capabilities for carbon rights. This is the 
task of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CARBON RIGHTS: REMAKING PROPERTY AND COMMUNITY 
I. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to bring civil and political rights into methodological, 
theoretical, practical, and ethical conversation with property rights, territory, and 
authority. Taken together, the theses of Chapters 4 and 5 yield a syllogism: If techniques 
for calculating carbon territory define the entities that can be traded as property, and 
carbon authority shapes the selection of techniques, then carbon authority also confers the 
de facto power to shape what counts as property.171 
 This syllogism would be a truism but for two constitutional implications 
stemming from the ontological indeterminacy of carbon credits. First, as we have seen in 
Chapters 2, 3, and 4, carbon accounting imports political-economic questions into market 
design (i.e. the definition of economically-valuable land), notably by shaping public and 
private domains through configurations of risk, scale, and finance. Second, as discussed 
in Chapter 4, the decision to wed carbon value to political territory through jurisdictional 
REDD+ adds to these political-economic questions about land political-strategic ones 
about terrain (i.e. the production of state power over a given space and the subjects within 
it). 
 The task of this chapter is to extend this syllogism to its corollary: If property 
rights and civil and political rights are inseparable (Jasanoff 2011), then carbon authority 
                                            
171 By civil and political rights, I refer to that class of universal and inalienable human 
rights which guarantee individual freedom and liberty. They include rights such as, the 
right to life; the right not to be tortured, enslavement, or coerced labor; freedom of 
speech; and the right to participate in the decisions of a political community. In 
international law, civil and political rights are enshrined in documents such as the UN 
Declaration on Human Rights and UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
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carries de facto constitutional significance for matters normally thought outside the 
market, such as the obligations of the state to its citizens, the channels individuals and 
communities can use to exercise those claims, and the identity they must have to do so. 
 I use the words ‘shape’ (in place of stronger words like ‘cause’, ‘explain’, or 
‘determine’) to describe the dependence of rights on territory and authority, for while the 
categories are laid out somewhat formally above, they are not determined in a linear or 
straightforward way. Indeed, this chapter, like those before it, presents detailed, empirical 
case studies to unpack the plurality, fragmentation, and contingency of these categories in 
practice. 
 The idea of carbon rights is relatively new and not terribly well defined. Usually it 
is used to refer to the property rights held over carbon credits. This aspect of the term I 
address in Chapters 2, 3, and 4, which discuss the relationship between techniques for 
measuring forest carbon and the allocation and ownership of credits. Here I treat carbon 
rights in a related but more expansive sense, as not simply the explicit property rights but 
also the implicit civil and political rights that emerge in the definition and negotiation of 
this new asset class. 
 To introduce the complexities in play, the next section develops the concept of 
carbon rights, in both its property and civil and political dimensions, which I define as 
complex category (i.e. composed of heterogeneous elements dispersed across multiple 
sites) similar to carbon authority discussed in Chapter 5. This section goes on to offer a 
brief vignette of claims-making made by indigenous and environmental justice groups in 
the wake of the release of the REDD+ Offset Working Group’s (ROW) 
recommendations, followed by a discussion showing how the concepts of reflexive 
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modernization and risk rationalities can be used to make sense of the illegibility of and 
response to their claims. 
 Section III uses risk rationalities to help understand transformations in rights-
making and global governance in the decades after World War II. It then discusses how 
the term can help theorize carbon markets in terms of rationalities of risk. 
 Section IV then develops a framework to analyze carbon markets and rights-
making, which I apply to four empirical cases in section V. Section IV introduces the 
concept of technologies of distance, which is related to the concept of risk rationalities 
and also be seen as capabilities or techniques of globalization. I employ the concept to 
think about the co-production of property rights and civil and political rights. 
 Section V presents four cases of rights-making: mapping the Lacandon rainforest, 
legislation to restrict offsets in California, design options for a grievance mechanism, and 
the formatting of the ideal stakeholder in REDD+ capacity building strategies. As in 
Chapter 5, the case material in this chapter comes from multiple sites of controversy over 
how to design a REDD+ architecture in California and Chiapas, which demonstrate: 1) 
how extant in-state capabilities are deployed to legitimize and adjudicate disputes over 
distributive justice between citizens and the state, and 2) how emergent transnational 
capabilities to administer procedural justice claims are being designed and implemented, 
in order to enable the flow of property (i.e. carbon credits) between states. 
 The discussion and conclusion respond to STS scholarship that underestimates the 
challenge of making markets across jurisdictions. A necessary response is to re-theorize 
the green economy in terms of the green political economy. 
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II. Theorizing Carbon Rights 
The three parts of this section: develops the idea of carbon rights and why it calls for 
better theoretical, methodological, practical, and ethical approaches; discusses illegibility 
and kickback resulting from an overly narrow discussion about rights; and suggests that 
illegibility can be understood in terms of rights, risk, and reflexive modernization. 
 
II.1. Ownership Rights and Emissions Trading (+) 
Carbon property rights define the nature of the thing that is owned, who may own it, and 
the benefits that can be derived from it. They are a property right that confers “the claim 
to a benefit stream that the state will agree to protect through the assignment of duties to 
others who may covet or somehow interfere with this benefit” (Bromley 1991). When 
those benefits are derived from a carbon market (as opposed to, say, a performance-based 
fund), carbon rights impart no value as a transferable economic asset unless accompanied 
by other rights to engage in emissions trading. Whether defined as a publicly-owned 
commodity or private property, carbon rights in the carbon market, at minimum, format: 
1) the ontological status of this thing called a carbon credit, 2) the identity of buyers and 
sellers, and 3) the practices through which buyers and sellers transact credits. 
 No universal definition of these three items exists. Government legislation and 
regulation and/or contracts may differentiate between the carbon itself (sequestered 
carbon), the trees or other biomass that stores the carbon (carbon sinks), and the potential 
of land to store carbon, for example, by managing the land to reduce deforestation 
(carbon storage potential) (Peskett & Brodnig 2011). Ownership can be either simple, by 
being tied to property rights over an existing resource (typically land), or usufruct, by 
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dissociating the rights to use a resource from the physical ownership of it. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, derivative rights related to emissions trading are immaterial in a purely 
national-level (or jurisdictional) approach—the government is the sole owner, buyer, and 
seller of credits, though may translate profits into benefits for local communities or other 
non-state actors in a manner determined through domestic policies or negotiations. 
Nested or project-based versions of REDD+, however, greatly complicate the 
interpretation of carbon rights because local communities, project developers, or other 
non-state actors can be designated as active market participants, which entails the 
creation of sub-national MRV systems, standards, reference levels, registries, safeguards, 
and a raft of additional technical, legal, and institutional mechanisms (Powell et al. 2002), 
the implications of which I will further detail in the coming sections. 
 It is extremely unlikely that a single set of rules defining carbon ownership and 
emissions trading rights will ever exist. A more likely scenario, borne out by the course 
of events in California, Chiapas and fellow GCF members, is the incremental stitching 
together of smaller markets through some mixture of consolidation and mutual 
accommodation mediated by non-state actors. A shift in emphasis from rights-making as 
something that takes place under the discretion of sovereign state authority to something 
assembled in tandem with the distributed making of in-state and private transnational 
forms of carbon authority presented in last chapter carries significant methodological, 
theoretical, and practical and ethical implications. 
 Methodologically, the study of distributed carbon rights calls for a multi-sited 
approach to look at how rules for owning and trading carbon are negotiated in, and 
harmonized among, fragmented, plural legal and institutional settings, levels of 
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governance, and state and non-state actors. Scholarship and high-level policy too often 
treat REDD+ rulemaking in a siloed manner, attending to how emissions trading rules are 
determined through existing international treaties and legal norms, international 
agreement on REDD+ safeguards, international and domestic carbon trading rules in 
buyer countries, or national rules and regulations in seller countries (Peskett and Brodnig 
2011)—but seldom considering how transnational networks of state and non-state actors 
produce, and are produced by, the interaction of such factors. 
 Theoretically, it demands a more encompassing perspective, which understands 
carbon rights as something that cannot be understood in isolation from broader social, 
technical, and political dynamics. This means more than a simple appreciation that the 
rules for owning and trading forest carbon carry wider implications for land tenure, or 
that they require sophisticated technical expertise—though both certainly ring true. 
Rather, it demands an account of how the specific legal and technical ideas and 
practices—that translate ‘forests’ into ‘forest carbon’ and ‘forest carbon’ into an entity 
that can be owned and traded—shape and are shaped by basic normative and 
constitutional questions, such as the justification of state authority to enforce contracts, 
the balance between individual liberties and the collective good, and even fundamental 
distinctions between humans and the natural world. 
 Practically and ethically, it challenges granted assumptions about what is at stake 
in REDD+ and the Green Economy and, hence, problematizes the routines of 
participation, engagement, consultation, representation, deliberation, and so forth 
intended to ensure their efficacy and legitimacy. Carbon markets are particularly telling 
in this regard. At the level of international negotiations, they seek to transform the 
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original interpretation of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ inaugurated in Rio, 
in which the countries of the Global North pledged to reduce emissions in recognition of 
their historical responsibility for instigating the climate crisis, and the concomitant right 
for the countries of the Global South to likewise lift themselves from poverty to 
prosperity. The Green Economy and its recreation of post-Kyoto carbon markets through 
REDD+, by contrast, aims to transform past geopolitical settlements into the win-win 
utilitarian logic of the market, where responsibility is cast not as an inalienable 
categorical imperative but as a fungible commodity to be bought and sold in pursuit of 
minimal individual costs and maximal global good.  
 At the level of local capacity building, design, and implementation, a multi-sited 
take on carbon rights calls attention to the connection of practical and ethical problems 
with technical efforts to measure and account for carbon on a separate track from benefit-
sharing and legal and institutional reform. According to the Center for International 
Forestry Research (CIFOR), “clarity over tenure and resource rights in tandem with the 
carbon asset is critical to prevent disruptive conflicts between competing stakeholders 
within REDD+ countries” (Loft et al. 2015). Although I do not take the position that 
conflicts must necessarily be avoided, I do agree that carbon rights must be considered in 
tandem with existing tenure and resources rights, as well as civil and political rights, with 
the additional qualification that such considerations must also extend to include multiple 
sites, scales, and private and public actors. 
 In most REDD+ countries, carbon rights, which can be created through new 
legislation or interpreted through existing legislation, remain in a state of legal ambiguity. 
Meanwhile, measurement and accounting systems are moving forward, amid a lack of 
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clarity on ownership, emissions, and tenure rights. This becomes an issue because, as 
discussed in the previous chapters, the scale these systems are designed for also entails 
whom they are for. 
 These problems are of special concern to forest-dependent poor and marginalized 
groups, who stand to gain or lose the most. A long-running debate has revolved around 
whether land and governance reforms, such as enabling the poor to access the legal 
system or granting title to the landless, should be a pre-condition or outcome of 
performance-based payments for REDD+. Some argue that fair and equitable REDD+ is 
impossible unless the rights and interests of the poor are first secured because corrupt 
governments or well-moneyed corporations will have an incentive to dispossess the poor 
in pursuit of a newly valuable asset. Others say that with proper oversight, REDD+ can 
be vehicle for empowering local and indigenous people by helping them to secure title to 
their land and empowering them to become carbon proprietors in their own right. These 
are but two generalizations in an immensely complicated and situation-specific debate 
that I can only point to here.  
 This is not a problem that cannot be satisfactorily resolved in the abstract. To do 
so empirically, I argue, requires a different theoretical and methodological approach to 
understanding how carbon rights are created, distributed, and harmonized in the 
authorization and production of carbon territory. In the following section, I offer an 
example of how unforeseen conflicts arose over expert recommendations for California’s 
REDD+ proposal, in large part because of too-narrow starting assumptions about what 
carbon rights entail. I then present an alternative way of approaching the problem through 
the concepts of reflexive modernization and risk rationalities, before offering four 
277 
illustrations of how this theorization can help us think through carbon rights in and 
between California and Chiapas. 
 
II.2. The Regulator’s Dilemma: Rights and Rights-claimers Made Present but Illegible 
An example of how the unexpected eruption of rights-claims can unsettle a presumably 
legitimate and well-thought process comes from the experience of the REDD+ Offset 
Working Group (ROW). The ROW released its draft recommendations in February 2013. 
Over the next several months, the group solicited public responses to its draft 
recommendations, 172 holding a five-month comment period and three open workshops at 
major universities in California.173 What the ROW heard in response expressed a depth of 
skepticism and division unheard amid the near unanimous support voiced to the ARB 
when it first convened a public workshop on REDD+ in July 2010 (Leuders et al. 2014). 
 While groups like TNC and EDF reiterated stalwart support for the proposal in 
2013, a wave of newfound opposition swept forward from human rights, conservationists, 
and environmental justice groups. To complicate matters, California business groups and 
political parties were themselves divided, further blurring conventional lines between 
local and global, conservative and progressive, domestic and foreign. 
 The most ardent of these wrote to “join its voice to the international outcry against 
the inclusion of REDD in the State of California’s Global Warming Solutions Act”, 
                                            
172 ‘Public Comments’, accessed September 2013 on Greentech Leadership Group 
website: http://greentechleadership.org/programs/redd-offset-working-group/public-
comments 
173 ROW convened three public workshops in California on monitoring, verification, and 
reporting at Stanford University on 5 February; safeguards at the University of 
California, Davis on 26 March; and legal and institutional issues on international linkage 
at University of California at Los Angeles on 5 April. 
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denouncing carbon trading and the green economy “as a thinly-veiled, wicked, colonialist 
planet grab.”174 Others attempted to offer constructive criticism, citing both in and 
beyond Chiapas a history of human rights abuses, vexed payment for ecosystem service 
projects, and concerns over technical uncertainties and enforcement. Altogether roughly 
one-third of the 34 comments staunchly opposed California’s proposal representing about 
three-quarters of the total 200 pages submitted to the ROW. 
 The conflicting claims presented a regulator’s dilemma (Weinberg 1986). Shortly 
after the ROW forwarded its final recommendations to ARB Chair, Mary Nichols, in July 
of that year, Chiapas’ new Governor canceled the PACT. The critical response did not 
kill the proposal, but it did damp the enthusiasm expressed in ARB’s 2009 Preliminary 
Draft Regulations, which had said California was “hoping to design a model international 
offsets program that will pave the way for the post-2012 international climate change 
agreement.”  
 Upon the release of the ROW recommendations, carbon market supporters lauded 
the “blue-chip scientific panel” as offering a “blue print for California REDD”, but even 
                                            
174 Global Alliance of Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities on Climate Change 
against REDD+ and for Life. Signed by: 
Latin America 
Marlon Santi Gualinga (Kichwa) 
Sarayaku, Ecuador 
Asia 
Leonard Imbiri 
General Secretary of Dewan Adat Papua and Executive Director of YADUPA West 
Papua 
Africa 
Nnimmo Bassey 
Alternate Nobel Peace Prize Co-Founder No REDD in Africa Network 
North America 
Tom BK Goldtooth 
Indigenous Environmental Network, Minnesota 
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the most enthusiastic of these supporters came to highlight content ions over indigenous 
rights and other issues.175 If it was a blueprint, it was one that required careful 
accommodations by ARB and its counterparts in Chiapas and Acre. 
 The process did not anticipate the acuteness of the opposition—this despite the 
fact that insiders recognized the critical need to address safeguards and potential negative 
effects on indigenous peoples and rural communities. The ROW dedicated one of three 
public workshops to these issues and gave them extensive coverage in its 
recommendations. Meanwhile, in California, the ARB received concerns from the 
environmental justice groups in its public review process; and in Chiapas, SEMAHN and 
collaborating conservation organizations made safeguards a central issue for the 
Technical Advisory Committee for REDD+. ROW members later reflected that both 
grassroots and business groups should have had an earlier place in the advisory process 
but that the group did its best to take into account dissenting views in the fully open 
public workshops and comment period. 
 A sympathetic observer might explain the oversight by underscoring that the 
ROW’s goal was to provide a general blueprint for designing a REDD+ market for 
general consideration of California, Chiapas, Acre or any entity interested in pursuing 
jurisdictional REDD+, not to offer a political-social diagnostic of the partnership. A 
cynic might attribute the exclusion to willful negligence, pre-determined by the material 
interests in play. 
                                            
175 Ecosystem Marketplace. “Scientific Advisory Panel Offers Blueprint for California 
REDD”. 19 July 2013. available at: 
http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/pages/dynamic/article.page.php?page_id=9846 
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 Neither account, however, adequately explains why the ROW took it upon itself 
to provide general rather than tailored advice, and drafted the specific recommendations 
it did, for the MOU mandating the group stipulates the group only, in the furtherance of 
coordination and collaboration between the Parties, develop recommendations: 
 
to begin the process for developing a state to state sectoral REDD linkage 
recommendation that will provide the foundation for an eventual submittal to the 
California Air Resources Board, as defined in California’s cap and trade program 
(CCR, Title 17, Sections 95991-95997) and to other necessary state entities to 
approve such a recommendation amongst the Parties.176 
 
The outcome was symptomatic of an overall partnership that had failed to make legible 
the concerns of indigenous and environmental justice groups in both California and 
Chiapas—an outcome that proved to be in the interest of neither Party in moving the 
market forward in the near-term, nor the broader ambition to lead by way of example the 
route to a more inclusive and effective version of sub-national jurisdictional REDD+. 
 To account for the illegibility of rights-claims that came late and only partially 
into the view of regulators and expert advisers, I build on Dean Mitchell’s account of 
Ulrich Beck’s sociological notion of the risk society, read through the analytics of 
government. 
 
                                            
176 http://www.gcftaskforce.org/documents/MOU_Acre_California_and_Chiapas.pdf 
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II.3. Rights, Risk, and Reflexive Modernization 
In his 1992 book Risk Society, Beck famously offered the term ‘reflexive modernization’ 
to replace an unhelpful dichotomy between modernity and post-modernity with a 
synthetic account of two phases of `where scientific and technical solutions continually 
fold back to become the problems they were meant to solve. As one consequence, sub-
political disputes appear “outside and beyond the representative institutions of the 
political system of nation-states” (Beck 1996, also see Beck 1999) in expert advisory 
processes like the ROW, threatening to unsettle the authority of previously sacrosanct 
claims to objective scientific knowledge. 
 The history of carbon markets belies such dynamics (MacKenzie 2008). As 
Chapter 2 recounts, each technical proposal leading up to REDD+—avoided 
deforestation projects, national-level compensated reductions, nested accounting, as well 
as the progression from RED to REDD+—was introduced to solve previous technical and 
political obstacles, even while introducing new ones of its own. Perhaps more striking, 
social and environmental safeguards became central to the international REDD+ 
negotiations only after a concerted push by indigenous and social justice groups to 
redress an agenda they felt had become dominated by matters of measurement, 
accounting, and finance. The ROW was fully aware of this shift, writing in its final 
report, “Environmental and social safeguards have moved in recent years from the 
periphery to the center of the debate on REDD+.” 
 The unanticipated grassroots blowback in California and Chiapas despite an 
abstract acknowledgement of explosive social justice issues, and subsequent rearguard 
reaction, is not an aberration but a reproduction of this ongoing reflexive dynamic of 
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reflexive modernization, which continuously renders emergent claims and claims-makers 
present but illegible. 
 One sympathetic submission on the ROW recommendations captured the 
situation so bluntly and clearly I quote it at length: 
 
Although each decision [about how to design jurisdictional REDD+] has pros and 
cons, well-reasoned arguments have been made for each decision point….These 
ROW recommendations represent a logical next step in a progression of policy 
initiatives that have grappled with the problem of attenuating severe forest loss in 
developing tropical countries. For over a decade intense discussions on REDD+ 
have proceeded at the international level, at the technical discussions of voluntary 
standard-setting bodies, at environmental and corporate board meetings, and in 
the meeting houses of local forest stakeholders. In the absence of international 
agreement, it is incumbent on national and sub-national governments to keep 
pushing the envelope and testing different policy approaches from the bottom 
up.177 
 
The statement picks up many of the themes addressed in this dissertation: decision-
making amid sharply divergent values, the reflexive progression of policy, the 
distribution of standard-setting and other technical matters among state and non-state 
actors at multiple levels of governance, and the imperative of policy innovation and sub-
national leadership in the face of intractable global problems. The author characterizes 
                                            
177 Public Comment to the ROW. Andrea Tuttle. Pacific Forest Trust. 7 May 2013. 
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the ensuing regulator’s dilemma as not merely over a complex problem but a wicked one 
(Rittel and Webber 1973), in which values clash and the solution defies any one logic: 
 
Because REDD is complex and crosses social, economic and environmental 
dimensions, there is a vast array of policy choices that can be made, and fierce 
arguments can be mustered for and against any particular combination….It is 
recognized that implementation of this – or any – REDD+ package is not risk-
free. No one has ever done this before, at least in the context of a government-to-
government agreement. [Emphasis added] 
 
The above passages echo the angst of reflexive modernization, where urgent decisions to 
manage risk must be made yet, at the same time, are made impossible by modernity’s 
self-confounding dilemma. Beck, a constructivist on identity, power, and so on, is a 
realist on risk. Nuclear holocaust, global climate change, pervasive and scarcely 
detectable toxins all present material risks generated as byproducts of science and 
technology. In contrast to the insurable hazards of industrial society, the threats of the 
risk society are quintessentially incalculable. 
 At this juncture, Dean’s interpretation of the risk society through the analytics of 
government is illuminating. Here, Dean deviates from the realist view not because he 
denies that risks may be real but because such a view does little more to further our 
understanding of how specific ways of knowing risk, or ‘risk rationalities’, align with 
certain ways of ordering politics and society. To read risk society against risk 
rationalities, Dean draws on historian and philosopher François Ewald’s analysis of 
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insurance practices. In the language I have adopted in this study, insurance is a particular 
capability for calculating risk and brings with it basic constitutional assumptions about 
where risk comes from, whose rights it threatens, who carries responsibility for 
minimizing that threat, and how to formulate a just response when those rights and 
responsibilities are violated. 
 In this sense, social insurance is a mode of calculation—prefigured in accounting 
techniques and corporate charters of early modern maritime expeditions and later refined 
in industrial society—to tame what were previously incalculable hazards in order to make 
new forms of social association and economic activity possible. Risk rationalities are 
therefore a political imaginary of a society forced to confront risks it did not understand 
and a political technology for overcoming the mores of a pre-industrial society where the 
traditional rights and responsibilities of, say, a vassal to his lord or parishioner to the 
Church constrained the depersonalized relationships necessary for a modern economy. 
Risk rationality, according to Dean, is the organizing principle and capability “to render 
what is felt to be incalculable, what is understood to have no price, amenable to 
calculation and monetary compensation” (Dean 2009). Social insurance is thus an 
instance of a general impulse to calculate and manage risk, to which Dean adds other 
rationalities, such as epidemiological risk, case-management risk, and clinical risk. Each 
constitutes a political technology, configuring agency, expertise, and identity in order to 
maximize social solidarity and make modern forms of social life possible that past orders 
would find nonsensical and probably immoral. 
 The passages above likewise reflect a rationality to deal with global 
environmental risks, imploring the ARB to fulfill its duty to organize an imperfect but 
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hopefully better way of doing things, made possible, legible, and legitimate through the 
instrumental rationality of the market. 
 In the case of social insurance, the political technology includes: financial 
techniques to calculate and remunerate risk; a moral sensibility for how individuals can 
conduct themselves responsibly amid the inherent dangers of modern life; and techniques 
for indemnifying damages and administering justice (Dean 2009). Carbon markets offer 
an analogous set of techniques and sensibilities, including: standards and MRV systems 
to account for carbon; rules and regulations to define carbon property rights; a moral 
commitment to voluntary action for the collective good through the market; and liability 
regimes and social and environmental safeguards to protect the contractual rights of 
market participants. Thus the author stresses that: 
 
REDD+ is [not only] crucial to reducing greenhouse gas emissions, but it also 
represents a much larger social commitment to sustain forest ecosystems and the 
people dependent upon them. [Emphasis added] 
 
This she understands to be a collective moral undertaking: 
 
Implementation will demand shared responsibility, discipline, risk-taking, and 
constructive commitment on the part of all parties. Social and environmental 
safeguards must be as stringently monitored as the carbon and benefit sharing 
schemes. Adjustments must be made as lessons are learned, and enforcement 
applied to violators. [Emphasis added] 
286 
Like social insurance, carbon markets are a collective endeavor premised on a 
transformation of both technical practices and moral understandings of the rights and 
responsibilities of citizens vis-à-vis the state and each other. Yet carbon markets also 
carry a quite different set of assumptions and practices, which are characteristically 
global in nature. Just as the rationalities of industrial society served to reform fragmented 
forms of territory, authority, and rights into a sovereign government unified over a 
national people and place, carbon markets potentially signal a contemporary 
transformation of a form of global governance premised on the nation-state to an order 
that, like the clamoring dissent in California and Chiapas, is present but illegible. 
 
III. Putting the Pieces Together: Carbon Rights, Risk Rationalities, and Reflexive 
Modernization 
III.1. Transformations of Rights and Governance 
Fear is a powerful motivator of individual and community action. Quantified as risk, fear 
becomes a means to organize entire societies, turning it into something manageable. At 
this point, it becomes possible to subordinate fear to its opposite: want. By calculating 
risk, rationalities like social insurance encouraged people to engage in pursuits they 
might otherwise avoid, paving the way for more complex forms of social organization 
and the rise of modern liberal democracies. When it comes to global threats like climate 
change, global treaty-based negotiations have not had the parallel effect of forging a 
world government and citizenry. 
 One reason is because people do not fear or want the same things. The fervor 
around REDD+ in California and Chiapas dramatizes the difficulties extant institutions of 
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public representation face in containing transnational disputes. In principle, this is not an 
insurmountable challenge for the imaginary of international security embodied in the 
founding principles of the UN System. Representative institutions, economic prosperity, 
and public mission had delivered national unity from vying principalities and promised to 
achieve a worldwide counterpart through the cooperation and compromise of the Member 
States of the UN.  
 Those principles draw on President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 1941 State of the 
Union speech, in which the wartime leader aspired to a world founded on four freedoms 
for people “everywhere in the world”: 
 
In the future days, which we seek to make secure, we look forward to a world 
founded upon four essential human freedoms. 
 
The first is freedom of speech and expression—everywhere in the world. 
The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his own way—
everywhere in the world. 
 
The third is freedom from want—which, translated into world terms, means 
economic understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime 
life for its inhabitants—everywhere in the world. 
 
The fourth is freedom from fear—which, translated into world terms, means a 
world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough 
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fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical 
aggression against any neighbor—anywhere in the world. 
 
At the UN General Assembly in Paris on 10 December 1948, the four freedoms became 
enshrined in the preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).178 
Fresh with the wounds of the Second World War, the Declaration laments that: 
 
disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which 
have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which 
human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear 
and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people 
 
However, the national representative institutions that were to act as a focal point for 
global government of “the common people” cannot support the weight of an era where an 
uncommon mix of legitimate and capable actors has become greatly diversified and their 
numbers multiplied many-fold. Global political theorists cite a resulting democratic 
deficit (e.g. Keohane 2002), where the contending fears and wants of people never so 
directly brought into contact with each other exceeds the ability of extant institutions to 
register them and the claims they make. 
 Beck associates the democratic deficit facing national and international 
institutions with the yet deeper, structural transformations and forced transnational 
encounters issuing from reflexive modernization. He calls this process 
                                            
178 UDHR. available at: https://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr 
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cosmopolitinization—“-ization” for being part and parcel of the ongoing dynamics of 
globalization and reflexive modernization, which together unweave a world ordered 
around the centripetal logic of the nation-state. Even as these processes have consolidated 
certain decision-making powers vertically at the level of international treaty-making and 
specialized institutions, they have dispersed others horizontally, for example, through 
multinational supply chains and transnational social movements. The lines of authority 
between markets, civil society, and the state are growing murkier and can be understood 
neither in purely vertical or horizontal terms. Older channels for claiming rights are being 
challenged along multiple dimensions: entitlement and status, structure of representation, 
accountability, legitimacy, scales of governance, orders of governance (Swyngedouw 
2005). 
 Nevertheless, the four freedoms live on in the foundational documents for the 
international order of the 21st century. The UN Millennium Declaration179 invokes them, 
as do discussions towards the post-2015 Development Agenda180 that emerged from 
Rio+20. The worlds of 1948 and 2015, however, are far apart. Over the ensuing half-
century, the interplay of reflexive modernization and cosmopolitinization have wrought 
foundational rights and freedoms, and the responsibilities to protect them, to mean 
something quite different today than they were in the immediate wake of the War. 
 New interpretations of rights and freedoms have created additional demands for 
the legitimate exercise of global power. The UDHR stresses that “human rights should be 
protected by the rule of law”, secured through the Member States and their cooperation 
with the UN. In addition to the ‘first- and second-generation’ rights and freedoms 
                                            
179 http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.htm 
180 http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/Think%20Pieces/9_human_rights.pdf 
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invoked in the UDHR, the Millennium Declaration asserts a number of ‘third-generation’ 
ones,181 stating, “We consider certain fundamental values to be essential for international 
relations in the twenty-first century”, including equality, solidarity, tolerance for nature, 
and shared responsibility. Moreover, the Declaration emphasizes cooperation among state 
and non-state actors, resolving “to develop strong partnerships with the private sector and 
with civil society organizations in pursuit of development and poverty eradication.” What 
the Millennium Declaration and its post-2015 successor cannot do alone is translate that 
vision for a world secure in these fundamental rights and freedoms into action. The green 
economy and its tools seek to do just this. 
 
III.2. The Risk Rationality of Carbon Markets 
If carbon markets, REDD+, and the green economy are political world-making 
endeavors, then what is their relationship to cosmopolitinization? Here the concept of risk 
rationalities comes in useful. Dean describes the process of problematization, in which a 
governing rationality like social insurance is a means of “questioning and interrogating 
past, present and potential alternatives and may itself be subject to such questioning and 
interrogating.” Often this happens through the incorporation of rationalities into broader 
governing regimes by way of programs, or “explicit, planned attempts to reform or 
transform regimes of practices by reorienting them to specific ends or investing them 
with particular purposes.”  
                                            
181 Karel Vasak. (1977) ‘Human Rights: A Thirty-Year Struggle: The Sustained Efforts to 
give Force of law to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’, UNESCO Courier 
30:11, Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization. 
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The tie between risk rationalities and the problematization of programs is useful 
for understanding carbon rights for several reasons. First, it calls attention to the 
distinction between jurisdictional REDD+ government programs for the compliance 
market and project-based REDD+ initiatives developed in the voluntary carbon market, 
underscoring the constitutional significance of government programs in the production of 
legitimate public authority and rights-bearing subjects in a given territory. Second, it is a 
way to understand programs to build sub-national carbon markets as problematizing 
national and international programs to govern the global environment, which are 
characterized as both creating a democratic deficit and a tragedy of the global commons 
due to a lack of clear property rights to pollute and market to trade those rights. This 
dovetails with the idea that the emerging capabilities of sub-national governments and 
non-state actors to build territory, authority, and rights come into being by extending and 
reorienting extant international capabilities like REDD+ rulemaking in the UNFCCC. 
Third, it points to the exercise of private entrepreneurial authority, for example, through 
standards and accounting innovations to nest offset projects in jurisdictions, as the 
problematization of the centralization of state decision-making power at any level. 
 In addition to the three points above regarding global environment governance, 
carbon markets problematize the internationalist programs of world government 
embodied in the UDHR and premised on the sovereign rule of the nation-state over its 
territorial subjects. In liberal forms of government, the balance between individual rights 
and the collective good is mediated through national institutions tasked to represent 
society and act on its behalf. Carbon markets, by contrast, can be described as a global 
extension of ‘advanced liberal government’ (Rose 1993, Oels 2005), in which:  
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the social will no longer be inscribed within a centralized and coordinating state; 
it will be reconfigured as a set of constructed markets in service provision and 
expertise, made operable through heterogeneous technologies of agency, and 
rendered calculable by technologies of performance that will govern at a distance 
(Dean 2009). 
 
I use the word ‘extension’ here to emphasize problematization as a process that: 
 
1) Reorients extant programs towards global environmental problems (e.g. passing laws 
like the Global Warming Solutions Act in California or Climate Change Adaptation and 
Mitigation Legislation in Chiapas to incorporate climate change goals into economic 
policy at the state-level); 
 
2) Reaches across multiple levels of governance and kinds of actors (e.g. nesting private 
local REDD+ projects in national and international carbon accounting frameworks); and 
 
3) Relies on developing new and harnessing extant capabilities (i.e. ‘technologies of 
distance’ in the quote above, which parallel the ‘techniques of globalization’ described in 
the introduction to the dissertation) for coordinating property rights or civil and political 
rights in and across political jurisdictions (e.g. devising financial instruments to attract 
private investment for offset projects eligible under international rules sanctioned by the 
Clean Development Mechanism). 
 
293 
In the following section, I elaborate what this means in regard to the risk 
rationalities of carbon markets, and develop an analytical approach for understanding 
their connection to the production of carbon rights, which I then illustrate with four 
examples related to REDD+ in California and Chiapas. 
 
IV. A Framework for Analyzing Carbon Rights and the Transformation of Global 
Governance 
Recalling the introduction to this chapter, my purpose is to bring civil and political rights 
into conversation with property rights, territory, and authority as reconstituted at the sub-
national level through REDD+ and carbon markets. In the introduction I proposed that 
the production of carbon rights, in regard to both property rights and civil and political 
rights, is shaped by the production and authorization of carbon territories. The subsequent 
sections explained that rights-making in carbon markets is a distributed process that must 
be theorized across multiple sites. Before proceeding to explore the production of carbon 
rights in and between California and Chiapas in section IV, I develop an approach to link 
rights-making to the techniques, practices, and rationalities for tying carbon markets to 
political territories. 
 The following sub-sections: 1) apply the concepts of problematization and risk 
rationalities to carbon markets, describing their relevance to the main objectives of this 
chapter, and 2) lay out the subsequent empirical inquiry into rights-making in Chiapas 
and California in terms of transnational and in-state capabilities that enact market 
rationalities through ‘techniques of globalization.’ 
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IV.1. Risk Rationalities and Problematization in Carbon Markets: Key Questions 
Here, I elaborate a methodological approach that draws on the preceding theoretical 
discussion to investigate the relationship between market-making and the reconfiguration 
of territory, authority, and rights. This has three objectives. First, I seek to demonstrate 
the polyvalence of market rationalities to show how carbon rights are a function of 
transnational expertise and authority, coordinated among and worked through specific 
socio-political situations. As shown in the previous chapters, expertise for knowing and 
governing carbon markets can be configured in different ways, towards different ends 
and organizing logics, which means that carbon rights are indeterminate as well. 
 Second, whereas governmentality scholars are concerned with how knowledge to 
calculate risks shape the social order, they do not take the second step to examine how 
that knowledge is produced. To avoid technological determinism courted by such an 
approach, and retain an openness to the polyvalence of risk rationalities, I attend to the 
legal, political, institutional, cultural, and epistemic repertoires that produce and authorize 
expertise in specific sites. 
 Third, I argue that market design has implications for procedural and distributive 
justice but that these issues are usually segregated and made illegible by being treated in 
separate non-technical venues. 
 Fourth, I aim to show that the polyvalence and justice implications of market-
making highlight the importance of designing institutions for expertise and public 
representation in tandem. Addressing the democratic deficit must therefore move past 
sterile, deterministic appeals to market mechanisms or, conversely, against the 
‘neoliberalization of conservation’, in an effort to grasp not only the effects of governing 
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rationalities but also the design processes that steer and select those rationalities towards 
some ends and away from others. 
 In order to advance an analytical approach to address these four objectives (re the 
indeterminacy of market logics, politics of knowledge, justice implications, and 
democratic imperatives for knowledge- and decision-making), I offer four illustrations of 
rights-making in California and Chiapas (Section V). The illustrations represent four key 
moments of market design in the two states.  
 
IV.2. Transnational and In-state Capabilities as Techniques of Globalization 
To organize the inquiry, I do two things. First, I capture a range of sites that must 
stabilize individually and in relation to each other for the market to function. I provide 
two examples (a legislative challenge in California and executive power in Chiapas), 
which center on questions about distributive justice and negotiation of political 
citizenship and the responsibility of the state to its subjects. The two other examples (a 
grievance mechanism and social and environmental safeguards) focus on procedural 
justice, namely the design of administrative mechanisms for giving forest people a voice 
in market design and for legitimizing the market by providing recourse to individuals or 
communities who suffer negative consequences from market-related activities. 
 Second, in order to center the analysis on knowledge-making and rights-making, 
each case explores ‘technologies of distance’ (also see Porter 1995). In governmentality 
studies, technologies of government are a rubric for the various techniques and practices 
used to guide human behavior in accord with a particular governing rationality (e.g. 
statistical tables and methodologies for calculating insurance premiums for different 
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categories of the population). Technologies of distance (Dean 2009) are a subset of these. 
They are used when the governed are spatially or socially removed from the governor. 
Such techniques and practices are prevalent in networked, delegated, or orchestrated 
arrangements. Technologies of distance are also used to encourage separated individuals 
to conduct themselves in a manner that leads to desirable behavior across a population or 
marketplace. 
 Technologies of distance correspond to the ‘techniques of globalization’ 
described in Chapter 1. These include the accounting standards, MRV systems, liability 
protocols and other rules and metrics needed to circulate carbon credits in cross-border 
markets. I use the concept to avoid an a priori distinction between property rights versus 
civil and political rights. This follows STS’s concern with understanding how some 
things come to be defined as ‘natural’ and amenable to scientific study, while others are 
labeled ‘social’ and therefore subject to political judgment. Applied to rights, this calls 
for an approach attuned to the co-production of property rights and civil and political 
rights. 
 The concept helps us think about how different kinds of rights are produced 
together and have consequences that often extend beyond their architects’ intent. It also 
prompts us to consider the opposite case, where the intent is not what it purports to be. 
This, for example, is what environmental justice groups often claim when they say that 
safeguards amount to a ‘box-checking’ exercise to expedite projects without the true 
interests of local communities at heart. We will see other examples of this kind in the 
cases. 
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 Technologies of distance fall into two types—technologies of performance and 
agency. These techniques work together to construct the two distinguishing features of 
carbon territory (Chapter 4): land as a political-economic resource (with implications for 
carbon property) and terrain as a geo-political asset (with implications for civil and 
political rights). 
 Technologies of performance include techniques such as benchmarking, 
assessment and evaluation methods, audit procedures, and other metrics for promoting 
and gauging the behavior of individuals or organizations in line with widespread 
standards. They may also empower central authorities to steer delegated or orchestrated 
relationships, or strengthen the cohesion of a network by disseminating shared 
expectations for how things should be conducted. Technologies of performance seek “to 
penetrate the enclosures of expertise fostered under the welfare state and to subsume the 
substantive domains of expertise to new formal calculative regimes” (Triantafillou 2004).  
 In regard to carbon property rights, technologies of performance are related to 
forest carbon (or carbon sequestration potential) within a delineated land area and 
translate that carbon into a tradable economic asset. They extend along the entire 
production chain, from best practices in project design and implementation to the 
verification and validation of project offsets to the monitoring, reporting, and verification 
systems to carbon accounting standards. Legal and institutional capabilities to make 
contracts for REDD+ projects or to buy and sell carbon credits also fall in this 
category.182 
                                            
182 Triantafillou (2004) distinguishes technologies of performance from: 1) contractual 
technologies and norms, and 2) technologies of accountability (also see Michael Power’s 
(1997) book, The Audit Society). For simplicity’s sake I follow Dean to contract their 
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 Technologies of agency refer to surveys, opinion polls, focus groups, citizen 
panels, health promotion campaigns, community policy, environmental impact 
assessments and other tools to mobilize citizens in decision-making. A critical goal of 
technologies of agency is to fashion individuals who are responsible for his or her 
actions. One way they do this is by facilitating, with or without the involvement of public 
authorities, the formation of “clusters of stakeholders in loose, issue-based networks that 
may cut across national boundaries” (Triantafillou 2004). 
 Technologies of agency play a role in carbon markets by extending an 
institutional space for individuals or local communities to participate in the design, 
implementation, or review of market-related activities. Examples include the inclusion of 
civil society groups in the drafting of REDD+ safeguards or their interpretation is specific 
settings. Technologies of agency also may empower citizens to voice grievances, making 
them a potential resource in the administration of procedural justice. 
 
V. Building Capabilities for Carbon Rights 
This section applies the preceding theoretical and methodological discussion to four cases 
of rights-making in California and Chiapas. The cases are intended to illustrate of how 
the concepts of technologies of performance and agency can be used to understand co-
production of property rights and civil and political rights in market-making. Each 
example begins with a case description and concludes with a summary of what it tells us 
about three key questions repeated below, which may inform future research: 
 
                                                                                                                                  
meaning here. 
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Design Choices for Carbon Territory (Land + Terrain) 
 
1) In-state: How do local priorities shape market design and rights-making within a 
political jurisdiction? 
 
2) Out-of-state: What effect do market design choices taken within a political jurisdiction 
have on rights-making in foreign jurisdictions and/or the coordination of activities across 
jurisdictions? 
 
3) Authorization and Expertise: Which actors and institutions are empowered with the 
authority and expertise to make these decisions? 
 
V.1. Extant In-state Capabilities 
V.1.1. MRV Systems, Political Legibility, and Illegality in the Lacandon 
This case is about the Governor Sabines’ proposal to map deforestation in the Lacandon 
rainforest as part of his signature REDD+ project, the Pact for the Respect and 
Conservation of Mother Earth (PACT).183 (See Chapter 5 for a detailed discussion of the 
initiative.) The sudden announcement of the project was intended to jumpstart carbon 
mapping in the region in order to prepare Chiapas for the coming REDD+ market. The 
lure of early action funding promised an immediate benefit to what Sabines described as 
                                            
183 Pacto por el Respeto y Conservación a la Madre Tierra 
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an urgent global problem to be solved by payments to local indigenous guardians of the 
forest: 184 
 
Here we directly support the owners of the land. We are not hiring rangers or 
guarding the forest but are betting that the owners of the land will protect it.185 
 
The PACT lacked any of the basic carbon accounting measures required of REDD+. 
Therefore one of the first steps was to establish a state-wide MRV system, with the 
PACT at its center. The Feasibility Study conducted by Conservation International and 
in-state affiliates discussed in the previous chapter was to start this process. 
 In short order, indigenous groups voiced their dissent. It did not help matters that 
some accused Conservation International of colluding with the army to evict illegal 
settlers in the forest.186 An official from SEMAHN, the state agency charged with seeing 
through the PACT, remarked that three-years of consultation and trust-building with 
communities in the Lacandon went “to the garbage.” 
 Meanwhile, forest communities were themselves divided, with landless villagers 
decrying the PACT as a facade to extend state control into the forest, citing the abrupt 
withdrawal of medical services from a remote, irregular settlement in the Montes Azules 
reserve called Amador Hernández. Villagers broadcast a dissenting letter through their 
                                            
184 http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2011/05/17/politica/004n1pol 
185 “Aquí apoyamos directamente a los dueños de la tierra, no estamos contratando a 
guardabosques o guarda selvas, estamos apostando a que los dueños de la tierra van a 
resguardar” 
186 Hermann Bellinghausen, “Conservation International, Trojan Horse of US 
Government and Transnational Corporations: Capise”, La Jornada, Mexico City, 7 June 
2003 
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local affiliates in San Cristobal de las Casas like Friends of the Earth Mexico (Otros 
Mundos), who disseminated the protest through global grassroots networks such as the 
Global Alliance of Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities on Climate Change 
Against REDD and for Life (No REDD+). The letter read: 
 
This past month, the governor of Chiapas traveled to the neighboring Lacandóna 
Community to make the first payments of the state-run REDD program; as he 
doled out the money, he told the beneficiaries that it should not be considered as a 
gift, but as a payment to guard the border against their neighbors, that is, us.187 
 
The state did not engage the claims directly, instead working through stakeholder 
engagement processes established under its REDD+ program, such as the Chiapas 
Technical Advisory Committee (CTC) for REDD+. In a government bulletin, Governor 
Sabines presented REDD+ as an opportunity to protect the forest against “invasores” 
(invaders) (Fadnes 2011): 
 
Man is the enemy of the jungle. Let’s be friends of the jungle. It is unique. There 
is nothing like it. None should invade it. He who attacks this jungle attacks the 
planet. 
 
The invaders here are illegal settlers in the Lacandon. Another bulletin echoes the 
Governor’s support for the Lacandon Community as the rightful guardians of the forest: 
                                            
187 I use the translation from: https://zcomm.org/zmagazine/turning-the-lacandon-jungle-
over-to-the-carbon-market-by-jeff-conant/ 
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out of the 170 people that were invading a reserve, today only 7 remain—but I insist—it 
is everyone’s responsibility, and you who are the owners of the reserve are the most 
committed to conservation". this he said to indigenous people from Frontera Corozal, 
who are "legal" and "receive payment for their environmental services" (Figure 8). 
 
 
Figure 8. Illegal Settlements in the Montes Azules Biosphere Reserve. 
 
Sabines attributed small-scale maize cultivation as the chief culprit, rather than, 
say, higher-level economic drivers or inadequate agrarian reform. Saving the rainforest, 
he said, required better policing of the forest to stop irregular settlers from growing corn 
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because it "damages the planet” and will cause “the reserve, the great richness of its 
inhabitants” to “run out.”  
 The Governor tied carbon mapping in the Lacandon to broader development plans 
for the region. In addition to delivering direct payments to the rightful forest guardians 
for protecting the forest against invaders, he promised that illegal settlers would not face 
forced relocation. If they so chose, the state would support irregular settlers’ voluntary 
relocation into one of the 6 to 25 pre-fabricated settlements planned under the state’s 
Sustainable Rural Cities Initiative, where they might find work with one of the oil palm 
or jatropha plantations being developed to make Chiapas into a biofuels leader. 
Grassroots groups saw the move as a ploy, designed to legitimize the eviction of already 
marginalized communities by herding them into shoddy structures, with inadequate 
support and the impossibility of continuing life as self-sufficient farmers. 
 To make sense of the complex rights-making in play, it is crucial to account for 
the historical rifts between the state and land insecure indigenous people in Chiapas. The 
agrarian reforms that brought the ejido system to much of Mexico after the 1910 Mexican 
Revolution overlooked this part of the country. Chiapas covers a territory of 74,415 km2 
of Mexico’s southernmost state bordering Guatemala and the states of Tabasco, Oaxaca, 
Veracruz, and Campeche. The Lacandon rainforest is in the eastern lowland area of the 
state. 4.8 million people live in the state, including 1.5 million indigenous people 
composing 11 distinct ethnic and linguistic groups. It has the second highest rates of 
poverty and malnutrition in Mexico, with over a quarter of the population lacking access 
to basic health and education services. 
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 From the early 16th century, Spanish colonizers through violence and disease 
depopulated the Selva Lacandona of its Mayan inhabitants. One group called the Caribes, 
later known as the Lacandones, migrated into the forest from neighboring Campeche 
sometime in the 18th century. The government allowed the Lacandones to stay and few 
others moved into the region until the mid-20th century, when a series of land reforms and 
political crises propelled settlers, in particular Mayans belonging from the Tzeltal, 
Tzotzil, Choles, and Tojolobal groups. The promise by national authorities to grant 
settlers title further encouraged the settlement and by 1960 thousands of peasants seeking 
better lives began to set roots in the region—many from the highland regions of the state 
where de facto indentured servitude persisted in large landholdings since colonial times. 
 In 1971, President Luis Echeverría issued a presidential decree for the largest 
restitution of land in post-revolutionary Mexico (De Vos 2002). The decree granted 66 
heads of Lacandón families (representing 6% of the people living in the region) exclusive 
settlement rights to 614,321 ha in the Zona Lacandona. The decree rendered over forty 
existing settlements illegal and cemented a patron-client relationship between the 
Lacandones and the government (Trench 2008). Around this time, the national 
government grew increasingly interested in developing the region’s natural timber, hydro, 
oil, and mineral resources—an interest expressed in a 1974 government report on ‘Gran 
Visión de la Selva Lacandona’. That same year, the Lacandones signed an agreement 
with the Compañía Forestal Lacandona, S.A. (COFOLASA), giving the state-owned 
company access to 35,000 cubic meters of timber for the next ten years in exchange for 
30% royalties. To complicate matters, the government began to place greater 
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environmental value on the region, especially for its cultural heritage and potential for 
ecotourism. 
 In 1978, President José López Portillo issued a presidential decree (dotacíon) 
establishing the 331,200 ha Montes Azules biosphere reserve where the villagers of 
Amador Hernández already resided. Seven more conservation areas were added in the 
Lacandon over the coming decades, for a total protected area of 454,860 ha, created with 
little or no community consultation. 
 The ensuing decades witnessed a spate of violent conflict and broken promises by 
the federal and state governments to recognize settler rights. Thousands of Tzetzal and 
Chole agreed to move into the planned settlements of Frontera Corozal and Nueva 
Palestina. Others remained steadfast in their claims to the land, while the government 
forcibly evicted thousands more. Some splintered communities reformed in the Zapatista 
Army of National Liberation (EZLN), culminating in the Zapatista rebellion in 1994. 
 Poor government planning and a physically and socially impenetrable forest 
frontier had caused all previous efforts to map the communities living in the Lacandon 
forest to fall flat. The disputed territory came to be known as the brecha Lacandona. 
 
The government was never able to mark the brecha Lacandona…When they sent  
topographers to the zone, everyone united to throw them in jail. Up to now, the  
only thing they’ve been able to do is measure the brecha by satellite.188 
 
                                            
188 https://zcomm.org/zmagazine/turning-the-lacandon-jungle-over-to-the-carbon-market-
by-jeff-conant/ 
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Clashes over the rightful claim to state and indigenous territory in the 1970s seeded the 
Zapatista movement. In the early 1990s, the Zapatista Army of National Liberation’s 
(EZLN) formed undetected in the jungle. On 1 January 1994, the day NAFTA launched, 
3000 insurgents shocked Mexico by launching an overnight takeover of the state capital 
San Cristobal de las Casas, three other cities, and a number of towns and villages. Their 
rallying cry: “No a la brecha Lacandona!” The twelve-day occupation ended in a 
ceasefire. Years of negotiations and a drawn-out truce followed, marked by intermittent 
violence and simmering discontent on both sides. 
 Only be taking this history into account is it possible to understand the complex 
interplay of various aspects of REDD+ and the reconfiguration of territory, rights, and 
authority in Chiapas. 
 
Design Choices for Carbon Territory (Land + Terrain) 
 
1) In-state: As a technology of performance, the MRV system being planned in Chiapas 
was at once to make legible the forest carbon stored in the Lacandon and the people 
living there. Mapping the forest advanced the political-economic ambition to internalize 
environmental externalities of forests lands into the economy; mapping the people 
amounted to a political-strategic attempt to bring unruly populations of a contested terrain 
into the polity. The two together make MRV systems a political technology, implicated in 
both market-making and state-making. In a study on the World Bank’s development and 
conservation efforts in regions where the state is weak, Michael Goldman refers to this 
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process as the making of an environmental state where international finance, 
transnational consultants, and resource-strapped governments come together to: 
 
to “improve” conditions of nature and populations by introducing new 
cultural/scientific logics for interpreting qualities of the state’s territory (Goldman 
2001, also see Goldman 2005).  
 
A lack of government control in the region spurred public worries over threats of civil 
unrest and unchecked flow of drugs and immigrants from Guatemala. For the state 
government, a weak federal presence presented the state of Chiapas room for independent 
maneuver, as indicated by Sabines’ attempt to one-up the National Forestry 
Commission’s (CONAFOR) conservation program for the region. 
 Landless indigenous groups equated carbon mapping with social mapping 
designed to divide the ‘legal’ Lacandon Community from the ‘criminal’ communities 
living outside state authority. MRV systems are expensive and time-consuming to build. 
REDD+ proponents justified the cost by arguing that such systems should be designed to 
collect multiple forms of social and environmental data, thereby fostering conservation 
and development beyond REDD+ alone. Local groups took this as an affront to their 
autonomy, emphasizing that mapping the brecha Lacandona would underwrite the state’s 
monopolization of legitimate violence, which a history of military and paramilitary 
abuses had proven it was willing to use. 
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 2) Out-of-state: The design of Chiapas’ REDD+ program involved choices not 
merely over the proper administration of state territory but the very delineation of what 
lay within state jurisdiction itself. For the Zapatistas and the communities who supported 
them, the very right to self-determination outside of any incarnation of state power—
including their own—was at stake. In what has been described as the “first post-modern 
rebellion”, the EZLN leveraged global media to shame the government and gain limited 
autonomy, so as to invent and imagine another way of life. In the twenty years since, the 
struggle has not dissolved, but it has dissipated somewhat. Increasingly, the government 
has cast the insurrection as not a military threat but an environmental one requiring state 
intervention to counter forests lost to settlers who had no rightful claim to the land. 
Indigenous groups that had gained some measure of autonomy believed REDD+ would 
rob them of their rightful jurisdiction to the land. 
 State and federal officials agreed that early action funding could free natural 
capital locked in Chiapas’ forests to flow in the form of carbon credits to California and 
others buyers around the world. In return, an influx of hard currency from abroad would 
protect the forest, develop the economy, benefit forest people, and reduce mitigation 
costs in buyer countries. 
 CONAFOR’s REDD+ plans drew on a history of negotiations with agrarian 
groups over federal PES programs, leading to an emphasis on the distribution of federal 
funds to small landholders based on a portfolio of ecosystem services in addition to 
carbon sequestration. The international carbon trade was an option but not a priority. The 
PACT, by contrast, was based narrowly on carbon payments alone. This encouraged a 
project-based approach centered on carbon rather than sustainable rural development or 
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other ecosystem services like the provision of freshwater. The state of Chiapas could not 
hope to match the budget of the central government. But if it could establish authority 
over carbon rights and the allocation of international funds from the carbon trade in 
Chiapas, it might leverage projects like the PACT to strengthen patronage ties with 
potentially unruly clients like the Lacandon Community. 
 3) Authorization and Expertise: Territorial authority was at the center of the 
struggle. The state government, central government, and recalcitrant local communities in 
the Lacandon each wanted it, and REDD+ could advance or stand in the way of each of 
their goals. For the public authorities, MRV systems and related technologies of 
performance were a means to this end since performance-based REDD+ payments rested 
with internationally credible measurements of deforestation, which did not exist. Both 
federal and state governments engaged domestic and transnational private expertise, 
notably Conservation International and The Nature Conservancy, to foster REDD+ 
readiness in Chiapas, with MRV systems, reference levels, and related technologies of 
performance at its core. 
 The Chiapas government, in particular, empowered in-state, national, and 
transnational private expertise, in cooperation with SEMAHN, to steer the readiness 
efforts. Although the state retained formal decision-making power over MRV design, its 
preoccupation with the PACT (as opposed to the micromanagement of the statewide 
REDD+ program) speaks to the de facto agenda setting power of private experts who, 
through orchestrated relationships with public collaborators, may steer technical designs 
down certain paths, in line with private rather than public interests. In this case, early 
action projects based on PES to local communities deemed responsible for the major 
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share of deforestation took precedence over longer jurisdictional possibilities like 
agrarian reform or sustainable rural development. This is a key argument of Chapter 5. 
 The above section complicates this account, indicating the state government’s 
own possible preference for a project-centric approach. Teasing apart the relative weight 
of the government and private advisors in market design is difficult, but it may also be 
unnecessary. Rather, the case shows a feature common to orchestrated governing 
arrangements: public authorities ceding expertise to private groups whose goals are 
compatible with their own. In uncontested situations this may be a strength but shown 
here it is a weakness. Ad hoc arrangements between the government and private advisors 
on REDD+ design effectively closed out dissonant views from civil society because, 
being ad hoc, no procedural channels for civil engagement existed. They had to be 
invented in new consultative arrangements like the CTC.  
 Dissident groups expressed frustration for being shut out of even that process, 
though, in theory, nascent institutions like the CTC may have opened a path to 
deliberation for a long-term future of REDD+ in Chiapas that set the grounds for agrarian 
reform. The fallout over Governor Sabines’ PACT, however, set a major roadblock on 
this path by exacerbating territorial divisions between local communities and the state, 
and local communities themselves. Governor Velasco’s cancelation of the project and 
affirmation of Mexico’s National REDD+ strategy leaves set the state on separate course 
that continues to play out. 
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V.1.2. SB 605: Legislating Justice through Property in California 
This case recounts a legislative effort by environmental justice groups to redefine the 
ontological status of a carbon offset. Their goal was to promote distributive justice in 
California and forestall the sale of specious offsets they believed would make a farce of 
the state’s ambitions to become a global green leader. 
 SB 605 on ‘Short Lived Climate Pollutants’ passed the California Senate in May 
2013 before stalling in the Assembly Natural Committee Resources Committee. An 
earlier version of the bill sought to exclude only international offsets, suggesting that 
REDD+ (as the only international sector under regulatory consideration) catalyzed the 
legislation. A modified version of the bill stripped of the offset provision passed the full 
Legislature in September 2014.  
 
Design Choices for Carbon Territory (Land + Terrain) 
 1) In-state: Proponents of the bill argued that it would benefit California’s 
economy by retaining offset projects within the state and creating jobs. They also argued 
that it would fix ARB’s flawed offset provisions, which would put low-income 
communities health at risk by placing compliance costs and global benefits ahead of the 
rightful benefits of low-income California residents stipulated as one of nine regulatory 
guidelines called for the AB32. 
 Opponents countered that restricting offsets to California would harm businesses 
and consumers by causing the supply of offsets to plummet by 85 percent through 2020, 
potentially increasing the cost of carbon allowances from $20-30 to $148 per ton. They 
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further asserted that local air pollution was a co-benefit and not a primary goal of AB32, 
and that air quality issues were to be properly addressed the adequate existing regulation. 
 2) Out-of-state: Proponents argued that California regulators could not properly 
enforce or monitor the performance of offsets outside its jurisdiction. They were 
particularly worried about risky international offsets, REDD+ offsets in particular. 
 The issue prompted transnational NGOs like Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, 
and the Indigenous Environmental Network to make common cause with affiliates in 
Chiapas. Global Justice Ecology Project sent a reporting team to Amador Hernández in 
the Lacandon, for example, and organized a delegation of indigenous people from 
Chiapas and Acre to hold protests in California. The transnational network-building, 
while ephemeral and inchoate, is interesting because it extends to sub-national 
governments, a growing trend by groups contending state legitimacy to bypass states by 
claiming rights in the international space. 
 3) Authorization and Expertise: The legislation was one part of a multi-pronged 
strategy to restrict the use of offsets in California. Other prongs included efforts to 
change public opinion, as well as through ARB’s public comment period and the lawsuits 
discussed in Chapter 5. Each in a different way sought to challenge the credibility of 
offsets. 
 SB 605 can be seen as an effort to legislate ontology of a carbon offset by defying 
regulators’ assertion that carbon emissions from one place on the planet are fungible with 
emissions from anywhere else because climate change is a global problem. Rather than 
defining carbon ontology in terms of the seller’s territory, it sought to define it according 
to the buyer’s. 
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 The strategy did not overcome cost-concerns and legislative and judiciary 
deference to ARB’s expertise. While the process strengthened ARB’s credibility vis-à-vis 
the government and business, it caused significant mistrust among environmental justice 
groups, which said they supported AB32 on good faith that the concerns of low-income 
communities would be a central part of the regulations. The loss of faith will take time to 
repair. Measures include the redistribution of funds from the auction of carbon 
allowances to benefit low-income communities, which independent groups have 
interestingly attempted to make visible to California residents by producing maps of such 
projects across the state. 
 
V.2. Emergent Transnational Capabilities 
V.2.1. The Grievance Mechanism: An Administrative Proposal for Procedural Justice 
This case presents options for a grievance mechanism that appear in the ROW 
recommendations. I conceive of a grievance mechanism as a technology of agency, 
designed to facilitate procedural justice across political jurisdictions. The broader 
implications of such a mechanism, however, extend through a complex web that 
distributes risk, responsibility, liability, ownership, and political representation across 
borders and groups. 
 A grievance, or complaint, mechanism refers to: 
 
a formalized right to a procedure for complaint, conflict resolution and remedy 
that can help to ensure rights and protect ecosystems potentially impacted by 
REDD+ [that serves to] remedy harms related to violation of indigenous rights 
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which can help resolve conflicts in a manner that both protects rights and 
maintain forests (Rainforest Foundation Norway and the Center for 
Environmental Law et al. 2011). 
 
In ROW’s final recommendations published in July 2013, the word “grievance” appears 
on 23 of the report’s 68 pages—a major increase over the nine references in the draft 
recommendations release five months earlier. While the latter does not mention the term 
in the executive summary, the final summary recommendations for the development and 
recognition of safeguards, highlights “the availability of a grievance mechanism” as one 
of the “necessary pre-conditions for the ultimate success of REDD+ programs.” 
 If fully implemented, the changes could have significant implications on carbon 
property and civil and political rights in both California and potential partner jurisdictions 
like Chiapas. 
 
Design Choices for Carbon Territory (Land + Terrain) 
1) In-state: The emphasis on a grievance mechanism in the final report, including in one 
of eight items in the “Partner Jurisdiction Checklist, is an outcome of the public comment 
period and vocal grassroots dissent. Instituting such a mechanism would have direct 
implications for project operators, local communities, and governments in seller 
jurisdictions. The recommendations put forward three alternatives for addressing 
grievances (Table 5). 
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Table 5. How Should Grievances Be Addressed? (ROW 2013) 
 
Pros: Easy No Mechanism 
Cons: Unacceptable to civil society, 
contrary to UNFCCC decisions and 
international law. 
Pros: Quality control; speaks to values of 
Californians; provides access to a high- 
quality review. 
California Designs and Pursues 
Cons: Not currently supported in statute. 
Hard to manage and oversee. 
Pros: More consistent with international 
practice; reduces distance between 
complaint and redress; can be adjudicated 
through national legal systems, where 
necessary. 
Partner Jurisdictions design a grievance 
mechanism and pursue cases as needed 
Cons: National/subnational grievance 
mechanisms can be poorly supported and 
unpopular with public officials. 
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Although the ROW does not endorse any one option, it does imply that the best option is 
for partner jurisdictions take responsibility for the design of a grievance mechanism. This 
is consistent with the broader text, which stresses the need for California and partners to 
“make clear that any liability associated with the operation of jurisdictional REDD+ 
programs is a matter for the domestic legal system in the REDD+ partner jurisdiction.” 
 Liability for false offsets and the violation of human rights are both central to a 
transnational REDD+ architecture. All manner of risk might be made calculable by being 
embedded in that architecture (or alternatively rendered illegible by being excluded). This 
might include financial risk to investments, buyer liability risk to regulated entities, cost-
compliance risks to regulators, or participation risks to local communities. 
 I can only gesture at the institutional innovation needed to isolate carbon as 
property so that it may freely circulate across political borders, while constructing civil 
and political rights in a way that minimizes the movement of claims across jurisdictions. 
The above options, for instance, are asymmetrical, highlighting the “values of 
Californians” if California were to design a mechanism but not the values of the people 
of Chiapas or other partner jurisdiction. This reinforces the body of the text, which 
further stress that partner jurisdictions “should also make clear that any such grievances 
or disputes are matters of domestic law…and thus do not in any way implicate the 
various market- and non-market opportunities that the REDD+ program seeks to access. 
 2) Out-of-state: California law holds itself liable differently for potential false 
emissions and human rights violations. The legislation makes it possible the state could 
be held liable for allowing offsets into the cap-and-trade program that were shown to be 
invalid due to false emission reductions, including those from international offsets. No 
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equivalent measure exists for civil and political rights violations and, though the potential 
for such liabilities is a concern, the recommendations note “it is very difficult to imagine 
any viable cause of action brought by an individual from a partner jurisdiction such as 
Acre (or Quebec for that matter) against California”. In principle, serious transgressions 
of either might be grounds to trigger a suspension provision built into the linkage 
agreement between California and its partner, although there are concerns that the 
bureaucratic and private pressures to take such an action would be great. 
 3) Authorization and Expertise: Specific procedures in grievance mechanisms 
include: fact-finding through field visits, providing advice on use of the mechanism, 
ensuring dispute resolution, assessing compliance with court rulings, and awarding 
compensation for damages or misconduct (Rainforest Foundation Norway and the Center 
for Environmental Law et al. 2011). 
 Social and environmental safeguards would be a critical component of 
transnational grievance procedures. The ROW recommendations underline the 
importance of building capable stakeholders, noting that “safeguards have moved in 
recent years from the periphery to the center of the debate on REDD”. A safeguard 
system would be one precondition to authorize REDD+ payments under the UNFCCC, 
California, or other possible compliance market, and a potential mechanism to articulate 
rights-claims to international laws and norms, such as the UN Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous People (UNDRIP) or the UN-REDD Programme Guidelines on Free, Prior 
and Informed Consent (FPIC). 
 In addition to affording protections to local people, the ROW ties them to benefits 
for governments (“high-quality safeguards is one of the most cost-effective investments 
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government can make in ensuring permanence and additionality of reductions and 
removals”) and sustainable development (“social and environmental benefits and provide 
a viable pathway to sustainable, equitable low-carbon rural development”). 
 Very likely, transnational private expertise would play a prominent role in design 
of safeguards and a grievance mechanism in partner jurisdictions. It is also possible that a 
third-party organization (perhaps the same organization or set of organizations 
participating in a third-party registry or verification and validation requirements) could 
play an administrative role by, for example, acting as a ‘semi-permeable membrane’ to 
filter ineligible offsets. Under certain conditions, an intermediary body between political 
jurisdictions could also bypass sovereignty concerns, such as the Supremacy Clause in 
the U.S. Constitution, which could be interpreted to prohibit states from monitoring or 
commenting on implementation activities in another jurisdiction. Attorneys advising 
California believe that unconstitutional oversight is not a likely outcome, although the 
liability measures and other measures taken by the state indicate it is one regulators are 
keen to avoid. 
 Liability protections might also be built into technical standards. The ROW, for 
instance, suggests that a linkage agreement should be conditioned on the partner 
jurisdiction’s demonstration of “own effort”. The immediate reason for this is to mitigate 
the possibility of false reductions by setting aside a certain percentage of the overall 
measured reductions as coming from the “own effort” of a jurisdiction, thereby raising 
the bar for the additionality requirement under California law. A secondary effect, 
however, might be to distance California from being associated with grievances in a host 
jurisdiction because they could be attributed to the efforts of the host jurisdiction itself. 
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V.2.2.‘The Knowledge and Skills Needed to Engage REDD+’: A Guide to the Ideal 
Stakeholder 
Here I draw out assumptions embedded in capacity building strategies about who 
stakeholders are and what skills they must have to act as entitled and responsible 
participants (i.e. agents) in REDD+. The case centers on the identity of the ideal 
stakeholder as presented in a manual released by the Alliance for Global REDD+ 
Capacity (AGRC), with support from USAID. Alliance members include Conservation 
International, IUCN, CATIE (where Lucio Pedroni developed nested-REDD+ approach 
discussed in Chapter 2), and Center for People and the Forests.189 
 It is important to note that the manual presents a spectrum of options for REDD+ 
and does not endorse markets or any specific design. In the current case, I read the 
document against the agreement between California and Chiapas, which is centered on 
making a REDD+ market.  
 The title of the 167-page publication is ‘The Knowledge and Skills Needed to 
Engage REDD+: A Competencies Framework’.190 Its goal is to provide “a hands-on tool 
                                            
189 The document is an example of one of many stakeholder engagement programs 
developed by private groups, often in cooperation with governments, such as: Pedagogy 
and Adult Training: A Trainer’s Manual 
 the WWF Guide to Building REDD+ Strategies[1] or A Guide for Consistent 
Implementation of REDD+ Safeguards by Client Earth and UKAid. A Training of 
Trainers Manual for REDD+ for Community-level Facilitators 
http://wwf.panda.org/?208684/WWF-Guide-to-Building-a-REDD-Strategy--A-toolkit-
for-REDD-practitioners-around-the-globe.  
190 Barquín, L., M. Chacón, S.N. Panfil, A. Adeleke, E. Florian, and R. Triraganon. 2014. 
The Knowledge and Skills Needed to Engage in REDD+: A Competencies Framework. 
Conservation International, Centro Agronómico Tropical de Investigación y Enseñanza, 
International Union for the Conservation of Nature, Regional Community Forestry 
Training Center. Arlington, Virginia, USA. available at: 
http://www.conservation.org/publications/Documents/CI_REDD-Competencies-
Framework.pdf 
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designed to provide an overview of the essential knowledge, skills and resources required 
to engage REDD+ themes. The document has two objectives: 
 
1) to facilitate the design of capacity building programs by helping users to understand 
the target audience, and 
 
2) empower stakeholders who, if they “master the information and skills presented in 
each section “should be well-placed to engage in the development and implementation of 
major aspects of REDD+”. 
 
One important and under-explored aspect of capacity building strategies is their function 
as technologies of agency and performance. While technologies of performance allow a 
smoothly functioning market by forging common agreement on the definition of ‘a 
carbon credit’, technologies of agency stabilize the identity and behavior of the 
participants who have a stake in the market. Thus, making-markets entail ‘making-
stakeholders’ as well. 
 A second, little understood point is that since carbon markets can take many 
forms (i.e. market rationalities are polyvalent), the ideal subjects who go with them are 
multiple too. Safeguards to protect civil and political rights, for instance, are scale-
dependent, just like MRV systems to calculate carbon property. Local, national, and 
international carbon accounting are each distinct, and therefore so too are the identity of 
the rights-claimer entitled to voice grievances or the articulation of grievance 
mechanisms with legal protections that are already in place. 
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Design Choices for Carbon Territory (Land + Terrain) 
1) In-state: The document is noteworthy not because of its content or endorsement of a 
particular version of carbon territory but because it is a universal framework applicable to 
almost any imaginable agenda—so long as one is not against REDD+ altogether. It is a 
seed then to grow REDD+ in any ground. The manual suggests, “If you are looking to 
expand the scale of your capacity program quickly, consider the use of a ‘training of 
trainers’ structure…so that the number of trainers grows exponentially.” From the 
perspective of governmentality, this is an interesting suggestion because its aim is self-
replicating agents to spread technologies of performance and agency high, low, far, and 
wide—to put a spin on it: making stakeholder-making, market-making, state-making 
stakeholders, or building capacity builders to build capacity-building capacity builders. 
 The manual aims to help users identify groups in any jurisdiction of any kind—
government, private sector, or civil society. The competencies framework is politically 
sensitive: it is careful to “not provide guidance on determining which stakeholders should 
participate in capacity building activities.” It is universal, open to virtually any population 
(gender, age, level of education, ethnicity, preferred modes of engagement, and reasons 
for engaging on REDD+). It is multifaceted, directed to build capacity for almost any 
class of stakeholders (technical expert, decision maker, local community member, civil 
society, or investor). It is also versatile, suited for initiatives that are short-term or long-
term, in-person or remote, and via books, radio, TV, or the internet. Finally, it is 
comprehensive, providing “Essential Knowledge and Skills” for ten themes of interest to 
REDD+ stakeholders, including the Science and Climate Change and Role of Forests, 
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The Scale of REDD+, REDD+ Social and Environmental Stakeholders, and REDD+ 
Funding and Finance. 
 The manual is but one of the more recent and refined guides targeted at REDD+ 
stakeholders. In 2010, for instance, Conservation International published ‘Climate 
Change & The Role of Forests: A Community Manual’. ‘A Community Manual’ has 
been translated into seven languages and been used by the government of Chiapas in its 
REDD+ consultation process.191 The document states that its goal is “to help 
communities to understand climate change and how REDD+ can help to mitigate climate 
change.” 
 The manual is an instructive case of a long and growing corpus on capacity 
building for REDD+. I hypothesize that the strategies are evolutionary, in the sense that 
they build not only on lessons learnt from earlier initiatives like ‘A Community Manual’ 
or ongoing development of REDD+ but, more importantly, by becoming more politically 
sensitive, more versatile, more comprehensive, more applicable—in a way more fit. One 
way capacity building strategies have done that is by extending their vertical and 
horizontal reach across global networks. Another is, at least in theory, by pursuing a 
strategy to circumvent, defuse, or take advantage of the cosmopolitical dynamics Beck 
describes as they unsettle older political orders. 
 2) Out-of-state: The manual works in the mode of networked governance, noting 
that since REDD+ is complex the identity and configuration of stakeholders may be too. 
This is not a model of national representation where political citizenship is a one-to-one 
correspondence with the sovereign territory people live. In this networked mode people 
                                            
191 ‘A Community Manual’ has been used in a number of other countries, including 
Madagascar and two GCF members, Indonesia and Peru. 
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shed identities and institutions to fit the needs at hand, so that “stakeholders may play one 
or more roles during its [REDD+’s] construction and implementation.” And certainly 
unlike the citizens of a nation-state, they are—like proposals for REDD+—nested, 
moving between project, sub-national, national, and international scales. This helps the 
stakeholder and the “vertical harmonization of information channels” to “mainstream the 
messages across scales”. 
 It is a quintessential technique of globalization—on the one hand, a technology of 
agency, with the objective to empower stakeholders with: 
 
 Knowledge: understanding new information 
 Skills: having the ability to do something new or in an improved way 
 Attitudes: change in the ways of thinking or feeling 
 
On the other, it is a technology of performance to guide, offering trainers guidance on 
how to be “S.M.A.R.T.”: 
 
 Specific: precisely describe what learners should achieve 
 Measurable: permit assessment of whether an objective is reached 
 Achievable: can be accomplished in the time allowed 
 Result oriented: should lead to a concrete result 
 Time bound: can be achieved in a predetermined amount of time 
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3) Authorization and Expertise: The tenor of the document is in accord with that of 
developers, conservation groups, and government workers I spoke with in Chiapas and 
California. SEMAHN and organizations like Conservation International, The Nature 
Conservancy, and Environmental Defense Fund tended to see the primary engagement 
challenge in terms of an information deficit. (A major goal of the Chiapas CTC, for 
example, was to educate forest communities about REDD+). Similarly, the guidelines 
prioritize “knowledge and skills” in order to transform unknowing and ill-equipped target 
populations into knowledgeable and competent stakeholders. So equipped, stakeholders 
are to responsibly conduct themselves (to self-authorize) within an overarching REDD+ 
architecture. 
 This raises several issues critical to democratic deficits in global governance. 
First, knowledge and skills to pursue one’s interests in REDD+ do not by themselves 
extend to decisions about REDD+ design, the decision to pursue REDD+ at all, or the 
ability to make alternative ideas heard. Empowering stakeholders for knowledge 
production or upstream decision-making would require a separate, and potentially 
incompatible, set of capabilities. Second, the information deficit model defines risk in the 
first instance as ignorance and a lack of skills, rather than inequality, corruption, 
environmental degradation or some other source. It assumes that whatever threats a 
community might face, they can be redressed with sufficient knowledge and skill at the 
level of the community itself. Moreover, it offers a rather hopeful model that politics can 
be circumvented through deliberation—or perhaps a rather bleak view that political 
obstacles are insurmountable. Third, making stakeholders responsible implies making 
some other entity less responsible. The state’s ultimate responsibility is to its people— 
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shifting responsibility from national institutions of public representation to global 
networks of empowered stakeholders is no minor thing. 
 
VI. Conclusion: Building Bridges or Abridging Rights? 
On the eve of the financial crisis and subsequent collapse of the carbon market, Donald 
MacKenzie (2007) wrote an essay called ‘The Political Economy of Carbon Trading’.192 
California’s cap-and-trade scheme was on the horizon, and MacKenzie saw that one day 
carbon credits might flow between London or Edinburgh and Los Angeles or San 
Francisco. He did not deny the political challenges of making a carbon market nor 
overlook the importance for other measures: 
 
Finding such a mechanism has been hard enough even in a partially unified polity 
such as Europe; it will be much harder globally. 
 
Yet, the essay is cautiously optimistic. Even imperfect instruments might be tightened, he 
argued, to some day civilize capitalism. Such a future would depend on continued 
political struggle from committed activists, academics, and government officials to define 
carbon rights in a way that transformed both ‘hot air’ and heated political divisions into a 
cool, effective, and efficient economy. MacKenzie was hopeful because: 
 
emissions markets gain their political force from their capacity to create alliances  
between ‘left-wing’ environmentalism and ‘right-wing’ pro-market sentiment. 
                                            
192 http://www.lrb.co.uk/v29/n07/donald-mackenzie/the-political-economy-of-carbon-
trading 
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The cases presented in this chapter suggest that building bridges for a green economy is 
harder than he imagined. MacKenzie acknowledges that “many people, especially on the 
political left, instinctively dislike the idea of emissions trading”. This he attributes to the 
‘hostile worlds’ doctrine, which asserts that “the intrusion of economic considerations 
corrupts intimacy, and conversely that kinship and other intimate relations need to be 
stopped from corrupting what should be impersonal economic transactions.” The ‘hostile 
worlds’ doctrine, though, may be a red herring, he said, because “Just as economic 
relations and intimacy aren’t necessarily at odds, we shouldn’t assume a priori that 
market pricing is detrimental to environmental stewardship.” 
 There is some merit in this view. Even as they broke ranks with the far wings of 
their parties, elements of the right and left did unite in California to surprise many by 
pushing forward a relatively smoothly functioning market. Governor Schwarzenegger 
rode the vision to rise above his Republican challengers in the polls. From there and 
patchwork markets around the world, MacKenzie saw that, just possibly, “we will before 
long be able to trade carbon anywhere in the world.” 
 But MacKenzie’s cautious optimism left much out. Making a carbon market in 
California is one thing but fully building out global green economy governance is quite 
another. A merely meddlesome ‘hostile worlds’ doctrine proved fatal for Sabines’ PACT 
in Chiapas, where many communities lacked even a modicum of trust in governments or 
the private sector. In California, environmental justice groups lost much trust they had 
built with regulators over the years. 
 The main reason is that the political economy of carbon trading encompasses 
much more than struggles over the allocation of property rights: it is equally a contest to 
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define property, civil and political rights, and the obligations between the state and its 
citizens. These are constitutional questions. They also escaped the plans of policy-makers 
and their advisers to make good on the MOU signed by the Governors. 
 In an op-ed to the L.A. Times, titled ‘California’s Cap-and-Trade Program—More 
Than Just a Solution for California’, two prominent advocates for the state’s carbon 
market wrote: “Climate change is a global problem that ultimately demands global 
solutions. A ‘California only’ approach simply won't cut it.” The piece, written by 
President of the Climate Action Reserve (CAR), Gary Gero, and CAR Chair and former 
Secretary of California’s Environmental Protection Agency, Linda Adams, extolled 
offsets in particular as globally “transformative investments,” adding that: 
Offsets build bridges to other states and countries, raising awareness, building local 
knowledge, and demonstrating how they, too, can address climate change and transform 
their own economies. Ultimately it is only by building these bridges and promoting wider 
collaboration that California, and the world at large, can prevent climate change.193 
A very different model of bridge-building emerged from dissident groups in 
Chiapas. In April 2011, some 300 delegates from regional campesino and indigenous 
organizations met in the Zapatista village of Patihuitz for the forum on ‘Indigenous and 
Campesino Perspectives on the Climate Crisis and the False Solutions’. The California- 
and Vermont-based Global Justice Ecology Project reports that it “was invited to send a 
                                            
193 Gary Gero and Linda Adams. ‘California's Cap-and-Trade Program -- More Than Just 
a Solution for California.’ L.A. Times. 18 Nov 2013. Available at: 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/gary-gero/post_6160_b_4285205.html 
328 
message to the gathering on behalf of ourselves and our allies, as an effort to build 
bridges across struggles and across borders.”194 
 The Declaration of Patihuitz that followed called for configuring territory, 
authority, rights into something that little resembled the transnational carbon market 
envisioned by the Governors of California and Chiapas: 
 
We reject the rights recently approved by the Congress [to amend the Mexican 
Constitution to allow the sale of ejido lands], which puts our lands and our 
indigenous and campesino territories at risk. No to the sale of land in our 
communities! We defend our right to live… 
 
…Our lands and territories are at risk. The conservation programs [especially 
REDD+] that are being implemented today have as their primary goal the 
transformation of our natural resources into commodities. 
 
Do then carbon markets build bridges or abridge rights? The cases in this chapter have 
shown that carbon rights is a complex category—that it entails questions about property 
and civil and human rights; that it takes place through transnational networks linking 
distant socio-political situations; that it implicates definitions of state, citizenship, and 
responsibility. In principle, market rationalities are polyvalent—as MacKenzie states 
there are not ground to assume “a priori that market pricing is detrimental to 
environmental stewardship.” 
                                            
194 http://globaljusticeecology.org/declaration-of-patihuitz-divided-we-become-allies-of-
the-government/ 
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 But there is also much that need not be assumed. The cases in this chapter show 
how seemingly technical matters about how to design a carbon market carry assumptions 
about risk, for example, that make certain rights and rights-claimers legible and others 
not. The justice implications run deep. 
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EPILOGUE 
KNOWLEDGE AND POWER FOR GREEN ECONOMY GOVERNANCE 
I. Introduction 
Surely one of the most remarkable things about being human is our ability to re-write the  
rules by which we live. This is why predictions of game-changing, epochal change are  
quite literally ‘Beyond the Pale’. The saying comes from the 14th century, when to cross 
a border called the English Pale was to step outside the rules and institutions of English  
society and enter the Irish wilds. 
In his book, The Enlightened Economy, historian of capitalism Joel Mokyr calls 
attention to the power of meta-institutions—those rules for changing rules, which amount 
to nothing less than a constitution: 
 
A successful economy…needs not only rules that determine how the economic 
game is played, it needs rules to change the rules if necessary in a way that is as 
costless as possible. In other words, it needs meta-institutions that change the 
institutions, and whose changes will be accepted even by those who stand to lose 
from these changes. Institutions did not change just because it was efficient for 
them to do so. They changed because key peoples’ ideas and beliefs that 
supported them changed. (Mokyr 2010) 
 
Colonial Ireland certainly experienced the re-writing of its traditional rules at the most 
basic level. What though of Mokyr's “peoples’ ideas and beliefs”? If ideas and beliefs 
shape institutions, how then might institutions shape those ideas and beliefs? In Science, 
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Culture, and Modern State Formation, Patrick Carroll (2006) invites these very questions 
of rule-making and knowledge-making in early modern Ireland. Carroll finds his answer 
in an expansive study of British colonial policy, mechanical philosophy, institutional 
change, and advancements in engineering practices and technologies. In a phrase tellingly 
reminiscent of the laboratories of carbon market innovation, Carroll finds that colonial 
Ireland had become a “laboratory for experiments in statecraft”. 
Today, hopeful observers like Donald MacKenzie and Michel Callon look with 
cautious optimism towards carbon markets as a civilizing force. MacKenzie, Callon and 
fellow STS scholars seeking to understand the ‘performativity of economics’ have done 
more than any to understand the coming together of rules and knowledge to make carbon 
markets. These scholars are cautiously optimistic for carbon markets’ civilizing potential, 
for if rules and knowledge are made, they may be made differently—possibly even to 
craft economies and polities that are civilized in the highest sense. 
Scholars, however, have said little about how contemporary global politics and 
the global economy amount to a constitution-changing game of this very type. In this 
dissertation, I have found caution to be well warranted due to the constitutional depth 
such changes would entail. Those changes are scarcely intelligible. Here I synthesize the 
concepts developed, cases explored, and avenues for bringing them together to 
understand how new architectures for global governance are taking shape.  
 
II. Summary of Theory: Stabilizing Knowledge and Institutions for Global Projects 
Initiatives like REDD+ extend far beyond the top-down treaty-based system devised to 
tackle global environmental problems. By framing the case material in terms of a global 
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project, the dissertation opens up a vast, messy, and poorly understood domain, where 
nascent networks of sub-national and non-state actors are struggling to fashion new 
global governing spaces outside the international domain proper. Theirs is a struggle not 
simply for being technically challenging and politically contentious—but because it is 
stringing together the fabric of a whole new world. 
Understanding global projects like REDD+ presents significant theoretical and 
methodological challenges, since the outcomes are unpredictable and the concepts at 
hand derived from an earlier nation-centric order. No clear guide exists to navigate the 
disparate sites, scales, and actors in play. Such global projects are polycentric—a concept 
being fruitfully applied to the study of global environmental politics in order to 
understand how independent sites of decision-making are coming together to enable new 
modes of global collective action. Scholarship on REDD+ and global environmental 
governance more generally, however, has done little to understand the entwined 
processes of polycentric decision-making and knowledge-making. 
This dissertation has begun to take up this theoretical challenge by embarking 
from a central tenet: If global projects are ever to gain hold, they will be both institutional 
and epistemic achievements. And this will require the drawing together of a welter of 
actors, techniques, norms, and other heterogeneous elements into configurations that have 
never before existed. The dissertation has begun to understand this process of global 
project-making using a core set of concepts: capabilities, organizing logics, and tipping 
points. 
From these high-level concepts, the dissertation has shown how institutions and 
knowledge come together to make and unmake seemingly eternal constitutional 
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categories like territory, authority, and rights. To make sense of this process as it unfolds, 
the cases explored in Chapters 2-6 are wide-ranging and the concepts eclectic. I have, for 
example, drawn on institutionalist ideas (e.g. orchestration) to tease out the authorization 
of transnational private expertise, constructivist ones (e.g. risk rationality) to reveal the 
construction of the rights-claiming subject, and constitutionalist scholarship (e.g. global 
environmental imagination) to resolve the competing globalisms in accounting for carbon 
at different scales. In the following section, I draw on these theoretical findings to suggest 
avenues for the deliberative design of carbon markets and global governing architectures 
writ large. 
 
 III. Questioning Design 
The theoretical approach advanced here bears relevance on the goals of the global project 
makers themselves. The struggle of REDD+ proponents and opponents issues in no small 
part from the disjuncture between an old vocabulary and new ambitions. How will the 
accountability claimed for global projects be ensured? How will long-standing norms of 
national authority be transfigured or preserved? What forms of global knowledge will 
make local people and ecologies some way commensurate? At heart, these are design 
questions, which a keener theoretical appreciation of de-centered world-making can help 
address. 
 The dissertation offers a window into emergence of this process through the 
complex interplay of global rules and global knowledge for REDD+. In some ways, the 
process resembles Bruno Latour’s notion of ‘centers of calculation’, which draw together 
far-flung actors and actions by circulating simplified representations of the world (Latour 
334 
1990, also see Jasanoff 2015). The dissertation, however, shows such a view to reflect the 
ideals of top-down global environmental governance more than its actual practice. 
Indeed, I have argued that a de-centered global order is arising from this very inability of 
the treaty-based system to forge a unified legal-epistemic order, combined with the 
normative imperative that such an order be established. 
This suggests the possibility of re-framing many of the design dilemmas that 
REDD+ players have wrestled with for years. In 2008, Douglas Boucher of the Union of 
Concerned Scientists penned a thought piece titled ‘Out of the Woods: A Realistic Role 
for Tropical Forests in Curbing Global Warming’. The piece poses questions directly 
pertinent to the institutional, epistemic, and constitutional concerns pursued by this 
dissertation, including: 
 
• Why do the estimates of costs vary so much between regional empirical studies, 
the area-based estimates of the Stern Review, and the output of the global 
models?  
 
• How does this difference among estimates square with the idea, going back to  
Adam Smith, that wider markets should lower costs, not raise them? 
 
• What are the best estimates we can make of some of the “additional costs” that  
are not included in the current analysis for lack of quantitative data? For example,  
how much should we allow for measuring and monitoring, or for capacity 
building? (Boucher 2008) 
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Eight years later, Boucher had grown dubious that these questions are even worth 
asking of REDD+, writing: 
 
Well, the argument has now been going on for eight more years, and I’ve just 
published an article in the Journal of Sustainable Forestry saying that it’s time to 
move on. The reasons are simple, but maybe not what you might anticipate. It’s 
not that the debate remains unresolved (although it does), nor that organizations 
trying to stake out a middle position haven’t gotten much traction (although we 
haven’t), nor even that NGOs have found that the best way to get policies adopted 
to reduce deforestation was by “agreeing to disagree” and not fighting about the 
question any more (although we certainly have, with substantial success).  
 
It’s an issue of ideology, politics, and how one views humanity’s relationship to 
nature. But at least we could recognize that this particular fight doesn’t really 
matter, and move on to a more important one. I’m happy to have arguments, but 
in general I like for them to be about something that really makes a difference. 
(Boucher 2015) 
 
The concerned scientist’s frustration comes out of the vexing issues the dissertation 
explores and seeks to develop a new vocabulary to talk about. Doing so might facilitate 
new possibilities for knowledge and action around the emergent global project that is 
REDD+. Boucher, for instance, concludes that those design questions for a REDD+ 
market are not only not worth asking but may divert attention from the real threat, the: 
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“major commodities driving tropical deforestation: beef, soy, palm oil and timber.” 
Previous chapters highlight, however, how REDD+ proponents have come to similar 
conclusions—both those in the early days favoring national-level compensated reductions 
and more recent efforts like the GCF-affiliated Earth Innovation Institute’s ambition to 
“Re-frame REDD+” towards sustainable commodity supply chains as well. Ironically, 
Greenpeace, a vocal critic of the GCF, calls for zero-deforestation supply chains itself. 
The case material examined in this dissertation recount many moments in many sites 
where these questions might have been answered in REDD+ design differently and 
alternative design paths followed. How might then these moments be configured 
differently in the future? The cases and concepts explored here offer a start to re-think 
how such design could and should proceed. These are opportunities for future research. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
So many proposals, so many visions for the future: Political jurisdictions or local 
projects? Carbon markets or a global fund? Incentivizing local people in carbon credits or 
in kind? On one level, it may seem a stretch to group these irreconcilable proposals under 
a single global project. Yet, on another level, what comes of any one of them has much to 
do with what comes of the others. Indeed, they owe their form to this amorphous and 
hotly contended initiative called REDD+. Just as whatever shape REDD+ takes will 
emerge out of the prior capabilities and strategies of the many actors behind these 
proposals, the competing visions themselves may, for instance, draw vigor from REDD+ 
or be expelled from it. 
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The theoretical and empirical investigation of this study therefore has much room 
to run.  In part, the dissertation was conducted in hopes of generating new insights about 
very particular and consequential cases in question. Yet, it also aims to build more 
general insights beyond the thick description of these particular cases. To turn one of the 
study’s ideas onto itself: the dissertation offers a kind of conceptual ‘proto-capability’ for 
understanding the stabilization of global projects. The next step is to advance the findings 
here into a generalizable framework to grapple with global epistemic, institutional, and 
constitutional change. 
The ongoing evolution of the GCF offers a rich place to extend and refine the 
current empirical and theoretical inquiry. The MOU between California and Chiapas, and 
their high-visibility in the global REDD+ debate, makes them key members of the GCF 
itself. But, as of early 2015, the sub-national partnership calls 27 other states and 
provinces as members. Topically and conceptually, the broader GCF network offers an 
obvious stepping-stone from the material developed here. I had hoped to incorporate a 
number of more cases but for the methodological constraints of thick description was 
forced to leave them out.  
The third party to the MOU, Acre, offers a stark case to Chiapas. In 2012, the 
state received the first performance-based payments from Germany’s REDD+ Early 
Movers Programme. Over four years the programme agreed to pay Acre around US$25 
million to retire carbon offsets. Here I can only touch on the difference between Chiapas, 
which failed to secure independent sub-national carbon authority, and Acre, which 
proved critical to carving out such a space. Acre was not without its own controversies, in 
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particular, over potential conflicts between indigenous rights and local projects rolled into 
the program. 
But, whereas Chiapas, with the backing of conservation groups, folded itself into 
Mexico’s national REDD+ strategy, Acre established sub-national solidarity with other 
states in Brazil, including those that also counted themselves as members of the GCF. 
Individuals working in SEMAHN later reflected that a stronger state strategy from the 
start would have done more to establish early state-to-state ties between Chiapas and 
other Mexican states developing their own REDD+ policies, namely Campeche, Yucatan, 
and Oaxaca. 
Brazilian states actually did so, forming a sub-national coalition actively drew a 
line between their own efforts and national-level REDD+ policy in Brazil. These states 
elaborated sub-national jurisdictional REDD+ through technical arguments tailored to the 
Brazilian policy situation called U-REDD, which presented a coherent alternative 
preferred to the national REDD+ strategy being developed by central authorities in 
Brazil. The sub-national solidarity and cogent technical arguments have gained the 
Brazilian states increasing attention internationally. And California, which has had little 
to say about Chiapas, has grown more confident in Acre, its Brazilian partner, and the 
sub-national governing innovations underway in Brazil, in 2015 signing onto the Rio 
Branco Declaration. 
All have more than simply the GCF in common. As weighty as these issues are, 
they manifest yet more fundamental institutional, epistemic, and constitutional shifts at a 
global scale. In this study, I have waded through these murky and halting efforts as they 
remain scarcely legible to contemporary observers. Ultimately these issues drive deeper 
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than the GCF, REDD+, carbon markets, or even global environmental governance: They 
are worlds struggling to be born. 
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